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A False Start? 
The Impact of Federal Policy 
on the Genotechnology Industry 
Michael J. Malinowski and Maureen A. O'Rourket 
Imponant scientific discoveries in the field of human genetics have been 
reponed in the nation's major newspapers since the beginning of the decade, 
and these discoveries have given rise to a multi-billion dollar industry. Mr. 
Malinowski and Professor 0 'Rourke explore the impact of federal policy on 
the field and the resulting industry. They argue that federal policy in suppon 
of genetics research and development has not been followed by the introduction 
of regulatory and health policy necessary for the efficient and responsible 
commercialization of the industry's products. As a consequence, Mr. 
Malinowski and Professor 0 'Rourke suggest, federal policy may have given 
rise to a ''false stan "for the industry. The authors suggest that, in light of the 
potential impact of genetics products on human health and the societal and 
ethical implications of said technologies, ignoring the policy and regulatory 
questions surrounding genetics products is, at best, i"esponsible. Mr. 
Malinowski and Professor 0 'Rourke identify many of the regulatory 
shoncomings and offer a series of refonns and suggestions to foster the 
responsible commercialization of the fonhcoming generation of genetics 
products. 
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Introduction 
Genotechnology is the subset of biotechnology concerned with human 
genetics and associated with the scientific efforts and advances of the Human 
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Genome Project (HGP) . 1 The business of genotechnology is big money, 
applied medicine, and as American in origin as the automobile industry and 
Microsoft. 2 Biotech-related products generated annual sales of m ore than $7 
bi llion in 1993 , approximately $7.7 billion in 1994, and $8.7 billion in 1995.3 
The total market for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) diagnostics is expected to 
exceed $700 million by 19984 and could be m uch greater in the near future.5 
A single successful drug , like Amgen Inc. 's6 anemia-fighting protein, Epogen, 
1. HGP is discussed infra Section II.A. The use of the term "genotechnology" is 
necessitated by the extreme breadth of the term "biotechnology," which has been defined as "any 
process in which organisms, tissues, cells, organelles, or isolated enzymes are used to convert 
biological or other raw materials to products of greater values, as well as the design and use of 
reactors, fermenters, downstream processing, analytical and control equipment associated with 
biological manufacturing processes." Rochelle K. Seide & Frank A. Smith, Intellectual Property 
Protection and Biotechnology, N.Y. ST. B.J., May-June 1995, at 53 (citation omitted). See also 
Thomas E. Lovejoy, Bugs, Plants and Progress, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1995, § 4, at 11 
(highlighting expansion of biotechnology, from environmental bioremediation to genetic 
engineering of organisms). "Biotechnology" and "biotech" are used where necessary for accuracy. 
The authors thank Pat Jones for suggesting this terminology. 
2. The industry's national trade and lobbying association, the Biotechnology Industry 
Organization (BIO), has 520 members in 47 states. G. STEVEN BURILL & KENNETH B. LEE, JR., 
BIOTECH 94: LoNG-TERM v ALUE SHORT-TERM HURDLES l ( 1993) [hereinafter BIOTECH 94] (Ernst 
& Young's eighth annual report on biotech industry). In 1994, 1311 biotech companies were 
located in the United States, while 485 were located in Europe. G. STEVEN BURILL & KENNETH 
B. LEE, JR., BIOTECH 96: PuRSUING SUSTAINABILITY 1, 39 (1995) [hereinafter BIOTECH 96]. The 
Japanese-expected to challenge the United States' accomplishments, outstrip the United States' 
investment in genotech, and even buy out huge numbers of United States companies-have not 
made major investments in the industry nor issued any major product approvals. G. STEVEN 
BURRILL & KENNETH B. LEE, JR., BIOTECH 95: REFORM, REsTRUCTURE, RENEWAL 21 (1994) 
[hereinafter BIOTECH 95]. See generally Robert A. Bohrer, Foreword: lWiat is Biotechnology and 
Why Devote a Law Review Symposium to Biotechnology Law?, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 607, 608 
(1994) ("Outside the United States, .. . biotechnological research and development is being 
performed largely by traditional pharmaceutical and chemical companies either directly or in 
collaboration with United States [genotech companies].") (footnotes omitted). For discussion of 
the possibility that the genotechnology industry might migrate offshore, see BIOTECH 96, supra 
at 56. The biotech industry has more than 30 Food & Drug Administration (FDA)-approved drugs 
on the market as well as 637 approved biotech diagnostics. BIOTECH 94, supra at 35. Just 10 of 
these drugs generated world-wide revenues exceeding $4.5 billion in 1993. BIOTECH 94, supra 
at 30-31. The top 10 money-making drugs for 1995 are identified in A Survey of Biotechnology 
and Genetics, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 25-Mar. 3, 1995, at 8 [hereinafter Survey]. 
3. BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 14; BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 15, 50; BIOTECH 94, 
supra note 2, at 5, 74; see also infra Appendix I (listing genotech drugs approved for market by 
FDA as of March 1995). Product sales for public biotech companies grew by 20% in 1994 and 
21 % in 1995. BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 9; BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 22. 
4. Paul H. Silverman, Commerce and Genetic Diagnostics, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, 
May-June 1995, at Sl6 (Special Supplement). 
5. The huge potential of the gene diagnostic market was demonstrated by a recent survey 
in which 91 % of breast cancer patients' immediate female relatives reported that they would want 
to be tested for genetic predisposition to the disease, were such a test to become availiable. C. 
Lerman et al., Interest in genetic testing among first-degree relatives of breast cancer patients, 
57 AM. J. MED. GEN. 385-92 (1995). 
6. Amgen, based in Thousand Oaks, California, is the largest and most successful biotech 
company in the world. See, e.g. , BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 70. In December 1994, it was one 
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may generate close to $1 billion in revenue per year.7 
Advances in genotechnology have been made considerably faster than 
anticipated a decade ago. 8 The Human Genome Project, an international effort 
to map and sequence the genes on all twenty-three pairs of chromosomes,9 
is advancing m ore rapidly than originally predicted. 10 Innovations in computer 
technology that  enhance the speed and precis ion of research and decrease 
of only six companies awarded a National Medal of Technology by the President and United States 
Department of Commerce. 
7. Terry McDermott, The Rarest Thing on &rth: The Story of an Elusive Blood Hormone, 
A Determined Group of Seattle Researchers and Biotechnology's Power and Promise, SEA TILE 
TIMES, Dec. 18, 1994, at Al.  Epogen, a hormone responsible for stimulating red blood cell 
production which was isolated almost one decade ago, has been on the market for five years. Id. 
Although the total amount produced and sold could fit within a bucket, epogen has generated $5 
billion in sales. Id. ; cf. Lawrence M. Fisher, Biotech Discovery Announced IJy Firms, DAILY NEWS 
OF L.A., June 17 , 1994, at B3 (two genotech drugs, Erythropoietin and Granulocyte Colony 
Stimulating Factor, which stimulate red and white blood cell production respectively, have each 
generated more than $1 billion in sales worldwide, making them the most successful genotech 
products to date). 
8. The following is a time-line of major discoveries and advances: 
1953 James Watson and Francis Crick discover DNA's structure; 
1966 Scientists elucidate the functional structure of genes-that they consist of groups of 
three molecules, located in strands of DNA, which provide the code for particular 
amino acids, the building blocks of proteins (see infra Section 1.1); 
1973 Stanford researchers are the first to clone genes; 
1975 Harvard researchers are the first to isolate and clone a mammalian gene (a 
component of hemoglobin in rabbits); 
1977 A human gene is cloned for the first time; 
1988 Congress funds Human Genome Project (HGP); 
FDA enacts accelerated regulatory process for products combatting terminal disease; 
1989 A cystic fibrosis gene is identified and identification of other genes immediately 
follows; 
1990 Work on the Human Genome Project, a commitment of $3 billion over 15 years, 
commences; 
Dr. Venter introduces a method for sequencing human genes and distinguishing 
genes (just 3 % of DNA) from junk DNA; First human gene therapy is introduced; 
1992 Dr. Venter leaves NilI to set up The Institute for Genetic Research (TIGR); 
Several thousand gene sequences are identified, and NIH files patent applications 
for them-thereby igniting international controversy; 
1994 Merck supports a massive sequencing effort at Washington University; 
1995 An estimated 85-90% of human genes are partially sequenced. 
BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 60; John Carey, The Gene Kings, Bus. WK., May 8, 1995, at 72, 
73. For an excellent overview of the accomplishments and health care potential of 
genotech, see Survey, supra note 2. Many of the incredible possibilities that may be realized in 
the near future are di
_
scuss�d in Gene Bylinsky, Genetics: The Money Rush is On, FORTUNE, May 
30, 1994, at 94. Insights mto the mechanisms behind human cancers, obtained in part through 
genotech, are explained in Webster K. Cavenee & Raymond L. White, The Genetic Basis of 
Cancer, SCI. AM., Mar. 1995, at 72. 
9. JOS EPHLEVINE&DAVIDSUZUICI, THESECRETOFLIFE30-31 (1993); see infra Section 
II.A. 
10. See, e.g., Positional Cloning Approach Expedites Gene Hunts, HUM. GENOME NEWS, 
Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 1-2 ; U.S. Human Genome Project Updates Goals, HUM. GENOMENEWs, Nov. 
1993, at 1. 
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The promise , possibilities, and challenges of the genotech industry are 
many times greater than what is  readily visible.12 There are at least 5000 
genetically-related diseases and conditions for which there are no cures.13 
Genotech-based advances in human health care will be as profound as those 
associated with anesthesia and antibiotics;14 some may prove even more 
profound. 15 Diagnostics that identify faulty genetic sequences associated with 
cancers and other common diseases and therapeutics that counteract 
predispositions for disease should be available by the end of this century or 
early in the next, thereby injecting multiple billions of dollars into the 
industry. 16 
The business of genotechnology is built upon an idiosyncratic collection 
of alliances between academics, venture capitalists, for-profit and not-for-profit 
institutions , large federal agencies, multi-national pharmaceutical companies 
(pharmas), and small, entrepreneurial firms. While the accomplishments of the 
genotech industry are largely attributable to the private sector and academia, 
the federal government has deliberately and extensively fostered the industry's 
growth in an effort to improve the nation's health care capability. As discussed 
in detail in Section II, federal policy has played an important role in the 
unprecedented advances in the science of genotech and the almost immediate 
emergence of a genotech industry characterized by commercial alliances 
between the public and private sectors. 
Unfortunately , federal policy regarding genotech has been grossly short­
sighted. Rapid advances in genotech research and product development have 
not been accompanied by the legal and regulatory advancements necessary for 
responsible commercialization of genotechnologies. For example, the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) and Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) have 
1 1 .  See, e.g., Ralph T. King Jr. ,  Gene Machines: An Eclectic Scientist Gives Biotechnology 
a Fast Assembly Line, WALL ST. J., May 30, 1995, at Al, AS; Positional Cloning Approach 
Expedites Gene Hunts, supra note 10, at 1-2. 
12. See generally BIOTECH 96, supra note 2 (phanna and genotech company contributions 
to human health have been profound); THE BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, INC., THE 
CONTRIBUTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES: WHAT'S AT ST AKE FOR AMERICA 65-67 (Sept. 
1993) ("Biotechnology is a breakthrough in biological understanding that will eventually lead to 
a revolution in available disease treatments .") .  
13 .  Ralph Oman, Biotech Patenting Issues Raise Ethical Concerns, NAT'L L.J., May 8, 
1995, at C42, C42. 
14. See Lissa Morgenthaler, Just What the Doctor Ordered, BARRON'S, Sept. 20, 1993, 
at 10 ("Some scientists have hailed gene therapy . . .  as the fourth great advance in health care, 
after sanitation, anesthesia and pharmaceuticals.").  
15 .  See generally infra Section I. A. (addressing the status and importance of the industry). 
16. See Carey, supra note 8, at 72, 78. But see Christine Gorman, Has Gene Therapy 
Stalled?, TIME, Oct. 9, 1 995, at 62-63 (noting that while gene therapy holds extraordinary 
promise, enthusiasm and financial pressures may have caused a premature push to market that 
is sacrificing basic science and human safety for a quick return on investment). 
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begun only recently to adapt their review processes in a meaningful way to 
account for the unique risks and potentials for profit of genotechnologies. 
Neither state nor federal policymakers have acted to ensure that genotech 
commercialization proceeds responsibly within an appropriate regulatory and 
ethical framework. This failure, among other things, has allowed some 
commercial and academic laboratories to bypass regulatory and ethical quality 
controls in their efforts to commercialize gene tests predicting future health 
risks.17 
The absence of a coherent and comprehensive federal policy has widened 
the gap between genotech' s scientific and medical advances and the regulatory 
and legal mechanisms needed to ensure that genotechnologies are made 
available quickly and used responsibly and safely. The end result is an industry 
built upon inflated short-term expectations and subject to extremely variable 
investment cycles. As a result, financially vulnerable firms are rushing to 
commercialize emerging HGP technologies. Critics allege that scientific 
judgment is being sacrificed for quick profits. 
The lack of an appropriate legal and regulatory infrastructure has created 
a growing danger that public misunderstandings of the genotechnologies and 
a few widely publicized failures could result in stop-gap policymaking rather 
than policymaking based on a thoughtful assessment of the risks and potential 
posed by genotech. This danger is increasing as more commercial applications 
of genotech are introduced into the healthcare market. 
This Article will first present an overview of the genotech industry and 
how federal policy has shaped and continues to influence the science and 
business of genotech. Section I provides a brief summary of the basic scientific 
foundations and medical applications of genotech and discusses the nature of 
the industry. Section II describes the federal government's past and present 
involvement in the industry. 
Section III proposes policy changes that would promote the government's 
interests in genotech development, yet take into consideration the risks and 
ethical issues presented by these novel technologies.18 We suggest that the 
federal government has been too hasty and short-sighted in its support of the 
17. Such was the conclusion reached by an HGP task force in a report released at the 
October 1995 annual meeting of the American Society of Human Genetics. Richard Saltus, Survey 
of Labs, New Tests Concerns Genetics Specialists, BoSTON GLOBE, Oct. 28, 1995, at 14. In a 
report issued in early 1995, the Institute of Medicine's Committee on Assessing Genetic Risks 
conc!uded that as gen�tic screening becomes more widespread, public policy needs may quite 
possibly outrun the ethical and regulatory standards in place. See ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS 247-
82 (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994). 
18. Many of the serious implications of these technologies are identified and mentioned 
briefly throughout this Article, but are not fully explored; one of the most obvious is who will 
pay for patient use of the technologies. Such questions require comprehensive and careful 
treatment, both by policymakers and scholars, which is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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industry, thereby giving rise to a "false start" for the genotech industry .19 
While federal policy has facilitated the accelerating scientific accomplishments 
of the industry, policymakers and drug regulators have begun only recently 
to respond to the novelty of genotechnologies and the unique issues they raise. 
The delay is underscored by the fact that the advancement of genotechnology 
and many of these issues have been foreseeable for years. 
Section III also addresses another aspect of this "false start." Ironically, 
in the absence of the legal and regulatory infrastructure necessary to 
commercialize genotechnologies, the scientific success of HGP is escalating 
the potential for irresponsible applications of genotechnologies and reactionary 
public policymaking. lnvestors in genotechnology have lofty expectations, but 
are notoriously short-sighted and jittery. The absence of policymaking 
addressing the social and ethical implications of genotech capabilities is 
becoming more ominous as those capabilities continue to advance and expand, 
and genotech-based products reach commerce. Without the appropriate legal 
and regulatory infrastructure, the overall impact of federal policy on the 
genotech industry may be to delay and impede the marketing of genotech 
diagnostics and therapeutics, thereby defeating the central objective of HGP. 
We do not propose that genotechnologies be made generally available before 
adequate policy safeguards are in place and the efficacy of the technologies 
is fully evaluated. We do, however, suggest that any regulatory policies that 
slow the availability of these technologies should be carefully and deliberately 
considered and implemented. A central premise of this Article is that delaying 
the introduction of genotechnologies due to lack of reasoned policy decisions 
is irresponsible. 
Accordingly, Section III sets forth proposals to improve federal policy. 
It focuses primarily on two things: (1) creating a more certain legal 
environment to reduce investment volatility; and (2) adjusting federal processes 
to encourage efficient yet prudent review of genotechnologies, with the hope 
that these proposals will help to bring genotech products to market in a manner 
that is both timely and responsible. 
I. The Accomplishments and Promise of Genotechnology 
It is no coincidence that the great majority of the world's genotech 
companies are located within the United States.20 As discussed below, 
although the industry's accomplishments are very much attributable to private 
enterprise and academic excellence, the United States government has been 
19. Cf. Gorman, supra note 16, at 62-63 (suggesting that the rush to develop and 
commercialize gene therapies may have misdirected efforts away from necessary, basic scientific 
research). 
20. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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deliberately fostering the underlying science and growth of the genotech 
industry. As a result, the industry, although perhaps still nascent in terms of 
actual commercialization of diagnostics and therapeutics, has attained a 
substantial domestic and international presence within a remarkably brief 
period of time. 21 For example, Genentech, Inc., one of the most successful 
genotech companies to date, was founded in 1976 with a $1000 investment.22 
In 1994, the company generated $795.4 million in revenue.23 
The genotech industry has realized the vast majority of its 
accomplishments within just the last five years. Consider that five years ago, 
less than five percent of all human genes had been identified. Now, DNA 
sequences representing parts of eighty-five to ninety percent of all genes have 
been identified, and the scientific community is rapidly matching these 
sequences to gene functions. 24 The following is a discussion of the present 
importance of the industry and the federal policy that has contributed to the 
industry's accomplishments. 
A. The Science and Medicine of Genotech 
Medical science is moving from a century dominated by physical science 
into one dominated by biological science. 25 Health care and drug development 
are undergoing a fundamental change in methodology. In the past, medical care 
was generally directed towards immunizing against disease and suppressing 
the symptoms of those diseases that could not be prevented. Now, however, 
medical researchers are attempting to understand the biochemical intricacies 
which cause health conditions. 26 As they come to understand the biochemical 
functions of genes, scientists will be able to identify and correct the specific 
defects that cause illnesses. 27 Thus, rather than just treating or supressing 
21. Id. 
22. McDermott, supra note 7, at Al. 
23. Steve Ginsberg, Genentech Buys Chevron Umd for Expansion, SAN. FRAN. Bus. 
TIMES, Sept. 22, 1995, at 6. In the third quarter of 1995, Genentech generated $40.2 million in 
profit, compared to $33.6 million in the third quarter of 1994. Third-Quarter 1995 Profits/or 711 
Companies, WA LL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1995, at AS. 
24. Carey, supra note 8, at 73. However, less than 5% of the genetic code has been 
sequenced fully, meaning that the precise nucleotide composition of more than 95 % of the human 
genome is yet to be determined. Mariette DiChristina, Unraveling the Mystery of Life, BoSTONIA, 
Fall 1995, at 16. 
25. See generally BoSTON CONSULTING GROUP, INC., supra note 12, at 65. 
26. This emphasis on fully understanding and influencing the impact of biochemistry on 
human health has been coined "Darwinian" or "evolutionary" medicine. See Terry McDermott, 
Darwinian Medicine: It's a War Out There and Margie Poifet, a Leading Theorist in a New 
Science, Thinks the Human Body Does Some Pretty Weird Things, SEATTLE TIMES, July 31, 1994, 
at 10. 
27. See Craig W. Johnson, Recent Developments in Venture Capital Financing for 
Biotechnology Companies, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, BIOTECHNOLOGY: Bus., L. AND 
REG., Nov. 18, 1993 , available in WESTLAW, C886 ALl-ABA l,  4. ("[A]s the collective 
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symptoms, the genotech industry aims to identify and attack the root causes 
of disease. 
Medical applications of genotech are already moving rapidly towards the 
healthcare marketplace. Biotech-related investigative new drug applications 
(INDs) now represent forty-five percent of all INDs. 28 Approximately 2000 
biologically-derived drugs are in developmental stages and over 494 products 
are in human clinical trials, the last prerequisite for seeking full marketing 
approval from the FDA. 29 Approximately 120 of these drugs are in Phase III 
advanced clinical trials, a stage reached by fewer than twenty percent of all 
drugs entering human trials. 30 Genotech products are likely to reach market 
quickly over the next several years because multinational pharmaceuticals have 
recently begun investing money and other resources into genotech 
companies,31 which in turn has helped renew investor confidence in the 
industry. 32 
1 .  The Science of Genotech 
The human body consists of an estimated 60 to 100 trillion cells, each 
of which, with a few exceptions, has a full complement of twenty-three pairs 
of chromosomes containing 60,000 to 100,000 genes.33 In terms of scale, if 
the human cell is equated to the earth, then the cell's nucleus is the equivalent 
of a continent, each chromosome the equivalent of a state, individual molecules 
of chromosomal DNA the equivalents of cities, genes the equivalents of 
understanding of the body's chemical mechanisms becomes clearer (the human genome project 
is an example), new approaches to drug development to promote or retard these mechanisms for 
therapeutic purposes becomes more obvious. ") The accomplishments of the genotech industry also 
have redirected the course of the research and development efforts of pharmaceutical companies. 
See Carey, supra note 8, at 76-77 (noting that, whereas drugmakers have had to test thousands 
of chemicals to find one that alleviates a particular medical symptom, they now have begun to 
understand the underlying biology and as a result narrow their research to find proteins or other 
molecules that block or activate particular biochemical pathways). 
28. BIOTECH 94, supra note 2, at 38. 
29. BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 23 (relying upon Goldman Sachs data); Swiss Betting 
Big On Biotechnology, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 30, 1995, at Bl. 
30. BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 23-24. The drug-approval process is discussed infra at 
Section II.D. l .  
31. Bylinsky, supra note 8 ,  at 95, 108; Lawrence M. Fisher, Gene Project is Already Big 
Business Pro.fit Potential Heavily Based on Public Research, SAN JosE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 30, 
1994, at 9A (expecting products to be in the marketplace by 1998-99). 
32. Ellie McCormack, Biotech Stocks Regain Health: Share Prices are Rising Amid Flood 
of Secondary Offerings, BOSTON Bus. J. , Aug. 18-24, 1995, at 1, 28; see also BIOTECH 96, supra 
note 2, at 9-10. 
33. LEVINE & SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 67; Michael Kirby, The Human Genome 
Project-Promise and Problems, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y I, 8 (Fall 1994); Carey, 
supra note 8 ,  at 74. But see LEVINE & SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 67 ("[T]he of�-quoted es�im�tes 
of 100,000 genes are relatively arbitrary, and may well understate our geneuc complexity. ). 
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specific streets, and the nucleotides of which the genes are comprised the 
equivalents of houses on those streets. 34 • 
Each gene is a unique sequence of DNA that, when active, encodes a 
protein or protein fragment. 35• Each .
protein, in tu�n, consists ?f �6 uniq�e 
combination of the twenty ammo acids that comprise all protems. While 
each cell contains the entire complement of an individual's chromosomes, 
different genes are active in different cell types and at different times, so cells 
differ in protein content and perform different functions. 37 This great variety 
of composition and distribution allows proteins to perform the extraordinary 
assortment of tasks that together give living organisms their structural forms 
and capacities for action. 
A person's visible characteristics (his or her "phenotype") are thus 
controlled by his or her genetic makeup ("genotype") and environmental 
factors. 38 By instructing cells how and when to make proteins, genes help 
determine, for example, whether we are tall or short, good at hitting home 
runs, predisposed to developing colon or breast cancer, likely to produce 
healthy children, 39 or destined to be stricken with Huntington's disease. 40 
Scientists can map the chromosomes-that is, identify where genes are situated 
precisely within the universe of the human genome-because each gene 
occupies a particular spot on a particular chromosome.41 Recently and for the 
first time, scientists deciphered the entire DNA sequence-a chain of 
1,830,121 DNA bases-of a living organism, Hemophilus influenza.42 The 
long-term objective of HGP is to do the same for the human body. 43 Scientists 
have already sequenced fragments of eighty-five to ninety percent of the 
34. This analogy, although slightly altered, is borrowed from Bylinsky, supra note 8, at 
%. 
35. The DNA of the 23 pairs of chromosomes is made up of about 3 billion nucleotide 
pairs, of which only about 3% are thought to comprise genes. LEVINE & SUZUKI, supra note 9, 
at 18, 28; Bylinsky, supra note 8, at 100; Carey, supra note 8, at 74-75. Each nucleotide contains 
one of four elements (or "bases") that comprise the fundamental four-letter molecular code. 
LEVINE& SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 18-19. Even a small gene contains 3,000 base pairs, and genes 
can be much larger. Id. at 18. 
36. LEVINE & SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 19; Christopher A. Michaels, Biotechnology and 
the Requirement for Utility in Patent Law, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 247 250 
(1994). 
, 
37. LEVINE & SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 11, 64-66. 
38. See, e.g., id. at 220-251. 
39. For a discussion of prenatal genetic screening and related ethical issues see Michael 
J · Malinowski, Coming Into Being: Law, Ethics, and the Practice of Prenatal Generlc Screening 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1435 (1994). 
' 
40. Seide & Smith, supra note I, at 53-54; Carey, supra note 8, at 72. 
41. O�an: supra note 13, at C42; see also LEVINE & SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 28-29. 42. Scientists Decode a DNA Sequence, BosTON GLOBE, May 26, 1995, at 10. 
" 
43. L�VINE & SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 30-31; see also Carey, supra note 8, at 77 ( . Experf:8 believe a database of all human genes must be laden with clues to previously unknown b1ochem1cal pathways that could be manipulated to treat or prevent the disease."). 
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estimated 100,000 genes.44 It is virtually certain that researchers will have 
sequenced all human genes and know the amino acid composition of all human 
proteins by the year 2010. 45 
Mapping and sequencing genes is frequently only the beginning of a 
researcher's task, as is underscored by the fact that the human and chimpanzee 
genomes differ in DNA content by only about 1.5 percent.46 The real 
challenge is identifying what genes do and how they contribute to phenotypic 
characteristics, especially those associated with disease.47 Generally, scientists 
must determine what protein(s) a gene sequence (or combination of sequences) 
encodes and then identify and trace the gene's role in cellular processes.48 
The task is even more difficult when the subject of research is a condition, like 
asthma or diabetes, that may result from multiple gene defects on more than 
one chromosome.49 
Nonetheless, scientists have already identified genetic defects associated 
with approximately 200 conditions, including Huntington's disease, cystic 
fibrosis, several cancers, and Alzheimer's disease.50 In just the last six 
months, scientists have isolated and confirmed genetic links to obesity in 
mice, 51 found an inherited genetic mutation in humans that appears to cause 
44. Carey, supra note 8, at 74. 
45. See Survey, supra note 2, at S4 ("It is entirely conceivable that, by the end of the 
century, scientists will know the true names [sequences] of all the proteins the human body uses; 
it is inconceivable that the names should not be known by 2010 . ... Once all the genes have been 
cloned, the raw stuff of all human inheritance will be laid bare. The implications of 
that go far beyond the fortunes of a bunch of biotechnology companies."). 
46. Bylinsky, supra note 8, at 96. Even fruit flies make proteins that are identical or 
similar to those made by human genes. Id. The genetic simililarities between humans, 
chimpanzees, and fruit flies suggest just how subtle, complex, and difficult to uncover are the 
connections between genotype and phenotype. Yet interspecies genetic similarities are essential 
to the study of human genetics. See generally LEVINE & SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 2 1-33. The vast 
majority of the techniques used in genotech research were developed for research on bacteria and 
viruses. Id. 
47. For examples of how such puzzles have been solved by researchers, see, for example, 
Survey, supra note 2, at S6; McDermott, supra note 7, at Al. 
48. See, e.g., Bylinsky, supra note 8, at 99-101. 
49. Such conditions are termed "polygenic" or "multifactorial." Id. at 100; Malinowski, 
supra note 39, at 1440. 
50. Morgenthaler, supra note 14, at 1 1; Richard Saltus, Early Alzheimer's: Do You Want 
to Know?, BOSTON GLOBE, July 3, 1995, at 39, 43 [hereinafter Saltus, Do You Want to Know?]. 
Researchers have identified a gene that causes a form of early-onset, familial Alzheimer's thought 
to afflict approximately 200,000 of the four million who have Alzheimer's. Richard Saltus, Gene 
that Causes Early Alzheimer's is Reported Found, BoSTON GLOBE, June 29, 1995, at 1, 17. The 
most common form of Alzheimer's, which accounts for about 85% of all cases, is believed to 
result from a combination of genetic predispositions and environmental factors. Id.; Saltus, Do 
You Want to Know?, supra. 
51. Richard Saltus, Weight Loss Hormone Reported, BoSTON GLOBE, July 27, 1995, at 
I, 10. Scientists isolated a hormone, called "Ieptin" and produced by an "obesity" gene identified 
last year, that controls obesity in both "obesity"-mutant and normal mice. Id. Researchers also 
identified a second gene, "tub," associated with obesity in mice. Id. Some scientists are skeptical, 
however, that the discovery of these genes in mice will result in products for people any time 
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a propensity for adult-onset diabetes and obesity ,52 and shown that a gene 
thought to be involved in Alzheimer's disease may serve as a marker for life 
expectancy. 53 Furthermore, discoveries from research targeting specific 
diseases and conditions are elucidating entirely different diseases and 
conditions. The search for a vaccine against HIV, for example, may benefit 
cancer and tuberculosis patients;54 deadly microbes like the Ebola virus may 
eventually be defeated by means of discoveries made in work on other viral 
systems.55 
2. Transforming Science into Diagnostics and Therapeutics 
The genotech industry has come a long way since the introduction of the 
first medical genotech product, a version of insulin. 56 The most important 
contribution from the patient perspective is the advent of gene therapy. 57 Gene 
therapy, 58 albeit still in nascent form, is a reality which has been in existence 
since 1990.59 In fact, as of 1993, well over 100 gene therapy procedures had 
soon. See Richard Saltus, Some Scientists Skeptical of a Cure, BOSTON GLOBE, July 28, 1995, 
at 3. 
52. Alison Bass, Genetic Mutation, Obesity: A New Link Area ls Relaled to Inadequate 
Calorie Burning, BoSTON GLOBE, Aug. IO, 1995, at 4. 
53. Jerry E. Bishop, A Gene Gives a Hint Of How Long a Person Might Hope to Live, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 1995, at 1, 14. 
54. Many therapeutic vaccines are being tested in people with AIDS and, if successful, 
could lead to treatments for other viral infections, cancer, and a variety of immune deficiencies. 
See Aids Vaccine Effort Offers Unseen Benefits, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar.21, 1993, at G7. 
However, several clinical studies of vaccines have had very dissappointing results. See, e.g., John 
Crewdson, Hope Fades for AIDS Vaccine Soon: Results of Tests Dissappointing, CHICAGO 
TRIBUNE, Nov.12, 1995, at 1 (prospects for AIDS vaccine by turn of century dimmed further after 
failure of gpl20 vaccine to protect high-risk volunteers from contracting IIlV; researchers' 
estimates of when a successful vaccine will be found range from five to 25 years). There is also 
concern that the experimental vaccine will be ineffective against other strains of IIlV which have 
slightly altered surface proteins. Carey, supra note 8, at 77. 
55. An outbreak of the Ebola virus killed over 200 people in Zaire earlier this year. 
Science Briefs: Army Joins Hunt for Ebola 's Source, BosTON GLOBE, June 12, 1995, at 29; see 
generally RICHARD PREsTON, THE HOT ZoNE (1994). 
56. Survey, supra note 8, at S5; see generally Appendix I .  
57. See Lawrence M. Fisher, Bottling the Stuff of Dreams, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1995, 
at DI (stating that companies developing these technologies are "edging closer to unlocking the 
therapy's vast potential to correct genetic defects and, in theory at least, treat almost every disease 
known to man"). But see Gorman, supra note 16 (contending that safe and effective gene therapy 
is a Jong way off and quoting the NIH's Dr. Harold Varmus, who is concerned that government 
is not getting its money's worth from its gene therapy investment: "My intuition tells me that we 
need to emphasize more basic aspects of gene therapy research."). 
58. "Gene therapy involves inserting genes into a cell of an individual to compensate for 
a deficiency or to give the cell a new characteristic." Daniel Sutherland, New Area Company 10 
Work on Gene Therapy, WASH. PosT., Mar. 4, 1993, at D12. 
59. Oman, supra note 13, at C42 ("On September 14, 1990, 4-year-old Ashanti 
DeSilva-who had been born without a working immune system resulting from a rare disorder 
called SCID, or sever combined immune deficiency-was given new genes to correct the defect. 
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been approved for and were in clinical trials in the United States and 
Europe. 60 One of the newest products to reach the market, administered 
through inhalers,  is a treatment for cystic fibrosis, a disease afflicting 30,000 
Americans .61 
The general premise of gene therapy is that genes contain the recipes for 
proteins, and defective genes make defective proteins .62 Among the various 
approaches to and technologies associated with gene therapy, 63 one 
methodology (in vivo) is to isolate, purify, and introduce the desired gene into 
the body, and then into cells' genomes , by means of a vector, such as an 
inactive virus with a prowess for penetrating cells ; another approach (ex vivo) 
involves introducing the gene into cells that have been removed from the 
. . .  This was the first time gene therapy had been administered to a human in an attempt to cure 
disease. Ashanti, now eight years old, is able to attend school and lead a normal childhood. ") 
(footnote omitted). In October 1995, scientists declared this first gene therapy a success. See 
Dolores Kong, Study: First Gene Therapy a Success, BosTON GLOBE, Oct. 20, 1995, at 3. 
60. Morgenthaler, supra note 14, at 10. 
6 1 .  Natalie Angier, Gene Therapy Begins for Fatal Lung Disease, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 
1993, at CS (reporting on the therapy);  Marilyn Chase, Genentech 's Cystic Fibrosis Treatment 
is Unanimously Cleared by the FDA Panel, WALL ST. J . ,  Aug. 10, 1993, at B6. The search for 
the cystic fibrosis gene cost $150 million and took three years. John Carey, Gene Hunters Go/or 
Big Score, Bus. WK., Aug. 16, 1993, at 98. Analysts estimate that Genentech's treatment, 
Fyurmean DNase, will generate $300 million in annual revenues by 1996 and up to $500 million 
worldwide; however, Genentech's window of opportunity to recoup its investment may not remain 
open for long: gene therapy has "potential to cure CF, thereby making DNase obsolete." Joan 
Hamilton, A Star Drug is Born, Bus. WK. ,  Aug. 23, 1993, at 66. But see Jerry E. Bishop, 
Biotechnology: . . .  but Trials Deflate Hope for Therapies, WALL ST. J. ,  Sept. 28, 1995, at B l  
(reporting failure of attempt to use genetically engineered common cold virus to insert normal gene 
into CF patients). 
62. See LEVINE & SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 192-93, 195 (gene therapy is human genetic 
engineering aimed at correcting or replacing defective genes); Bylinsky, supra note 8, at 108 
(objective of gene therapy is to introduce new genes into cells to restore production of proteins 
that, when missing or mutated, cause disease); Morgenthaler, supra note 14, at 10 (objective of 
gene therapy is to get the necessary protein to the appropriate sites within cells without the 
problems associated with conventional drugs). 
63 . Carey, supra note 8, at 75. HGS and its affiliates are sequencing DNA fragments 
(called cDNA) from almost all human genes with the objective of establishing a database resource 
for the research and development of therapies. Id. at 76. The data base allows researchers to 
identify human analogs of genes identified in yeast, bacteria, or other research organisms, and 
vice versa. See, e.g. , id. (In December, 1993 , two Johns Hopkins University oncologists "were 
racing to catch up with rivals at Harvard and the University of Vermont in a hunt for the gene 
that, when flawed, causes inherited colon cancer. They suspected that the gene normally fixes 
errors made when cells copy DNA during cell division and had in hand such a gene from yeast. 
So, in what many see as a vindication of the cDNA approach, they agreed to cede product rights 
[to HGS] in return for access to HGS's database. In minutes, they found the human version."). 
Other companies are taking a more focused approach. For example, Myriad Genetics, Sequana, 
Mercator and Millennium are studying families with high incidences of diseases such as diabetes 
and cancer to identify the underlying genetic mechanisms. Id. at 78. Sequana Therapeutics is 
searching family histories and HMO data for genes associated with hypertension, obesity, and 
asthma. Id. at 76. 
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patient and then putting the cells back into the body. 64 Genes may also be 
used, as is now most common, to manufacture proteins in bulk as 
pharmaceutical drugs or other useful compounds to cure human disease. 65 A 
major objective of the industry is to develop an approach to deliver corrective 
genes to the nuclei of cells that is administered, packaged and sold like other 
drugs. 66 The industry's products have been grouped as diagnostics; gene 
therapeutics based upon the introduction of new genes; gene regulators which 
function by replacing command sequences; protein therapeutics which are 
medicinal proteins produced in laboratories ; and small molecule drugs ("bio 
molecules") administered by injecting proteins directly into the blood or in pill 
form, possible because these small molecules are able to pass through the 
stomach lining. 67 
Much of the genotech industry's efforts and the investment of pharmas 
are concentrated on cancer-related drugs. 68 The resulting drugs and diagnostic 
64. See, e. g. , LEVIN E & SUZUKI, supra note 9 ,  at 20 8-1 5; Fisher, supra note 57 , at D I ;  
cf. Bishop supra note 61 (noting failure of cystic fibrosis and muscular dystrophy gene therapy 
experiments); Robert Langreth, Gene-Based Vaccines Ride Directly to Cells on Backs of Bacteria, 
Delivery System Has Promise/or Bringing "Naked DNA " to Hard-to-Reach Organs, W A LL ST. 
J., Oct. 13, 1995, at B3 ("Researchers cautioned that the approach has been tried only in animal 
experiments and it will likely be several years before its potential for use in humans is known. "). 
This virus-delivery approach does, however, carry some risk-both of infecting the patient with 
the virus and of rejection, since viruses tend to trigger the cell's immunity mechanisms. See 
Michael Waldholz, To Fight Disease, Researcher Reforms Cold Virus 's Evil Ways, W A LL ST. J. , 
Jan. 1 8, 1994, at B l. For a discussion of another approach to gene therapy delivery, which makes 
use of liposomes, see J udy Foreman, Gene Therapy System Aims to Restore Youtliful Hair, BoSTON 
GLOB E, June 30, 1995, at 1 ,  4. Liposomes, applied to skin, are able to slip easily through cell 
membranes, and this approach is being used in research on gene therapy to restore youthful hair. 
Id. 
65. Fisher, supra note 57 , at DJ; Oman, supra note 13 , at C42. 
66. See Fisher, supra note 57, at DI (stating that at present most genetic therapies are 
administered ex vivo and the major obstacle is developing the means to administer them in vivo, 
meaning to introduce them into and have them become a lasting part of the cell function). But see 
Bishop, supra note 61. 
67. All of these technologies are discussed in Bylinsky, supra note 8, at 107 -08. The 
technologies are often grouped by the industry into the following areas of concentration: bio 
molecules; drug delivery; drug design; drug development; disease-specific drug discovery ; 
immunotherapy; living cell therapy; monoclonal antibodies ; and proteins. BIO TECH 95,  supra note 
2, at 1 8. 
68. See generally Webster K. Cavenee & Raymond L. White, The Genetic Basis of 
Cancer, SCI. AM., Mar. 1995, at 72-81; James Flanigan, What Ails the Drug Industry Has Little 
to Do With Politics, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 1994, at 72-81. For example, Matritech has sought FDA 
approval for a protein-based bladder cancer test and is developing similar tests for breast, cervical, 
colorectal, and prostate cancers. Maritech Asks FDA to Approve Bladder Cancer Test, NEWS 
RELEASE (Maritrech Corporation), Nov. 9, 1994 . Genentech Inc. and Zymogenetics Corporation 
have announced the discovery of a hormone, thrombopoietin, that stimulates the production of 
blood-clottU:g platelet cells, which are destroyed by chemotherapy and radiation cancer treatments; 
the world-wtde market for the hormone is estimated at $1 billion. Fisher, supra note 7 ,  at B3. 
Immunex Corporation and Genetics Institute Inc. have other platelet-stimulating drugs in clinical 
trials. Id. 
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capabilities are likely to be at the forefront of the forthcoming generation of 
genotech products .69 For example, researchers claim to have found a genetic 
marker for colon cancer, the second leading cause of cancer-related deaths in 
the United States .70 An individual in whom the marker is detected may have 
an astonishing ninety-five percent chance of developing the cancer. 71 
The diagnostic prospects associated with "genotyping" offer perhaps the 
most immediate and significant possibilities. In its simplest form, genotyping 
technology is diagnostic capability. Eventually, it will enable health care 
providers, pharmas , and genotech companies to determine which drugs and 
therapies will work on individual patients-thereby eliminating wasteful drug 
consumption, lost treatment time, unnecessary side effects , and some costs .72 
In an era of reductions in health care financing, pharmas and genotech 
companies will be better able to assess their markets and, therefore, enhance 
their efficiency. 73 The direct implication of this technology for individuals 
is that one's genetic profile "will become an indispensable part of the 
medication [he or she] might be prescribed. "74 Once this genotyping 
technology is fully advanced, health care providers may be able to design drugs 
on demand that are fitted to target each person's biochemical needs.75 
3 .  The Drug-Development Time Lag 
Considering the youth of the genotech industry and the fact that the time­
frame required for an idea to evolve into a marketable drug or other product 
is generally ten or more years , it is extraordinary that an entire generation of 
69. Investors are also seeking out products close to reaching market. See Lisa Eckelbecker, 
Biotech 's Long, Hot Summer, WORC. TEL. & GAZETTE, Sept. 3, 1990, at El,  E2 (stating that 
"biotech investors want products close to market"). 
70. Kirby, supra note 33, at 12. 
71. Id. Recently, scientists determined that tomerase, an enzyme which repairs the ends 
of chromosomes, is active in many cancers, thereby making it a prime R&D target for developers 
of both diagnostics and therapeutics. Scientists Report uimmortality " Enzyme in Many Cancers, 
BoSTON GLOBE, Dec. 23, 1994, at 3. 
72. See Survey, supra note 2, at 1 4. "Pharmocogenetics" is the name given this emerging 
field that seeks to dissect diseases genetically in order to match diagnoses and treatments more 
effectively. Id. 
73. See id. at 1 4-1 5; cf Michael Schrage, Drug Merger Frenzy Dampening Confidence 
in Future, BoSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5, 1 995, at 32 (arguing that the industry offers investment 
opportunities which are being missed). 
74. Schrage, supra note 73 . 
75. Leslie Helm, "Grind and Find " Robots, VDTs May Be the RX for New 
Pharmaceuticals, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1 994, at D 1. The methodology is that, "[f]irst, the objective 
is to find a protein, or 'receptor,' that plays a key role in a disease. Once a receptor is found, 
the task is then to find a compound that will attach itself to the receptor and either disable the 
receptor if it has harmful functions or activate it if it has a positive role. Think of the receptor 
as the lock that must be opened or closed for treatment and the drug as the key that must be 
found. " Id. 
177 
The Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 1 3: 1 63, 1 996 
novel drugs is already visible. Nonetheless, while the underlying science has 
proceeded more quickly than expected, the commercialization of  genotech has 
been much slower and more expensive than anticipated due i n  part to the 
regulatory challenge of obtaining approval from the FDA. 76 Many genotech 
firms and investors may have assumed, incorrectly in retrospect, that the FDA 
would be quicker to approve technologies based on more "natural," 
biologically-derived molecules.77 Firms overlooked the fact that genotech 
products are different than the products that FDA is accustomed to reviewing. 
In other words, what sets genotechnologies apart from traditional technologies 
and gives rise to their potential has held them back during some steps of the 
FDA process. The companies that arrive first at the FDA with proposed 
therapeutics and diagnostics in hand have found that the FDA process, while 
time-consuming, uncertain, and expensive under the best of circumstances, 
may be prohibitively so when applied to truly novel technologies. As 
"firstcomers," these companies bear the burden of designing and proposing 
adequate testing protocols and convincing regulators that both the protocols 
and the resulting data are a dequate. 
Since genotech companies lack established product lines, they must live 
off their capital while attempting to develop products� conduct trials, and get 
products to market. 78 The "burn rate" (the extent to which capital is 
exhausted on research and development (R&D) before profits from products 
are generated) in the genotech industry has been much higher than was 
anticipated in the 1 980s.79 Ernst & Young has estimated that, a s  of late 1 994, 
one-half of the 1 32 publicly held biotech companies did not have enough 
capital to survive two more years.80 During 1 995, the overall survival index 
for the industry dropped from twenty-five months in 1 994 to just sixteen 
months. 81 Such financial pressure has resulted in a race to push products 
through the FDA approval process before bank accounts are depleted, credit 
is tapped, and potential investors have lost interest. 
Although the investment appeal of genotech has returned recently, 82 the 
investment cycles for the industry have been relatively brief and unquestionably 
extreme. 83 Moreover, federal grants for scientific research and d evelopment, 
traditionally a major source of funding for genotech efforts, appear to be at 
76. BIOTECH 96, supra note 2 ,  at 1 1 ;  see also infra notes 2 39-241 and accompanying text. 
77. BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 1 1 .  
78. BIOTECH 95, supra note 2 ,  at 54. 
79. Id. at 30-3l .  
80. Id. at 54. 
8 1 .  BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 15. 
82.  See supra note 32 . 
83. See supra note 78. 
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the top of Congress' budget-cutting agenda. 84 Although it appears that a 
federal trust fund will be established to finance scientific research and NIH 
funding is being spared , there is no guarantee that these funds will escape 
congressional budget cuts in the future. 85 
In part, the problem the genotech industry is facing is familiar, as most 
new industries are confronted with some version of it. But the problem and 
its consequences have been exaggerated and intensified in the context of the 
genotech industry. The virtually unconditional support for genotech research, 
accompanied by international cooperation and competition, have resulted in 
a surge in technological advancement and given rise to a multi-billion-dollar, 
international industry in record time. Early success built tremendous 
expectations, 86 and the result is a hyper-sensitive market especially responsive 
to disappointments. 87 
84. See Troy Goodman, Should the Labs Get Hit?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 6, 
1995, at 83 ("Some of the most sweeping budget cuts considered this year have focused on 
science. "); Charles Petit, Huge Cuts on Horizon For Science: U. S. Spending Could Drop One-
1hird by the Year 2000, S.F. CHRON . ,  Aug. 29, 1995, at A5 (while cuts in science spending 
planned for many other agencies, the budget proposal would increase spending for medical 
research at Nlli); infra Section J.B. 
85. See Petit, supra note 84, at AS. 
86. "In the past, some biotech companies, eager to obtain financing, often made broad 
claims regarding their product's futures-heralding cures for cancer or AIDS, for example. These 
companies often rushed products with large market indications through early clinical development 
and into Phase m in order to reap Wall Street's rewards-too often running into clinical 
disappointments. "  BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 38-39. The impact of such disappointments on 
the value of stock is direct and substantial :  "Stocks like Synergyn, that once traded for as much 
as 60, have sunk to below 5 . . . .  Furthermore, of about 300 biotech companies, only 14 have 
operating earnings. "  Herb Greenberg, Biotech Babble-Is the Worst Finally Over?, S .F. CHRON . , 
July 25, 1994, at D I .  At least one commentator has attributed these inflated expectations to 
genotech CEOs: "That the CEOs of these major biotechnology/pharmaceutical firms have little 
or no relevant scientific training in the technologies that drive their companies may in part account 
for the industry's exaggerated claims and failure to show leadership in research and development. " 
Silverman, supra note 4, at Sl6. An alternative explanation is that "the capital markets were 
operating under the fallacious assumption that, because biotechnology dealt with molecules that 
were natural, biotech's products would be safer than traditional pharmaceuticals and would get 
through the FDA regulatory process faster."  BIOTECH %, supra note 2, at 1 1 .  
87. See Gorman, supra note 16,  at 63; infra Section LB. Consider the investment market's 
reaction to the announcement of Biogen, Inc. ,  one of the first genotech companies to realize 
operating earnings, that it was abandoning development of hirulog, an experimental anticlotting 
drug. (The drug was effective, but cost seventeen times as much as the existing anticlotting drug; 
see also Ronald Rosenberg, Biogen Lost a Drug, Kept its Health, Reputation, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Nov. 20, 1994, at A l -2.)  The company's stock price dropped 25% within a few days of the 
announcement and a flurry of class-action shareholder suits soon followed. See, e.g. , Lazar v .  
Biogen, Inc . ,  et al. ,  No. 94-121 77PBS (D. Mass., filed Nov. 2 ,  1994) (representative of more 
than ten such complaints); Tom Schmitz, High-Tech Heart Drug Gets Tiny Edge in Study, SAN 
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May l ,  1993, at l A  (reporting Genentech's experience with TPA, an anti­
clotting enzyme that is somewhat more effective than an already-commercialized counterpart but 
costs five times as much); cf Ronald Rosenberg, More Woes Ahead for Biotech, BoSTON GLOBE, 
Jan. 3 ,  1 995, at 61 [hereinafter Rosenberg, More Woes] ("In the short history of commercial 
biotechnology, 1 994 will be remembered as one of the bleakest years. Only one new biotechnology 
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When evaluating the industry, the inevitable drug-development time lag 
should not detract from the extraordinary technological accomplishments . 
Within the next year or two , some of the industry's most promising 
technologies will go into production. 88 
B. The Genotechnology Industry: Shifting Alliances and the Impact of 
Federal Policy on Industry Stru.cture 
The remarkable advancement of genotechnology during the last five years 
is attributable to both scientific advances and aggressive entrepreneurialism. 89 
While the genotech industry began as pure science, concentrated in academia 
and aided by federal research grants and technology transfers, a myriad of 
discoveries with commercial potential enabled the industry to attract venture 
capital financing and, more recently, pharma funding. Pharma involvement has 
renewed general investment confidence in the industry, and small, speculative, 
independent genotech firms have largely been replaced by consolidated 
entities . 90 
drug earned Federal Food and Drug Administration approval. "); Daniel Sutherland, Amgen to 
Buy Faltering Synergen for $240 Million, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1994, at DI ("The biotech 
industry . . .  was a favorite for venture capital in the 1980s. But many of the promised products 
have proven far more difficult to make than expected, or have failed tests run by the Food and 
Drug Administration."). 
88. See Tina Cassidy, Biotech the Real Estate Decision, BoSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5, 1995, 
at Al3; supra note 3 1 .  
89. See Michael Malinowski, Bringing Human Genome-Related Biotechnology to Market: 
A Matter of Survival, THE HEALTH LAWYER, Early Spring 1995, at 8, 8.  
90. See BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 22; irifra note 254 (addressing CRO model). 
Organizational strategy has shifted from the original models-fully integrated pharmaceutical 
company (FIPCO) and royalty-based pharmaceutical company (RIPCO)-to fully integrated 
discovery and development organization (FIDDO) model, which means genotech companies 
focusing on drug development and del�gating manufacturing, sales, distribution, and marketing. 
BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 40; Kathleen Day, Experimental Journey, WASH. PoST, Mar. 27, 
1995, at 1 ,  18-19 ("Most companies don't have the illusion anymore that they'll become fully 
integrated, stand-alone pharmaceutical companies that can do everything . . . .  Money is scarce 
out there. ") .  Lawrence M. Fisher, With New Genentech Chief, Science Takes Center Stage, 
N.Y.TIMES, July 12, 1995, at D2 (stating that the ousting of G. Kirk Raab and naming of Arthur 
D .  Levinson as president and chief executive "is a clear signal that first and foremost Roche 
[Holding Ltd.] intends Genentech to be a research and development center, with sales and 
marketing largely handled by the parent company. ") .  The FIDDO model is built upon an alliance 
philosophy, in which the biotech company "could partner with academia for discovery; partner 
with CROs for clinical and preclinical development; partner with pharma companies for marketing, 
distribution, and sales; and even partner with others for manufacturing. "  BIOTECH 95, supra note 
2, at 40. Making genotech companies members of alliances around a shared technology and 
objective (developing and marketing that technology) cuts risks to genotech investors and enhances 
genotech company's attractiveness to investors, though it also restricts their potential for profit. 
See James Flanigan, What Ails the Drug Industry Has Little to Do With Politics, L.A. TIMES, May 
25, 1994, at D l  . ("Drug stocks are declining because market forces are driving the air out of drug 
prices, forcing the pharmaceutical industry into a historic restructuring. Powerful trends in the 
business show that drug companies will continue to merge and consolidate and important drug 
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There has thus been a rapid shift in involvement and contributions from 
the gov�rnm�nt to the private sector. The private sector is now assuming the 
economic nsks and cost'i of developing practical applications of 
genotechnolo
.
gy.  Nevertheless, the
. 
accomplishments of the industry rest upon 
a regulatory mfrastructure supportive of R&D and the direct contributions of 
the federal government, as discussed below in Section II. The end result is an 
industry built upon a conglomeration of complex alliances between the private 
and public sectors-alliances among members of industry, academia, and 
government arranged i n  a staggering number of ways.91 
This entanglement between the public and private sectors has been a 
source of controversy as rights allocation issues at least as complex as the 
underlying all iances are already arising.92 These are the latest in a series of 
ethical and legal issues which have emerged over the course of the industry's 
development. Despite the industry' s  growing significance ,  many of these issues 
remain largely unaddressed. 93 
1 .  The Exodus From Government and Academia to the 
Genotechnology Industry 
From its inception , the genotech industry has been tied closely to 
academia, a traditional source of pure scientific research heavily funded by the 
federal government. 94 What distinguishes genotech from analogous fields is 
the willingness of academics either to enter into joint development agreements 
with genotech firms, or to leave their academic and government posts 
altogether to join existing genotech companies or start their own. Academic 
institutions and teaching hospitals-unwilling to give up affiliations with these 
leaders in the field of genotechnology and miss out on the prestige and 
potential financial gain associated with the genotech industry-also are getting 
directly involved in the researc h ,  development and commercialization of 
research will increasingly be done by smaller biotechnology companies."). Some in the genotech 
industry, such as ImmuLogic, redefined their objectives before the down-tum in investment. S�e 
Hlls and Mlssts/or Biorech Class of '91 . BosTON GLOBE, Oct. 2, 1994, at 84 ("�he Im�uLo�c 
stratqy was different from some other biotcch companies, which eschewed al!1anc�s with. maJOr 
phannaccutical companies, hoping instead to become fully int�grated comparues with their ow_:i 
research, manufacturing and sales forces . " Founder and chairman, Malcolm Gefter, says, I 
watched Gcnentcch, which had huge fixed costs for commercializing their proclu.cts �
nd the� had 
to wait for [Food and Drug Administration) approval and recognized the potential P,1tfalls m �e 
developinc process . . . .  ") .  Leaders in the genotcch industry, however, are buymg up their 
successon. &t BJOTECH 96, S"f'ra note 2. at 7 (Amgen buyin� Synergcn). 
9 1 .  For a good summary or how consortiums may be pieced together, see BIOTECH 96, 
s11pra nocc 2, at 34. . 
92. &t, t. g . . infra note 341 -34.5 and accompanying text (a
ddressmg BRC�l controversy). 
93. lllesc ethical issues arc identified and addressed briefly infra Section ID.D. 
94. Su infra Section 11.C (addressing NIH funding of basic research). 
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genotech-based advances . 
The exodus of genotech researchers from government and academia to 
private industry predates the modern genotech industry. In 1 973 , Herbert 
Boyer and Stanley Cohen were the first to clone genes, accomplishing this 
while working at Stanford University .95 Shortly thereafter, Boyer left and, 
with venture capital provided by Robert Swanson, founded Genentech. 96 This 
pattern-university researchers moving into the private sector or forming 
alliances with genotech firms-was repeated and, with each repetition, the web 
of connections among government, academia and industry became increasingly 
entangled.97 
The trend undoubtedly has been furthered by the federal government's 
fostering of a genotech industry through HGP and its technology transfer 
policy.98 For example, Dr. Craig Venter, working on the government-funded 
HGP at NIH, invented a method for identifying gene sequences , thereby 
igniting the patent controversy discussed below. 99 With this method and $70 
million from venture capitalists in hand, Venter left the NIH in 1 992 and 
founded a not-for-profit research institution, The Institute for Genomic 
Research (TIGR), and a for-profit counterpart, Human Genome Sciences , Inc. 
(HGS), to commercialize TIGR's findings . '00 TIGR and HGS have been busy 
carrying on the work identifying gene sequences which Venter began at the 
NIH, filing thousands of patent applications to protect their findings , and 
developing ways to commercialize them .101 They have compiled an extensive 
database of identified gene sequences and, in September 1995 , opened certain 
parts of this database to academic and government researchers who previously 
had been allowed accesss only if they were willing to give HGS licensing 
95. Carey, supra note 8, at 77. 
96. Joan O'C. Hamilton, Biotech 's First Superstar-Genentech is Becoming a Major­
Leaguer-and Wall Street Loves It, Bus. WK. , Apr. 14, 1986, at 68. 
97. Cf. Johnson, supra note 27, at 6 ("The search for capital has spurred extraordinary 
creativity among biotech companies and their investors in structuring alternative financing 
techniques . . . . ") . 
98. See infra Sections II.A, H.B. I .  
99. Carey, supra note 8 ,  at 74; see also infra notes 198-203 and accompanying text. 
100. Carey, supra note 8, at 76. 
IOI. Id. at 74, 77. The controversy surrounding Venter's career has been summarized as 
follows: 
Depending on one's perspective, Venter and his company typify the ideal link 
between government-supported basic science and the entrepreneurial verve necessary 
for seeing that the fruits of [the] Human Genome Project make their way into the 
medical marketplace. But some scientists are uneasy-ethically and 
professionally-with the idea of their colleagues profiting from the research for 
which the government has paid . . . .  All the work [Venter] produced at the National 
Institutes of Health was published in scientific journals that were available to the 
public, [Venter] . . .  said, and he has had little to do with the financing he has 
received since leaving the government. 
Fisher, supra note 3 1 ,  at 9A . See generally Carey, supra note 8. 
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rights to their discoveries .102 
Revolving doors among academia, government and industry are now 
characteristic of the genotech industry. 103 Examples are plentiful. Millennium 
Pharmaceuticals, co-founded by an MIT professor, employs former 
academics104 and lists the director of the federally funded Whitehead/MIT 
Center for Genomic Research and professors at Rockefeller University and 
Albert Einstein College of Medicine among its founding scientific 
advisors . 105 Chiron Corp. , one of the few remaining integrated genotech 
firms, 106 was founded by three scientists from the University of California at 
Berkeley. 107 Myriad Genetics was co-founded by Walter Gilbert, a Harvard 
University academic, and Darwin Molecular was co-founded by Dr. Leroy 
Hood of the University of Washington. 108 Richard Myers and Dennis 
Drayna, affiliated with the federally funded Genome Center in Palo Alto , 
California, formed Mercator Genetics. 109 Mark Pearson, a member of the 
federally funded HGP's national advisory board, is CEO of Darwin 
Molecular.11° Dr. Ronald G. Crystal,  once extensively involved in in vivo 
gene therapy as a chief scientist at the NIH, is now a founder of and Chief 
Scientific Advisor at Gen Vee. 1 1 1 
This exodus to the private sector and rush to commercialize emerging 
science has generated resentment within the genotech field: 
102. Elyse Tanouye, Biotechnology: Gene Pioneer Opens His Databank . . . , WALL ST. 
J . ,  Sept. 28, 1995, at B l ,  Bl6; see also supra note 63 (discussing use of database by Johns 
Hopkins researchers to identify gene associated with colon cancer); infra note 336 (discussing 
HGS's practice of licensing its database and Merck's efforts to make similar information freely 
accessible). 
103. The revolving door also exists within the genotech industry itself as executives move 
between companies. See, e.g. , Don Clark, Raab Is Named Chairma.n of Shaman, Two Months 
After Genentech Ouster, WALL ST. J . ,  Sept. 14, 1995, at BIO (Former Genentech CEO who 
resigned after Board probe revealed his secret request for $1  million personal loan 
guarantee from Roche Holding, Genentech's majority stockholder, resurfaced as chairman of 
Shaman Pharmaceuticals, a small biotech firm developing drugs from tropical plants .) .  
104. Thomas M. Burton, Eli Lilly Plans Gene-Research Venture With Millennium in Bid 
for New Drugs, WALL ST.J., Oct.24, 1 995, at B6 (Millennium co-founded by Eric Lander, 
professor at MIT's genome center). 
105. Ronald Rosenberg, Biotech Thrives on the Hot Idea, BoSTON GLOBE, Apr. 10, 1994, 
at A77. 
106. See infra Section ill.A (few remaining genotech firms are capable of moving drugs 
from R&D to market without assistance from pharma partner(s)). 
107. Chiron Stock Jumps Amid Merger Talk Rumors: Biotech Firm Confirms It 's Discussing 
Alliance with a Company, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 12, 1 994, at 12D. 
108. Bylinsky, supra note 8, at 95. 
109. Fisher, supra note 101 ,  at 9A. 
1 10. Id. 
1 1 1 .  GenVec Acquires Promising New Gene Therapy Cancer Technology: Exclusive Patents 
Offer Promise for Precise Therapy at Tumor Sites, GENVEC PREss RELEASE (GenVec 
Corporation), Nov. 29, 1 993. 
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The commercial recruitment of leading scientists from publicly 
supported universities and federally backed genome centers has 
stirred professional resentment among some geneticists , who argue 
that the rush to commercialize or patent pieces of the genome 
project will hinder the greater discover_ies that can come when the 
scientific community freely shares its discoveries. 1 12 
This resentment has been displayed in allegations of conflicts of interest 
and professional impropriety . For example, the PTO has a number of 
examiners who formerly worked at the NIH. Those examiners are reviewing 
patent applications from firms with executives and employees who are also 
former NIH employees. This has resulted in allegations of PTO favoritism. 1 13 
Such allegations are likely to increase as more technologies reach commerce 
and individuals begin to realize substantial profits from genotechnologies that 
originated through government research and funding. 
Despite this controversy ,  the trend shows no signs of stopping, or even 
slowing . In fact, final FDA-approval of technologies, recent scientific 
successes with immensely lucrative commercial potential, 1 14 the return of 
market appeal to investors and pharma investment, and the impact of potential 
congressional budget-cutting on publicly-funded research and development are 
likely to cause the exodus to continue and expand. 
2 .  The Prevalence of Alliances 
As discussed below, progressing from genetic discovery to marketable 
drug is a capital-intensive project, often c osting as much as $300-400 million 
and taking ten to twelve years . 1 15 The federal government, through the HGP, 
NIH, and Federal Technology Transfer policy, has been involved in much of 
the basic genotech research . 1 16 Accordingly, alliances between private 
genotech companies and the government, in the form of cooperative research 
and development agreements (CRADAs),  1 17 are long-standing. Also, direct 
involvement from the researchers and scientists whose work has formed the 
basis of the industry is, as a practical matter, often needed b y  companies 
seeking to build commercial entities around such work .  These researchers are 
commonly affiliated with academic institutions, making alliances between 
1 12. Fisher, supra note 101 , at 9A. 
1 13. See infra note 428. 
1 14. E.g . ,  Amgen's discovery of leptin, a hormone found to significantly control obesity 
in mice. See supra note 5 1  and accompanying text. 
1 15. See infra Table I accompanying note 25 1 .  See generally i'!fra Sections 11.D and III .A.  
1 16. See infra Section IL 
1 17. See infra Section 11. B .  l for discussion of CRADAs. 
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genotech companies and academia a natural and necessary development. 1 1 8  
Depending upon the outcome of present and future budget cuts, the most 
prestigious academic institutions and teaching hospitals, which have benefitted 
from federal government largesse and were once too uncomfortable with these 
alliances to engage in them, may pursue genotech companies aggressively on 
behalf of their faculty, staff and patients. 1 19 The commercial success of 
genotech may have the same effect. In fact, beyond shifting some of the cost 
of their faculty's research to genotech companies and investors in those 
companies, royalties from the forthcoming genotech therapeutics and 
diagnostics may be a means for such institutions to offset expected cuts in 
government subsidies. 
Outright alliances between academia and industry are pervasive and 
recently have taken on a more commercial flavor than is customary for 
academics. For example, Harvard University and Genica are working together 
on a potential eye test for Alzheimer 's disease. Pursuant to their agreement, 
Genica receives exclusive rights to market the test while Harvard receives 
royalties on future sales. 120 In 1994, HGS announced a collaboration with 
Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine to research genes identified by 
TIGR and HGS that may play a role in colon cancer. 121 Johns Hopkins 
granted HGS an exclusive license to the results of the project in return for 
access to HGS's gene sequence database. 122 HGS also has over thirty 
agreements with nineteen different research institutions , most of which are 
university affiliated. 123 To compete with HGS in the identification of gene 
sequences, Merck & Co. paid Washington University to sequence 200,000 
gene fragments . 124 Additionally, Amgen is paying MIT $3 million per year 
1 18. Note also that, since academia has traditionally received research funding from the 
federal government, alliances with academia have allowed firms to leverage that government 
funding-an indirect means for firms to obtain government subsidization as opposed to the 
direct funding received by firms under CRADAs. 
1 19. See Travis E. Polling, Financing the Studies: Faced with Stagnant Federal Funding, 
Institutions Seek More Private Contracts, SAN ANTONIO Bus. J . ,  July 2 1 ,  1995, at 15 ("The focus 
of academia tends to be squarely on federal sources when it comes to funding, but locally and 
nationally academic research institutions are having to look beyond Washington, D.C.,  to keep 
their projects funded and researchers busy. "); supra note 1 12 and accompanying text. 
120. Dolores King, Harvard, Biotech Firm Strike Deal, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 1 1 , 1994, 
at 1 .  
121 .  HUMAN GENOME SCIENCES, INC. ,  HUMAN GENOME SCIENCES TO COLLABORATE 
WITH JOHNS HOPKINS MEDICAL SCHOOL ON COLON CANCER RESEARCH (Feb. 28, 1994). 
122. Id. ,· see also supra note 63 (describing Johns Hopkins' efforts to identify cancer 
gene) . 
123. HUMAN GENOME SCIENCES, INC. ,  HUMAN GENOME SCIENCES ANNOUNCES NEW 
AGREEMENTS WITH REsEARCH INSTITUTIONS l (July 2 1 ,  1994). 
124. Carey, supra note 8, at 76; cf. Robert Rosenberg, Genzyme's Plans to Beal 
()_bsolescence, BoSTON GLOBE, Jan. 8,  1995, at 57 (Genzyme working with University of 
Pittsburgh researchers and Dutch genotech firm to develop gene therapy technique). 
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for ten years for rights to some of the school's biological research. 125 
Many of these academia-industry collaborations have taken on the 
appearance of commercial joint ventures. For example, Genetics Institute, Inc. 
(GD and Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine combined to form 
MetaMorphix, Inc . ,  a company focusing on treatments to repair the nervous 
system . 126 GI invested $3 .6 million for a fifty-eight percent share of the 
company, while Johns Hopkins contributed nineteen genes for the remaining 
forty-two percent. 127 Johns Hopkins will receive royalties based upon its 
contribution to a particular product when that product is sold either by GI or 
MetaMorphix. 128 GI has the right to commercialize any discoveries by 
MetaMorphix which MetaMorphix decides not to develop and market 
itself. 129 As observed by one commentator, " [t]raditionally[ , ]  what happens 
with academic centers that have licensing agreements with c ompanies is that 
scientists get small royalties . . . .  In this situation, though, it seems that the 
scientists get more control .  It is an expanded collaboration that goes one step 
beyond the traditional agreement. " 130 
Johns Hopkins also has filed jointly with Integrated Genetics , a division 
of Genzyme Corp. , for a patent to commercialize decoded genetic information 
involved in kidney disease. 131 This alliance was reported in the popular press 
as : 
an example of a trend in biotechnology research, in which 
university scientists team with small biotech companies. Such 
relationships offer long-term financial incentives to universities , 
which stand to make money if products result from the efforts , and 
immediate gain to struggling start-up companies , which are often 
strapped for cash and need additional brainpower. 132 
However, the alliance between Johns Hopkins and Integrated Genetics 
also provides an example of the potential for controversies such as arguments 
over intellectual property rights and questions of divided loyalties , which often 
surround many such agreements . Johns Hopkins and Integrated Genetics relied 
125. Ronald Rosenberg, Amgen to Get Synergen for $240 Million, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 
19, 1994, at 25. 
126. Cathryn J. Prince, Genetics Institute, University Form Baltimore Research Finn, 
BoSTON Bus. J. , May 26-June 1 ,  1995, at 1 1 . 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131.  Mass. Firm, Johns Hopkins Announce Kidney Disease Find, BoSTON GWBE, Apr. 
2, 1995, at 13. 
132. Id. 
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on assistance from a scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory to help them 
understand how the gene's proteins cause adult polycystic kidney disease, yet 
there is no mention of the government scientist's being named on the 
patent. 133 The BRCAl dispute, discussed in Section III .B,  also dramatizes 
the problem of allocating rights when government, academia and industry 
combine to form a product with commercial value. 134 
Additionally, the ethical implications of these collaborations have not 
been explored. Some scientists have expressed concerns that the expectations 
of investors financing genome companies have created and will continue to 
create pressures that scientists are hard-pressed to resist-perhaps resulting in 
overly-optimistic reports on research, if not outright scientific fraud. 135 
Moreover, this investor pressure to generate profits may have skewed the 
course of basic science in the genotechnology field, thereby contributing to a 
"false start" for the industry . Some commentators fear that financial pressures 
are replacing "scientific rigor in determining how and when to use gene 
therapy" and sacrificing basic scientific research and human safety for a quick 
profit as " [ c ]ommercial pressure has . . . pushed scientists to test gene 
treatments on human subjects as early as possible. "136 
Nevertheless, existing alliances are only the beginning. As the genotech 
industry continues to consolidate, 137 genotech firms are investing in other 
genotech firms . 138 The most significant example is the Amgen takeover of 
133.  Id. 
1 34. See, e.g. , King, supra note 120, at 1 (reporting that Genica Pharmaceuticals 
Corporation began marketing a test for a gene that may indicate the risk of Alzheimer's disease, 
even though it had no agreement with Duke University, which conducted the original research); 
infra text accompanying note 341 . 
1 35. Fisher, supra note 101 , at 9A (noting that roles must be clearly defined to avoid 
inherent conflict of interest). 
136. Gorman, supra note 16. 
137. Rosenberg, More Woes, supra note 87, at 61 (noting that 1994 was a bad year for 
biotech with only one drug receiving FDA approval, and that, "[i]n the year ahead, analysts are 
expecting tougher times for weaker biotech firms, including more fire sales of assets and 
technology sales to stronger biotech firms and to large pharmaceutical firms"); Steve Kaufman, 
Bio-Roulette Failures Have Cut the Flow of Funds to Biotech, But Big Rewards Tempt Some 
Investors, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 28, 1994, at ID (" A big shakeout is imminent among 
the industry's 1 , 3 1 1  companies, and it will probably hit venture capital-backed players hardest 
because they are the furthest from introducing products . The best guess among many industry 
insiders is that about half of all companies will be gone within about five years. "). Although this 
trend has not been as extensive thus far as was anticipated, it is expected to continue. See BIOTECH 
96, supra note 2, at 5 (statement of Dr. Arthur D.  Levinson, President and CEO of Genentech, 
Inc.) . As this Article goes to print, the market appeal of genotechnology has largely returned. See 
supra note 32. 
138. Johnson, supra note 27, at 6 ("Corporate investments have . . .  become popular as 
a way for profitable public biotech companies interested in preserving earnings to fund new 
technical opportunities on an 'off balance sheet' basis while retaining marketing rights to the 
developed products . "); see also Clark, supra note 103 (Raab planning to assemble fund to buy 
small biotech firms and consolidate them into a larger company). 
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Synergen for $240 million in 1994. 139 Genentech invested $17 million in 
GenVec140 which, in turn, later merged with Theragen. 141 Other 
companies, including HGS, have a portfolio of deals with other genotech 
firms. 142 
In their efforts to form alliances , genotech companies' attentions have 
shifted to pharmas . 143 Especially during times of low m arket appeal to 
investors , this match seems ideal, enabling genotech firms to leverage existing 
pharma expertise in manufacturing, marketing, and dealing with the FDA and 
other regulatory bodies, both domestic and foreign. 144 Multinational pharmas 
are better positioned than small genotech firms to be aware of and exploit 
comparative m arket advantages such as clinical trials conducted abroad. 
Additionally, pharmas, with their portfolio of products, are more capable of 
absorbing losses when particular products fail, thereby perhaps stabilizing the 
market for genotech companies ' stocks . 145 Finally, pharmas are in need of 
new products as patent expiration dates on many of their major drug products 
are approaching. 146 
Pharmas are investing in the genotech industry in a myriad of ways . 147 
139. Sutherland, supra note 87, at D 1 .  According to a Paine Webber analyst, this takeover 
may have marked the "beginning of the end for the biotech industry as an assortment of small, 
speculative independent companies trying to play David to the drug industry' s  Goliath . . . . " Id. 
140. See GENVEC CORP., GENVEC ACQUIRES PROMISING NEW GENE THERAPY CANCER 
"ECHNOLOGY 1 (Nov. 29, 1993). 
141. GENVEC CORP . , Two GENE THERAPY COMPANIES FINALIZE MERGER (Sept. 6, 
994). 
I 142. See, e. g. , HUMAN GENOME SCIENCES, INC. , HGS AND GENETIC THERAPY FORGE 
]ENE THERAPY COLLABORATION (Sept. 14, 1994); HUMAN GENOME SCIENCES, INC., HGS AND 
GENENTECH TO COLLABORATE (Apr. 20, 1994) . 
143. See generally, BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 49-50 (describing IO most influential 
deals in the industry). Ronald Rosenberg, From Foes to Financiers; BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 24, 
1995 at 89, 92. 
144. See e. g. , Rosenberg, supra note 143. 
145. Id. 
146. Johnson, supra note 27, at 4 (Nov. 18 ,  1993) ("Many large pharmaceutical companies 
have recognized that they need to increase their rate of development of new products and that 
biotechnology is the most promising method to do so. Companies with major products which are 
soon coming off patent (such as Glaxo with Zantac, SmithKline with Tagament and Syntex with 
Naprosyn) are particularly vulnerable and motivated. Their willingness to enter into creative 
collaborative relationships with younger biotech companies has taken a substantial part of the load 
off venture investors in financing young biotech companies from inception to profitability. "). 
147. See generally BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 49-50 (listing 10 most influential deals). 
SmithKline Beecham invested $125 million in HGS for a 7% equity position and rights to 
promising genes. Carey, supra note 8, at 73. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. has invested $5 million 
for an equity position in Darwin Molecular. DARWIN MOLECULAR, CORP . ,  DARWIN SIGNS 
AGREEMENT WITH RHONE-POULENC RORER; COMPLETES FINANCING ROUND (Oct. 4, 1994). 
Hoffman-LaRoche owns 60-percent of Genentech and has invested $70 million in Millennium 
Pharmaceuticals. Survey, supra note 2, at S6; Rosenberg, supra note 105. Eli Lilly paid almost 
$3 million to Myriad Genetics for rights to the BRCAl gene. Bylinsky, supra note 8, at 95. Other 
pharmas are paying genotech firms just for the opportunity to look into their databases. Carey, 
supra note 8, at 76; see also Burton, supra note 104 (Eli Lilly and Millennium Pharmaceuticals 
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The fully-integrated entrepreneurial genotech companies that could both 
discover and produce genotech products are becoming R&D centers dependent 
upon pharmas for drug approval, manufacturing, and international and 
domestic marketing.148 In fact, of the nation's dozen or so major biotech 
companies, only Amgen has been able to remain independent-and rumors 
persist that Amgen is up for sale.149 
It is too soon to tell whether these alliances will bode well for the 
industry . 150 With the return of investment appeal, the genotech industry may 
be less dependent upon pharmas, except to the extent that the return of this 
entering into $50 million joint venture); Lawrence Fisher, Therapy with Genes Gains in 
Credibility, ORANGE Cl'Y. REG., June 4, 1995, at D6 (big drug firms such as Bayer, Rhone­
Poulenc Rorer and Sandoz are investing big money in joint development deals with new 
companies, including Applied Immune Sciences, Somatix Therapy, and Systemix); Gorman, supra 
note 16, at 63 ("The list of recent mergers . . .  reads like a Who's Who of biotechnology: 'Sandoz 
buys Genetics Institute. Chiron buys Viagene. Bristol Myers makes a big investment in Somatrix 
. . .  Rhone-Poulenc invests in Applied Immune Sciences and several other gene-therapy 
companies . " ') ;  Robert Langreth, New Technique for Discovering Medicines Takes Hold, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 1 1 , 1995, at B3 (discussing combinatorial chemistry, a new drug discovery technique 
that allows chemists to speed up development of new substances and is driving pharmas' "new 
round of gobbling up small biotechnology companies, " citing Glaxo Wellcome's acquisition of 
Affymax NV, Marion Merrell Dow's purchase of Selectide, Inc., and Eli Lilly's purchase of 
Sphinx Pharmaceuticals as examples). But see Repligen Says Lilly Is Out O f  Drug-Development 
Pact, WALL ST. J . ,  Sept. 13 ,  1995, at B9 (Eli Lilly backing out of agreement to fund Repligen' s 
development of monoclonal antibodies for inflammatory diseases, after string of setbacks for 
Repligen); Thomas M. Burton and Rhonda L. Rundle, Lilly Gets Out of Biotechnology and 
Medical Diagnostics, WALL ST. J.,  Oct. 2, 1995, at B4 (Eli Lilly selling off biotech assets to 
Beckman Instruments, Inc. at fraction of price it originally paid) . 
148. Rosenberg, More Woes, supra note 87, at 6 1 ;  cf. Day, supra note 90, at 1 8  (blaming 
investors' flight from the industry for driving some biotech companies out of business and forcing 
others to acquiesce to giant pharmaceutical take-overs); Ronald Rosenberg, Repligen Cuts Nearly 
Half its Staff, BoSTON GLOBE, Feb. 15, 1995, at 41-42 (company cut work force by nearly 50% 
and postponed or discontinued promising drug development in desperate attempt to conserve cash) . 
Genotech companies working on the same technologies are merging to eliminate duplication and 
rechannel resources to diversify-"like two people sharing two lottery tickets rather than each 
holding one with perhaps the same numbers. "  Day, supra note 90, at 1 ,  1 8- 19 (citing the sale of 
Crop Genetics International Corp. of Columbia to Biosys Inc. of Palo Alto, California and a 
merger between Oncologix Inc. of Gaithersburg and two Texas firms, Argus Pharmaceuticals Inc. 
and Triplex Pharmaceutical Corp.). See supra note 90; (addressing FIPCO, RIPCO, and FIDDO 
organizational models). 
149. However, Amgen also has a number of deals with pharmas. See BIOTECH %, supra 
note 2, at 49-50 (Amgen partnering with drug firms such as J & J and Roche); cf. Kathleen Day, 
Biotech Company Fills Prescription for Success, WASH. PosT, Aug. 2 1 ,  1995, at 9 ("As health 
care insurers and providers push to contain rising medicinal costs even large drug companies have 
found it hard to remain independent. ") .  Most of the biotech companies' deals have been large and 
narrowly targeted around specific technologies, such as SmithKline Beecham's $125 million deal 
with HGS and Hoffman LaRoche's $70 million deal with Millennium. See Lawrence Fisher, RMne 
Unit Focuses on Gene Drugs, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1994, atD5 (discussing how Rhone-Poulenc 
Rorer has created a new division concentrating on R&D and commercialization of drugs based 
on gene and cell therapies) . 
150. See Gorman, supra note 16, at 63 (noting that pharma investment, while probably 
unavoidable, may premsturely push science out of basic research and into a rush to market). 
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appeal is attributable to pharrna involvement. The genotech industry's alliances 
are a direct result of supportive federal policy. Now, policymaking regarding 
the commercialization of genotechnology must be as direct, responsive, and 
comprehensive as the federal policy promoting genotech R&D .  Section II sets 
forth an overview of federal policy generally, while Section III assesses that 
policy and makes proposals for change. 
II. Federal Financial Support and the Regulation of Genotechnology 
Just as the United States engaged in the Manhattan Project to develop the 
atomic bomb and end World War II, the Apollo Project to beat the Soviets to 
the moon, and the Cold War to deter the use of nuclear weapons, the United 
States has made a deliberate and substantial effort to advance genotech R&D. 
Smith and Kettelberger claim, "Not since the dawn of the atomic age have 
scientists from all over the world sought the same prize . " 15 1  Although the 
primary objective of federal policy presumably has been to improve human 
health, there have been economic returns on the federal government's 
support-as evident from the fact that the genotech industry exists almost 
entirely within the United States' borders . 152 
HGP is the United States' most direct and perhaps most publicized 
statement of support for advancement within the field of genotechnology. In 
fact, the federal government-through the NIH, FDA, and PTO-has had an 
impact on the past and current state of the genotech industry and will also 
shape the industry's future . The following is a discussion of how the United 
States , through these agencies and relevant statutes and regulations, has 
supported the industry . 
A. The Human Genome Project 
HGP is an effort, initiated by Congress in 1 988-89 and commenced in 
1990, to map all twenty-three pairs of human chromosomes. The three primary 
technical goals of the project are to produce ( 1) genetic linkage maps to trace 
inheritance of chromosome regions through pedigrees; (2) physical maps of 
large chromosome regions to enable direct study of DNA structure in search 
of genes; and (3) substantial DNA sequence information, enabling the 
correlation of DNA changes with alterations in biological function.  153 Some 
151 . G. Kenneth Smith & Denise M .  Kettelberger, Patents and the Human Genome 
Project, 22 A.l.P.L.A. Q.J. 27, 39 (1994) (addressing support of various governments for 
protecting and fostering genotech) . 
152. See supra note 2. 
153. Robert M. Cook-Deegan, Origins of the Human Genome Project, 5 RISK: HEALTH, 
SAFErY & ENVIRONMENT 97, 100 (1994). The fact that the overall objective of HGP is to map 
the human genome has generated extensive criticism within the scientific community. "Some 
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350 laboratories throughout the world now are engaged in HGP. 154 Despite 
the elimination of federal programs to fulfill the Republican Congress' 
"Contract with America ," the Project is targeted to receive more than $100 
million in federal funds per year through its completion in 2005, unless it is 
completed sooner. 155 
HGP intentionally seeks to join the commercial and academic sectors to 
exploit the rapidly growing body of knowledge about DNA structure in order 
to generate practical benefits for human health. As discussed above, the result 
has been alliances among academic, not-for-profit, and private individuals and 
entities around specific technologies. Public funds designated for academic 
research and private funds have been commingled-feeding the impression that 
public money is being used for private gain. 156 Critics charge that academic­
industrial alliances will slow or halt the transfer o f  gene mapping and 
sequencing research, adding needless time and money to complete the genome 
sequencing. 157 These are just some of the serious policy and economic isues 
associated with the HGP. 158 Nevertheless, HGP clearly satisfies a cost-benefit 
analysis based on the real dollar investment associated with it. Public funds 
reaching private industry through HGP are trivial in comparison with the 
investment of private industry-$1.5 to $2 billion in 1 987, some three years 
before HGP even commenced. 159 The practical effect of HGP cannot be 
overestimated. HGP is responsible for generating world-wide scientific, 
political, and financial commitment to the field of genotechnology. It has 
spurred scientific advances in the field in record time and thereby created a 
multiplication effect o n  private-sector investment, first from venture capitalists 
and now from pharmas. 160 
critics assess that it would be pr eferabl e to sp end the limited funds availabl e to det ermin e th e 
compl ete structure and function of individual genes of m edical importanc e. " Kirby, supra note 
33, at 8. 
154. Bylinsky, supra note 8, at 100. 
155. Although the monies appropriated to HGP are reviewed annually and subj ect to cuts, 
this sum has increased over the past sev eral years from $ 106 million in 1993, to $108 million in 
1994, to $114 million in 1995. Tel ephone Intervi ew with Sharon Durham, Public Affairs 
Specialist, Nat'! Ctr. for Hum. Genom e Res earch (Aug. 1 ,  1995). Current federal budget-cutting 
efforts are expected to result in a reduction of only $1 million for 1996. Id. ;  see also Victor A. 
McKusick, The Human Genome Project: Plo.ns, Status, and Applications in Biology and Medicine, 
in GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES 18, 22-26 (George J. Annas & Sh erman 
Elias eds., 1992); Jam es D. Watson, The Human Genome Project: Past, Present, and Future, 248 
SCIENCE 44, 46-47 (1990). For an exampl e of how federal grants from DOE and NIH are funding 
the res earch of Genom e Th erap eutics, Inc. of Waltham, Massachus etts, see Ronald Ros enb erg, 
Taking Gene Therapy to the Market, BoSTON GLOBE, J an. 22, 1995, at 80. 
156. See supra Section LB ; Smith & Kettelberg er, supra note 151,  at 50. 
157. Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 151,  at 50. 
158. See infra Section ill. 
159. Rebecca S. Eis enberg, Patenting the Human Genome, 39 EMORY L.J. 721 ,  737-38 
(1990). 
160. See generally supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
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HGP has inspired the European Union and some individual countries to 
finance parallel efforts . 16 1 For example, the United Kingdom committed £15 
million from 1989 to 1992. Several other European countries likewise have 
devoted specific government funds to the project, and Canada has allocated 
$18 million over the next five years . 162 These government funds have been 
supplemented by money from charities, such as the Howard Hughes 
Foundation in the United States and the Welcome Trust in the United 
Kingdom. In addition, the Human Genome Mapping Project administered by 
the Medical Research Council in the United Kingdom, the Science and 
Technology Agency of Japan, and the combination of the French Muscular 
Dystrophy Association, Genethon and le Centre d'Etude du Polymorphisme 
Httmain of France have made direct contributions to the field. 163 HGP also 
has inspired the creation of the Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP), 
a collaborative effort among anthropologists , geneticists, doctors, linguists, and 
scholars throughout the world to document genetic variation within the human 
species. 164 
World-wide efforts in the field of genotechnology are coordinated, albeit 
loosely at times, through two international organizations-HUGO and the 
United Nations Educational, Social , and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 
HUGO, established in 1989 in Geneva, Switzerland, is comprised of an 
international group of scientists and operates by coordination among 
people-rather than nations-in the Project. It claims to be an "enabler" 
instead of a "provider" or rule creator. 165 Although HUGO has no formal 
161 .  Survey, supra note 2, at S9. The efforts of other nations are discussed country-by­
country in Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 15 1 ,  at 50. In order to encourage industry expansion, 
the Senior Advisory Group on Biotechnology (SAGB), which is composed of Europe's biotech 
company leaders, has petitioned the European Union for a change in its regulatory policies. 
BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 15. SAGB has also recommended the creation of a task force with 
a defined mission to confront current obstacles to biotechnology industry growth. The plan would 
include, inter alia, revision of regulatory guidelines; changes in investment policies so as foster 
entrepeneuralism; and greater education funding. Id. But see infra note 213 (describing European 
Parliament's action in vetoing legislation to clarify conditions under which genes may be patented 
in EU). 
162. Kirby, supra note 33, at 9. 
163. Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 151 , at 32-33. 
164. Since January 1994, HGDP has been carried out under the auspices of the Human 
Genome Organization (HUGO) . UNESCO is, at the outset of HGDP, taking care to address ethical 
implications of the collection of DNA samples. See generally, Bartha Maria Knoppers et al ., 
Ethical Issues in International Collaborative Research on the Human Genome: The HGP and the 
HGDP (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). According to Professor Knoppers and her 
colleagues, who are highly regarded for their international perspective, a "macro-ethical" 
framework focu sing on both communities and individuals must be established for both HGDP and 
HGP. Id. at 4. Like HGP, HGDP has generated criticism, including a 1993 commmunique from 
Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI) and a 1993 Declaration on Cultural and 
Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples by MATAATUA. Id. at 6. 
165. Kirby, supra note 33, at 9-10. 
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decision-making powers, its recommendations carry "moral weight. "166 
UNESCO, located in Paris, France, has not been as active as HUGO but it ' 
has succeeded in encouraging regional and national discussions of the ethical 
and legal issues associated with research and advancements in the field of 
genotechnology. 167 
B. Property Rights and Other Market Protections 
The federal government has encouraged investment in genotechnology 
both by directly funding research and by granting property rights and other 
market protections to research results . The government is ( 1) giving 
government-funded R&D to the private sector; (2) granting patent protection 
to the private sector's genotech advances; and (3) protecting specific markets 
for genotech products . 
1 .  Federal Transfer of Technology Policy 
The United States is making scientific contributions and g1vmg 
them-along with the tremendous financial risks accompanying their 
development-to the private sector. The underlying hope is that the private 
sector will commercialize these contributions and, consequently, benefit public 
health . The exercise of existing statutory authority to transfer technology as 
well as provisions in proposed legislation directly tailored to the business of 
genotechnology demonstrate the federal commitment to the industry. 168 
Under the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act169 and the 
Bayh-Dole Act, 170 the United States has given small businesses and nonprofit 
organizations a statutory right to retain title to technology and innovations 
realized through federally-assisted R&D, so long as they are interested in 
patenting and attempting to commercialize this technology . 171 The Bayh-Dole 
Act was expanded in 1984 to apply to not-for-profit government-owned, 
contractor-operated facilities (GOCOs) . 172 Under the Federal Technology 
Transfer Act (FfTA) , enacted i n  1986, those employed by agencies may patent 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 10. 
168. Note that, unless otherwise indicated, federal technology transfer law applies to the 
transfer of all technology, not just that associated with genotech. 
169. Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 231 1  (1980) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701 (1980)) 
(technology innovation/transfer). 
170. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3020 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 202 (1980)); 
see also 35 U.S.C. § 203 ( 1980) (patent rights in inventions made with federal assistance). 
171 . See generally Lawrence Rudolph, Overview of Federal Technology Transfer, 5 RISK: 
HEALTH SAFETY & ENV'T 133, 134 ( 1994). 
1 72. Id. 
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inventions if their agency employer does not intend to do so. The FTTA also 
(1) authorizes cooperative R&D agreements between federal laboratories and 
nonfederal entities; (2) requires royalty sharing with federal employees 
whenever an agency retains ownership of its inventions; and (3) authorizes 
award programs for such employees .  The American Technology Preeminence 
Act of 199 1 173 extended the Stevenson-Wydler Act to agencies within the 
legislative branch. 
On a practical level, the FTT A has created incentives for high tech 
companies to join with the NIH and other government agencies to work 
together on the research and development of new technologies . These 
incentives encourage the creation of biotech firms concentrating on the 
development of new pharmaceuticals . 174 For example, Human Genome 
Sciences, Inc . (HGS), a company formed largely to identify genetic sequences 
and find commercial applications for them, uses a technique developed at the 
NIH to catalogue the chemical sequence of human genes . 175 Likewise, the 
Bayh-Dole Act has permitted universities to retain title to their federally funded 
inventions and to grant licenses for patents arising from inventions . 176 
These policies benefit the genotech industry most obviously through the 
prevalence of cooperative research and development agreements 
(CRADAs)-contractual agreements that create actual privity between federal 
laboratories and private ent1t1es for the development of specific 
technologies .177 Executive Order 12591 , issued in 1987, directed federal 
agencies to encourage cooperative research and technology transfers through 
their laboratories . 178 In 1989, the National Competitiveness Technology 
Transfer Act authorized Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories to enter into 
CRADAs on the same basis as GOCOs. To foster such agreements , the Act 
created a Freedom of Information Act exemption for certain categories of 
173. Pub. L. No. 102-245, 106 Stat. 7 (1992) (also known as the Technology 
Administration Act) . 
174. Day, supra note 90, at 19. 
175. Id. ; see also supra note 102 and infra notes 336 and 382 (discussing HGS and its 
sequencing efforts in more detail). 
176. See also David Warsh, Lab-to-Market Miracle at MIT, BoSTON GLOBE, Oct. 3 1 ,  
1995, at 41 (reporting that universities have been able to supplement federal funds through royalty 
revenues from patent licenses). 
177. See, e. g. , Notice, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,939 (1994) (solicitation by DHH for genotech 
or pharma participant in CRADA for the biomedical use of novel approaches for lentivirus vaccine 
development, with the aims of rapid publication of research results and timely commercialization); 
Notice, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,938 (1994) (solicitation by DHHS and the National Cancer Institutes for 
genotech or phanna participant in CRADA for the biomedical use of novel approaches for IIlV-1 
Vaccine Development) ; see also 37 C.F.R. § 401 . 1-. 16 (1987) (recognizing rights to inventions 
made by not-for-profit organizations and small business firms under government grants and 
cooperative agreements) . 
178. Special assessments and intellectual property protection must be considered when 
negotiating with foreign individuals and governments . 
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information derived during the resulting cooperative research. Moreover, all 
federal agencies are "taxed" to support the Federal Laboratory Consortium, 
an interagency group which helps to resolve technology transfer issues raised 
between government agencies , as well as CRADAs . 179 
The NIH180 and DOE, 181 two of the three major institutions funding 
the HGP182 have made extensive use of their authority to enter into CRADAs 
with the private sector, thereby advancing genotechnology in the field of 
human genetics .  183 DOE laboratories have entered into over 300 CRADAs 
while the NIH Office of Technology Transfer encourages and licenses the 
development of technology at its GOCO laboratories . 1 84 Moreover, DOE and 
NIH foster technology transfers by actively seeking applicants for Small 
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) grants . 185 
CRADAs have been criticized for, among other things, allegedly creating 
an unfair advantage for former government researchers both directly and 
through added responsiveness at the regulatory (PTO, NIH and FDA) 
levels . 186 Private firms also have alleged that they have less influence than 
179. Day, supra note 90, at 19.  Currently, there is a revived proposal to establish a 
cabinet-level Science Department to coordinate R&D programs among federal agencies . See 
Graeme Browning, Tense Days Down in the Lab, NAT'L L.J. ,  Apr. 22, 1995, at 1005; irifra notes 
231 and accompanying text. 
1 80. NIH is the principle biomedical and behavioral research agency within the federal 
government, and its mission is to improve human health by increasing scientific knowledge related 
to health and disease through biomedical and behavioral research. 
1 8 1 .  HGP actually was initiated by Dr. Charles DeLisi, the former director of DOE's 
health and environment research programs.  DiChristina, supra note 24, at 16. 
182. The other major contributor to the HGP is the Howard Hughes Medical Institute. 
183.  See DAN BERGLUND & CHRISTOPHER COBURN, PARTNERSHIPS: A COMPENDIUM OF 
STATE AND FEDERAL COOPERATIVE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS 219, 486-91, 51 3-19, 521-22, 523-
24, 548-53 (1995); Rudolph, supra note 171 ;  Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Grants, 
HUM. GENOME NEWS, May-June 1995, at 15; see also NIH Should Rethink Pricing Clause, 372 
NATURE 488 (1994) . The federal transfer policy was at the center of a major pricing clause 
controversy. The clause at issue allowed NIH to set "reasonable prices" for products developed 
jointly with industry. This clause was introduced out of anger over the cost of AZT, an AIDS 
drug, which was furthered by work done in NIH laboratories. Because the clause was reputed to 
discourage investment by venture capitalists in companies that enter into CRADAs, NIH was urged 
by various members of its advisory councils to drop it, and did so. Id. 
184. Rudolph, supra note 1 7 1 ,  at 142. The policy implications of CRADAs are addressed 
fully supra Section II and infra Section III. The NIH recently announced that it will monitor 
recipients that conduct studies for private industry more closely and hold agencies back from 
imposing entanglements . See David E. Bartlett, NIH Regulations Now Guide Sponsored Research , 
NAT'L L.J . ,  Oct. 23, 1995, at C46. 
1 85. Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Grants, supra note 183, at 15. 
186. See Victoria Slind-Flor, Biotech Patent Derided: Critics Say It 's Overbroad and Will 
Hinder the Search /or Treatment of AIDS, NAT . 'L L. J . ,  Apr. 10, 1995, at A6; see irifra notes 
348 and accompanying text (addressing patent granted on Mar. 2 1 ,  1995, to Dr. W. French 
Anderson and his colleagues at the NIB, which "covers any method of introducing genetically 
altered human cells into a patient to combat disease"). This controversy is likely to continue, for 
career shifts from government service to genotechnology by top researchers are common. For 
example, David J. Galas, Darwin Molecular's president and chief scientific officer, previously 
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they desire in setting the research agenda and must abide by complicated rules 
about conflicts of interest and property rights of research results . 187 
Nevertheless ,  the popularity of using federally-owned technology to foster 
human health benefits while promoting economic competitiveness and growth 
is evident in the hundreds of measures introduced in Congress in each of the 
last few sessions which would affect technology transfer. 1 88 These measures 
include proposals to coordinate all federal transfers of technology and federal 
investment in the area of genotechnology. 189 
ran HGP. See Rosenberg, supra note 155, at 80-81 ; see generally, supra Section II. 
187. Rudolph, supra note 171, at 142. 
188. Giving away federally-owned technology to promote economic competitiveness and 
growth is a popular notion within Congress. "Congress is constantly tinkering with the laws 
governing technology transfer. In the last Congress, 80 bills were introduced that referenced or 
amended the Stevenson-Wydler Act, among 243 measures introduced that somehow affected 
technology transfer. "  Rudolph, supra note 171 ,  at 133 (completely addresses all federally 
supported R&D) (discusses H.R. 820, H.R. 1432, and H.R. 523, which are identified as 
"noteworthy"). H.R. 820 contains the National Competitiveness Act of 1993, the Manufacturing 
Technology and Extension Act of 1993, and the Civilian Technology Development Act of 1993. 
"These proposals seek to boost the nation's international competitiveness by strengthening our 
technology base and fostering the development of advanced products, particularly in 
manufacturing. "  Id. 
189. See Rudolph, supra note 171; see also Browning, supra note 179, at 1005; Eliot 
Marshall, Data Sharing: A Declining Ethic, 248 SCIENCE 952 (1990). Among these proposals are 
the following: 
1 96 
· Federal Technology Commercialization and Credit Enhancement Act of 1995, 
H.R. 80, 104th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1995) : A bill "[t]o foster economic growth, create 
new employment opportunities, and strengthen the industrial base of the United 
States by providing credit for businesses and by facilitating the transfer and 
commercialization of government-owned patents, licenses, processes, and 
technologies, and for other purposes."  The stated objectives are to: provide 
financing to private sector to commercialize the technologies; develop centralized 
database; plan to finance by taxing foreign corporations; and establish an 
independent corporation to administer some $3,000,000,000. 
· Developing Sponsored Research Agreements, 59 Fed. Reg. 55673 (1994): A draft 
agreement, introduced by NIH, for use by recipients of NIH funding. The main 
concern expressed by the NIH in this proposal is that recipients of NIH funds 
comply with the funding agreement requirements so that information produced under 
the CRADA is disseminated to industry as per the requirements of the Act and 
implementing regulations. 
· Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 12771 (1995): 
Proposal sponsored by the Department of Health and Human Services and NIH for 
a Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement (UBTMA) This agreement was 
designed for use when material is transferred between not-for-profit organizations 
for research.  It does not address transfer between universities and industry, because 
such transfers essentially are license agreements for which universities have 
standard-form agreements. Under this proposal, (1) such material may be used only 
for teaching or academic purposes; (2) the recipients of the transferred material have 
unchecked rights to distribute the substances created only if such a substance is not 
a progeny, modification, or unmodified derivative; and (3) the material must be 
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2 .  Patents and Genotechnology 
Another fundamental example of the federal government's desire to 
advance genotechnology is its willingness to recognize and protect intellectual 
property rights190 in technological advancements .191 Although United States 
provided at no cost. The predecessors of this proposal are the "Policy Relating to 
Distribution of Unique Research Resources Produced with PHS Funding" issued by 
the PHS in 1988 and PHS's adoption in 1989 of a standard Material Transfer 
Agreement form for use by PHS scientists. 
· 37 C .F.R. Ch. IV, §§ 404. 1- . 14: Department of Commerce policy to use the 
patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally 
supported research or development. 
· H.R. 632, 104th Cong. ,  1st Sess. ( 1995): A proposal to increase fairness in the 
compensation of patent owners whose patented inventions are used by the United 
States government. 
See also Bill Mandating Transfer of Patient 's Rights from Federal Labs is Reintroduced, 50 PAT. 
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 369 (Aug. 10, 1995) {summarizing provisions of H.R. 2196 
which would amend Stevenson-Wydler Act by, inter alia, directing federal labs to assign any 
intellectual property rights resulting from work done under CRADA to the private sector partner 
and government to retain paid-up irrevocable license and "march-in" rights if  holder of intellectual 
property rights fails to commercialize technology). 
190. This section concentrates on United States patent policy . Copyright may apply to 
certain outputs of the genotech companies' work, including written documentation, computer 
program s  and databases. However, the scope of protection afforded under copyright law may vary 
depending on the nature of the output. In particular, copyright is unlikely to afford meaningful 
protection to gene sequences for three reasons. First, for a work to be eligible for copyright 
protection, it must be "original . "  17 U .S .C.  § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The Supreme Court 
has interpreted originality to require some modicum of creativity. Mere mechanical listings of gene 
sequences, whether in hard-copy form or stored in a computer database, are unlikely to meet the 
originality requirement . See Oman, Biotech Patenting Issues, supra note 13, at C43-44. Second, 
it is a long-standing doctrine of copyright law that copyright protects only expressions of ideas, 
not the ideas themselves: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship 
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in 
such work."  17 U.S. C .  § 102(b) (1988). Genetic code may be regarded as an idea or discovery 
which, if protectable at all, must meet the rigorous requirements of the Patent Act. Third, closely 
related to the textual language of § 102(b) is the judicial gloss of "merger." According to the 
merger doctrine, where there is only one or a very limited number of ways to express an idea, 
the expression merges with the idea and no copyright protection is available. See, e. g. , Computer 
Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,  982 F.2d 693, 707-08 (2d Cir. 1992). Even if genetic code can 
be copyrighted, its expression may merge with the idea and therefore be unprotectable if it can 
be precisely described in only one way. See Oman, supra note 13, at C43; Seide & Smith, supra 
note 1 ,  at 58 (footnote omitted) (Copyright Office indicating it will not register copyrights in DNA 
sequences). 
Note, however, that state trade secret law may provide an avenue of protection for genotech 
firms. In contrast to the patent system, which requires disclosure of a discovery prior to an 
inventor receiving a patent, trade secret protection inheres in data only so long as that data is kept 
secret. The congressional willingness to grant patents in genotech-related inventions, as well as 
to consider lowering the traditional patent threshold requirements for protection, may be motivated 
in part by a desire to provide an incentive for inventors to seek patent protection through 
197 
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law historically has accorded patent protection to inventions meeting statutory 
standards, 192 United States patent practice in the genotech area has created 
domestic and international controversy. The policy has been opposed 
vigorously by other countries 193 and by groups within the United States as 
disparate as the scientific and religious communities. 194 Although it is 
premature to assess with certainty the extent to which genotech-related United 
States patents will be upheld by the courts , patent practice is affecting the 
shape of the industry. Moreover, there is an obvious need for reforms to 
minimize investor uncertainty and to optimize innovation in the field of 
genotechnology. 
The opposition to patenting genotech-related inventions has been 
grounded in economics , law and ethics . The willingness of the United States 
to encourage patent applications 195 and issue patents has generated concern 
on the part of other nations. Many fear that the United States will "corner the 
market" on genotech, thereby increasing industry entrance costs to foreign 
firms due to the necessity of their licensing technology from American firms 
or seeking funding from their own governments . 1 96 American patent practice 
also has engendered global uneasiness about the propriety of (1) patenting 
human life forms and (2) competition among countries , rather than 
cooperation, for information which has the potential to save and improve 
countless lives . 197 
The controversy over patenting genotech inventions exploded in 1991 
when the NIH attempted to patent certain identified gene sequences discovered 
by Dr. Craig Venter, then an NIH researcher. The NIH claimed 351 partial 
cDNA fragments in its initial application and later filed claims to over 2750 
concomitant disclosure rather than relying on trade secret . Thus, patent protection may make more 
information available to the public and other researchers than would reliance on trade secret law. 
See infra note 382 and accompanying text. 
191 . See infra note 349 (Genetic Therapy Inc. obtained a broad patent in April 1995 for 
one form of gene therapy.). 
192. The first United States patent statute was enacted in 1790. Major revisions were 
enacted in 1836 and 1952. Recently, major changes have been enacted and proposed to bring the 
United States into compliance with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) . For 
an excellent overview of the history of patent law, see ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW 
AND Poucy 1-9 (1992). See also infra notes 364-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the statutory standards. 
193. See, e.g. , Kirby, supra note 33, at 1 1  (conflict over recognizing property interests 
in genome discoveries); infra text accompanying notes 212- 1 3 .  
194. See infra text accompanying notes 214 and 4 1 4 .  
_ 195 . . �e United States leads the world i n  genotech patent applications and thus, potentially, m issued patents. Kirby, supra note 33,  at 17 (over 35,000 patent applications for 
biological materials filed in United States compared to about 13,000 in Europe) . 
196. See supra note 2 (noting that outside the United States, genotech R&D often is 
con�u�ted. in collaboration .
with United States genotech firms) . However, note that government 
subs1dizat1on has charactenzed the genotech industry within the United States as well as abroad. 
197. See infra text accompanying notes 212-14. 
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partial cDNA sequences . 198 These patent applications were filed despite the 
fact that researchers had not identified the genes' structures or functions. 199 
The NIH's stated intentions were: (1) to encourage commercial applications 
of its research by licensing the data to private commercial entities at a nominal 
fee, thereby giving them an incentive to develop new drugs and (2) to avoid 
situations where several companies own a segment of a complete gene, thus 
requiring complex cross-licensing in the event that any of these companies 
wished to commercialize the entire gene or its particular product. 200 
Regardless of the NIH's intentions, the filings outraged members of both 
the scientific and international communities . Renowned scientist James Watson, 
co-discoverer of the DNA double helix and then director of the NIH's HGP 
project, argued that patenting the "secrets of life" would hinder research. 201 
He also emphasized that gene sequences , like the double helix, should be 
available for all humanity. 202 Many members of the international community 
consider the NIH's filings to be shortsighted and contradictory to HGP: 
Ironically, the very country that founded the HGP and recognized 
its essential international character sponsored patent applications 
that inflamed those whose cooperation was essential to completion 
of the project . . . . Many countries have specific provisions 
barring the grant of patents for innovations whose publication or 
exploitation would be contrary to morality . 203 
198. Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 1 5 1 ,  at 46. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 46-47 (noting that another force encouraging NIH to file was fear that prior 
publication would destroy potential foreign patent rights). But see Christopher A. Michaels, 
Biotechnology and the Requirement for Utility in Patent Law, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
Soc'y 247, 248 (1994) (noting that, within government itself, patenting gene sequences is 
controversial: "The National Research Council Committee on Mapping and Sequencing the Human 
Genome concluded in its 1988 study that 'human genome sequences should be a public trust' not 
subject to the intellectual property laws, while the Office of Technology Assessment's 1988 report 
on the Genome Project suggested that federal agencies and Congress should instead promote early 
filing of patent applications followed by prompt release of data"). 
201 . Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 151 ,  at 47; Bylinsky, supra note 8, at 100. Watson 
resigned from the NIH shortly after the patent controversy erupted . The reasons for his resignation 
are unclear. See The Genome Project: Will It Be Allowed to Survive?, NEWSDAY, May 19, 1992, 
at 61 (Watson left after Dr. Bernadine Healy, then director of the NIH, "raised questions about 
Watson' s  ownership of biotechnology company stocks . . .  [Healy] did deny in the journal, 
Science, that she had used conflict of interest allegations to force Watson's resignation. Watson's 
friends are convinced she wanted him out because of bitter disagreement over the NIH's new 
policy of seeking patents ."). 
202. Kirby, supra note 33, at 17; Bylinsky, supra note 8, at 100. 
203 . Kirby, supra note 33, at 1 1 , 17 (noting also that patent applications undermined the 
principle of international cooperation, and the subject led to "many an angry clash" among 
participants at the May 1993 conference in Balboa, Spain) . 
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Individual nations have also spoken out against the NIH's actions . France 
accused the United States of placing HGP at risk by penalizing low-budget 
research efforts and increasing the overall cost of the Project. 204 France also 
raised ethical objections, contending that patents should not be issued on 
something that is "part of our universal heritage. "205 Similarly, Italy opined 
that the NIH decision would undermine the HGP by encouraging competition 
for patents . 206 Italy also objected on substantive legal grounds, contending 
that an invention setting forth partial gene sequences of unknown function fails 
to meet standard threshold requirements for patentable inventions. 207 On the 
other hand, countries such as Great Britain reacted by rushing to file their own 
patents. 208 
The NIH patent applications were rejected by the PT0209 and later 
withdrawn by the NIH. 210 The most widely voiced legal objection to the NIH 
patents was that the NIH did not know what functions the gene sequences 
performed and that, therefore, the inventions lacked utility as required under 
the Patent Act. 2 1 1  
The NIH filing controversy highlighted the differences between the patent 
policies of the United States and European nations that are visible in Article 
53(a) of the European Patent Convention . Article 53(a) prohibits granting 
patents for inventions whose publication or exploitation would be contrary to 
public policy or morality. 212 Moreover, the European Parliament recently 
vetoed European Union (EU) legislation aimed at making the EU genotech 
industry more competitive with that in the United States and Japan. The 
legislation would have clarified the conditions under which genes could be 
patented.213 There is no doctrine under United States law that is comparable 
204. Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 1 5 1 ,  at 47. 
205 . Id. 
206. Id. at 48 . 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 57 (rejection based on failure of claims to meet statutory standards: partial 
gene sequences not new, useful or nonobvious, and no enabling disclosure provided); see also 
infra Section III.B.2. 
210. Christopher Anderson, NIH Drops Bid for Gene Patients, 263 SCIENCE 909 (1994). 
2 1 1 .  35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also infra text accompanying notes 
364-67 (discussion of utility requirement) . In its applications, NIH cited the following utilities for 
the .gene sequ�nces: �to (1) �ap cti:omosomes; (2) identify tissue types . . .  ; and (3) identify gene regions associated with a disease. MERGES, supra note 192, at 159; cf infra notes 377-78 and 
accompanying text (arguing that strongest legal objection should be that gene sequences are 
"phenomena of nature" and a non-patentable discovery rather than a patentable invention). 
212. John Richards, International Aspects of Patent Protection for Biotechnology, 4 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L .  J .  433, 443 (1993). 
213.  Specifically, the European Parliament: 
200 
invoked new powers on March l to veto European Union legislation on gene patents. 
Supporters of the proposals by the executive European Commission claimed that the veto 
. . .  could harm the competitiveness of Europe's biotechnology industry. They argued that 
A False Start? 
to Article 53(a), although religious leaders have raised strong public policy 
objections to patenting human life forms.214 
Despite objections to United States patent policy from abroad and at 
home, the United States government has remained committed to advancing 
genotechnology through the recognition of intellectual property rights . For 
example, Congress has enacted legislation to bring the United States into 
compliance with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) . The 
legislation seeks to assist in maintaining the viability of genotech patents .215 
Furthermore, the United States was reluctant to sign the Convention on 
Biological Diversity without an interpretive statement, 216 and the President 
recently signed legislation making it easier for genotech firms to obtain process 
absence of EU legislation laying down conditions under which genes could be patented 
would play into the hands of rival researchers in the United States and Japan . . . . 
Parliamentary officials said it was the first time the assembly had used the rights granted 
it in the Maastricht Treaty to reject a legislative proposal in its entirety under new "co­
decision" procedures 
European Parliament Blocks EU Rules On Patents for Biotechnology Products, 9 WORLD INTELL. 
PROP REP. 96, 96-97 (1 995). National patents and European patents through the European Patent 
Office may, however, still be available. Id. at 97. 
214. See irifra note 414 (describing objections raised by religious leaders); cf. Robert P. 
Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System and Controversial 
Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051,  1067 (1988) (arguing that new technologies should not be 
denied patent protection merely on speculation about consequences and that the patent system is 
not where technology evaluation should occur) . Nevertheless, American courts historically have 
been willing to withhold patents on inventions considered immoral, such as gambling machines 
and inventions used to defraud. Id. at 1062. 
215.  Legislation: GATT Bill Clears House with Major Intellectual Property Law Reforms, 
49 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J .  (BNA) 95 (1994) . Under prior United States law, the term 
of a patent was 17 years from the date of issuance. Id. Under GATT, it is 20 years from the date 
of filing. Id. Because many applications, including those associated with genotech, often take in 
excess of three years to find their way through the PTO, a number of firms, including genotech 
firms, were concerned that compliance with GATT would effectively shorten their patent 
protection. Id. To address this concern over lag time between application and patent issuance, a 
provision was inserted into the implementing legislation to extend a patent term if the patent's 
issuance is delayed by interference proceedings, a government secrecy order, or by appeals to 
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences or the Federal Circuit. Id. at 95. Such extensions 
may be up to five years . Id. at 96. 
216. Karen Anne Goldman, Note, Compensation for Use of Biological Resources Under 
the Convention on Biological Diversity: Compatibility of Conservation Measures and 
Competitiveness of the Biotechnology Industry, 25 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 695 (1994) (United 
States refused to sign Biodiversity Convention for one year because of economic provisions 
requiring direct financing or exchange of resources and technology, including compensation to 
developing countries for use of biological resources.); cf Ralph T. King, Jr. ,  Grace 's Patent on 
a Pesticide &rages Indians, WALL ST. J. ,  Sept. 13,  1995, at B l ,  B9 (coalition of 200 
organizations from 35 countries challenging a W. R. Grace & Co. process patent for pesticide 
development based on a formulation from seeds of the Indian neem tree, claiming, "intellectual 
and biological piracy. "  At the same time, however, Shaman Pharmaceuticals, Inc. seems to have 
adopted a policy of compensating those countries which it prospects for materials for gene therapy 
through up-front payments and contributions of future profits to a foundation for rain-forest 
preservation.). 
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Another source of market protection available for many of the 
forthcoming genotech-based drugs-many of which are characterized as 
"biologics" (drugs premised on altering or influencing genes)218-is the 
Orphan Drug Act. This legislation gives companies working on  drugs for "rare 
diseases and conditions" control over their target markets , making the 
development of such drugs more economically worthwhile. 219 The first 
applicant to obtain such designation and approval of a marketing application 
for a drug is entitled to market exclusivity for a period of seven years . 220 
Moreover, the developers of such drugs receive a fifty percent tax credit and 
may request federal grants to offset testing expenses incurred in drug 
development. 221 
Although the Orphan Drug Act protects markets to encourage drug 
development, it has been criticized by members of the genotech community 
and others as helping individual companies at the expense of the overall 
industry. Critics argue that the actual markets for such drugs are much larger 
than anticipated because the drugs' initial potentials are often underestimated, 
and that markets may continue to grow through subsequently discovered 
uses. 222 Another criticism is that it is possible for a drug developer 
intentionally to define its "target" market narrowly enough to obtain the 
designation, with full knowledge that the actual market is much larger and that 
physicians will prescribe the drug for other known uses. Raising this and 
related market concerns, some activists for AIDS sufferers claim that this 
217. President Clinton Signs Bills on Biotech Patents, Performance Rights, 51 PAT. 
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 45 (1995) (legislation amends 35 u.s.c. § 103 by 
"prohibiting obviousness rejections of process patent applications for biotechnological processes 
'using or resulting' in a composition of matter which is novel and non-obvious if: (1) the product 
and process claims are in the same application and have the same filing date; and (2) the product 
and process claims were owned by the same person when they were invented. ") .  
218. See infra notes 234, 243-44 and accompanying text. 
219. Orphan Drug Amendment of 1988, Pub. L.  No. 100-290, § 3,  102 Stat. 90 (1988) 
(codified at 2 1  U.S.C. §§ 301 ,  360aa, 360bb, 360ee (1988)); 42 U.S.C.  § 236 (1988). See 
generally Veronica Henry, Problems With Plw.rmaceutical Regulation in the United States, 14  J. 
LEGAL MED. 6 1 7  (1993); Malinowski, supra note 89, at 8, n. 13. 
220. In other words, no other company can market a molecularly identical orphan drug 
for FDA-approved use for seven years after that approval is  granted. 
221. The applicability of this credit is, however, limited by three factors: (1) the tax credit 
applies only to expenses incurred in clinical trials on humans, not preclinical testing expense; (2) 
the credit cannot be reaquired, and the company only benefits if it can afford to take advantage 
of the credit; and (3) the company must be continually "carrying on business. " The third limitation 
makes it difficult for biotechnology companies, making very little profit and accordingly not 
marketing products until many years after start up. Henry, supra note 219,  at 636. 
222. Id. at 632. 
202 
market exclusivity has led to monopoly pricing. 223 
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"Orphan drug" designation is granted by the FDA for rare diseases, 
which include numerous genetic diseases . Many of the products being 
developed by the genotech industry may qualify as orphan drugs . Designating 
them as such will benefit their individual developers and may indirectly help 
the entire industry by bringing about market successes that lure investors . 
Despite such purported benefits , since 1 993 , BIO, the biotechnology industry's  
trade association, has been seeking to limit the market protection allotted under 
the Act. The organization drafted a proposal to limit the market exclusivity 
of such drugs to five years with a provision allowing the sponsors of products 
with "limited commercial potential " to apply for five-year extensions .224 
Also, while the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association wants to keep the 
Orphan Drug Act as it is, the National Organization for Rare Disorders 
(NORD) has supported a bill that would protect markets either for seven years 
or until $200 million in cumulative sales has been realized, whichever comes 
first. 22s 
Recent developments suggest that amendments to the Orphan Drug Act 
are likely . In 1 994, Congress proposed amending the orphan drug rules to 
reduce the period of market exclusivity from seven to four years , with an 
opportunity to extend exclusivity for an additional three years for drugs that 
are of limited commercial potential. 226 This proposed legislation also would 
allow companies to share exclusivity if they develop a drug independently but 
simultaneously . 227 
C. National Institutes of Health Funding 
As stated by one commentator, " [i]n a very real sense, NIH is the father 
of the biotechnology industry in the United States. "228 Beyond its 
involvement in administering HGP, the NIH conducts its own research229 and 
sponsors billions of dollars worth of research annually at universities and other 
public and private institutions . 230 In other words, the NIH is to the genotech 
223 . Note, however, that the kinds of drugs which the Orphan Drug Act applies to carried 
prices higher than average even prior to the passage of the Act. Id. at 635-36. 
224. Id. at 636. 
225. Id. 
226. See BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 14. 
227. Id. 
228. Thomas 0. McGarity, Peer Review in Awarding Federal Grants in the Arts and 
Sciences, 9 HIGH TECH . L.J. I,  7 (1995) . 
229. Id. NIH transfers many of the resulting discoveries to private industry for 
commercialization. See supra Section II.B. l .  
230. McGarity, supra note 228, at 7-8. "Americans have been generous to their biomedical 
researchers. For more than 30 years, large fees for hospital treatment have supported the 
development of many new techniques. At the same time, the budget of the National Institutes of 
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industry what NASA has been to the space mission. However; unlike NASA's, 
NIH's funding is secure-at least for the time being. 231 With an annual 
budget of almost $7 billion, NIH supports "more than 25,000 separate awards 
in health and environmental sciences . "232 
The NIH oversees human clinical trials ,  including those involving 
genotech-based therapeutics and diagnostics. Although the FDA is directly 
responsible for review of genotechnology applications,233 it is collaborating 
with the NIH to combine and accelerate review of gene therapy protocols. 234 
The NIH ' s  involvement in the genotech industry also has caused immense 
controversy as evidenced by the patent dispute discussed above. 235 The NIH 
also became involved in a pricing controversy triggered by the marketing of 
AZT.236 These controversies demonstrate that the NIH's actions can 
profoundly affect the genotech industry-negatively and positively-and, 
therefore, its decisions and policies must be crafted with both foresight and 
caution. 237 
Health, which supports 70% of American academic medical research, has climbed steadily . "  
Managing to Care, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 2 3 ,  1995, at 75. 
231 .  In 1994, the NIH budget included an 18% increase (to $152 million) for the National 
Center for Human Genome Research. BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 15. Although recently there 
was a proposal to cut NIH's budget by $7.9 billion, the Senate quickly restored $7 billion, thereby 
essentially singling out the NIH and sparing it from the wide blade of Congressional budget cuts. 
See Richard Saltus, NIH Wins Support on Funding in Senate, BosroN GLOBE, May 25, 1995, at 
1 1  (NIH spared from present budget cuts, at least relative to most other agencies). HGP's budget 
for 1996 presently is expected to be reduced only by $1 million. Supra note 85. But see Anthony 
Flint, Universities Face New Era in Research Funding, BoSTON GLOBE, June 19, 1995, at 1 ,  6 
(addressing "slashing" of federal funds designated for research, addressing the question "why not 
have Dow or Merck pay for the work instead of Uncle Sam?" and considering the possibility that 
teaching institutions will be transformed into corporate R&D centers); Lovejoy, supra note l 
(highlighting the expansive potential of genotechnology and stating that "(t]his potential could be 
jeopardized, however, by . . .  [b]udget cuts that could slow advances in biotechnology, where 
the U.S. leads all other nations"); Browning, supra note 179, at 1005 (noting that the federal 
government funds 36% of research and development in United States; and that new Congress may 
reduce funding for projects with reasonable expectation of private sector financing). 
232. See McGarity, supra note 228, at 7. 
233. See infra Section II.D. 
234. See Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571 ,  106 Stat. 449 1 ;  
BIOTECH 95, supra note 2 ,  a t  14-15. Biologics were regulated before other drugs, and that 
responsibility originally rested with NIH. Now the FDA and Nill work together on biologics 
through the Center for Biological Evaluation and Research (CBER) , which is under the jurisdiction 
of the FDA, as discussed infra Section 11.D. 1 .  
235. See supra notes 198-2 1 1  and accompanying text. 
236. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (addressing the CRADA "reasonable 
price" clause controversy). 
237. There is some evidence that the NIH is reassessing its policies, particularly with 
respect to gene therapy. See Gorman, supra note 16, at 63. The head of NIH "appointed an 
independent committee of scientists to look into how the NIH spends its gene-therapy research 
dollars (some $200 million a year) and whether the government is getting its money's worth. "  
Id. 
204 
D. Food and Drug Administration Regulation 
A False Start? 
The United States has "the most demanding prescription drug approval 
regimens in the world. "238 The time from discovery and cloning of a new 
molecule to market entry for a resulting drug-the aforementioned "drug 
lag" -is seven to twelve years ,  and the process of getting to market often costs 
as much as $400 million. 239 Beyond institutional sluggishness within the 
process ,  " [t]he reasons for delay include errors in pharmaceutical industry 
practice, lack of cooperation between the pharmaceutical industry and the 
FDA, misdirected research, poor investigative data, and excessive bureaucratic 
procedure. "240 Moreover, "[f]or every 10,000 drug candidates created in the 
lab , only 1 ,000 compounds will be tested in animals" and, of those, only one 
will reach the market. Human testing itself is a two to four year process, and 
only twenty percent of the compounds tested in humans will reach the 
market.241 
All new drugs, including biologics, are subject to regulation under the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) . 242 Biologics and their 
developers and manufacturers are also subject to further requirements under 
the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). 243 The primary objective of the 
FDCA is to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the final product, with 
controlling the manufacturing process a secondary concern. In contrast, 
biologics regulation under the PHSA is focused on "rigid control of the 
238: Henry, supra note 219, at 617.  
239. See Fisher, supra note 7, at B3; Eric D. Randall, Genetics Research Carries Risks, 
U.S.A. TODAY, Mar. 22, 1994, at 3B (stating that the development of drugs based upon identified 
genes takes four to six years). "Researchers at large pharmaceutical companies screen thousands 
of compounds in trial-and-error 'grind and find' tests before finally hitting on a promising 
drug-typically spending $400 million and 12 years in the process . "  Helm, supra note 75, at D l .  
240. Henry, supra note 219, at 623 . 
241 .  Id. at 617.  
242. See JAMES T .  O'REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION §§ 13-15 (2nd ed. 
1993). 
243. Public Health and Service Act, Pub. L. No. 57-244, 58 Stat. 682, 702-03 (1944) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C.  § 262 (1988)). The added burdens for biologics have included requirements 
that ( 1)  the product used in the Phase ill trials generally must be produced in the intended 
commercial-scale manufacturing facility; (2) only the company that manufacturers the biologic 
may obtain and hold the marketing licenses; and (3) each significant participant in the 
manufacturing process must hold establishment and product licenses for the new technology. 
According to some commentators, the divergent regulatory emphasis of the PHSA (manufacturing 
process) and the FDCA (safety of final process) reflects the assumptions of a time "when biologics 
were crude mixtures or biological extracts . "  Gary E. Gamerman, Regulation of Biologics 
Manufacturing: Questioning the Premise, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 2 13, 213 (1994) . As stated by 
one commentator, "[t]he establishment licensure requirement, in particular, creates for biologics 
manufacturers significant and costly commercial and legal problems that drain financial resources 
and competitiveness, and impedes the useofimproved manufacturing technologies and strategies. "  
Id. at 214. This distinction between biologics and other drugs i s  discussed i n  more detail infra 
Section ill.A. 
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manufacturing process , " which reflects the particular scientific and historical 
characteristics of biopharmaceuticals . 244 
1 .  The Drug-Approval Process 
As stated above, both the FDCA and the PHSA, and their implementing 
regulations, govern the testing (for efficacy and safety), manufacturing, and 
marketing of biologics and new drugs . 245 Within the FDA, the Center for 
Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) regulates new drugs, while new 
biologics are regulated by the Center for Biological Evaluation and Research 
(CBER) .246 Genetic therapeutics are subject to added regulatory clearance 
requirements prior to clinical trials and commercialization, and the novelty of 
these technologies requires the FDA to review each protocol on a case-by-case 
basis.247 
Diagnostics are regulated separately as "medical devices " and "testing 
kits . "248 Because of their complexity, genetics-based diagnostics generally 
are labelled Class III devices . A Class Ill device requires pre-market approval 
unless its manufacturer can demonstrate that the device is the substantial 
equivalent of an existing Class I or II device,249 or a pre-1976 device not yet 
classified. 250 Accordingly, the burden on the developers and manufacturers 
of genetics-based diagnostics is comparable to that for developers of new 
drugs . They must perform clinical studies , obtain an investigational device 
exemption to conduct clinical tests , file a pre-market approval application, and 
ultimately obtain FDA approval. 
The approval process traditionally consists of a preclinical phase, 
followed by three phases of trials on human subjects and a review phase. The 
process is summarized in Table I: 
244. Gamerman, supra note 243, at 2 1 3 .  
245. See generally O'REil..LY, supra note 242, a t  § 13-15. 
246. See generally id. 
247. See supra note 243 (addressing added requirements) . The FDA has published a 
"Points to Consider" guidance document to help develop gene therapy protocols. 
248. O'REil..LY, supra note 242, at § 18.02. 
249. Establishing substantial equivalence to a Class I device requires adherence to general 
controls associated with that device, and substantial equivalence to a Class II device mandates 
adherence to general and special controls. Manufacturers of new devices also may have to conduct 
clinical tests to demonstrate that differences between the new and existing devices do not affect 
safety or effectiveness. See O'REil..LY, supra note 242, at § 18.04. 
250. Pre-1976 devices not yet classified are viewed as having proven efficacy because of 
the longevity of their use. 
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PHASE 
PRECLINICAL 
IND 
APPLICATIONS 
I 
II 
ill 
IV 
(FDA REVIEW) 
TABLE 1:251 
FDA Review Process for Biotech Products 
TEST PURPOSE TIME 
FRAME 
(YEARS) 
Laboratory Assess Safety 1 . 8  
and Animal and Biological 
Studies Activity 
20 to 80 Evaluate Safety .5 
healthy and Dosage 
volunteers 
100 to 300 Evaluate 2 
patient Effectiveness 
volunteers and Safety 
1000 patient Verify 3 
volunteers Effectiveness, 
(approximate) Continue Safety 
Evaluation 
Review All 1 .7  
Submitted Data 
Concerning 
Safety and 
Efficacy for 
Proposed 
Product 
A False Start? 
SUCCESS 
RATE 
10% 
30% 
67% 
25 1 .  Table I is  compiled in part from data provided by Kendall Strategies Inc. of 
Cambridge, Massachusetts; additional data was obtained from numerous interviews with 
representatives from industry and government during the fall of 1995-many resulting from the 
circulation of earlier drafts of this Article. IND = Investigational New Drug. PLA 
= Product 
License Application. ELA = Establishment License Applicator. NDA = New Drug Application. 
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PLAS and ELAS OR 2.5 75 % 
NDAS (average; approval 
APPLICATIONS overlap (pre-
AND REVIEW with FDA review) 
review) 
TOTAL 9.8 (min.) 1 out of 
10,000 
drug 
candidates 
The preclinical phase consists of laboratory work and studies of two or 
more animal species in order to establish an impact on the target disease and 
assess side effects and safe dosage ranges. 252 The results of the preclinical 
phase studies, if promising , become the basis for an Investigational New Drug 
Application (IND) filed with the FDA. An IND must be granted for drugs to 
be tested on humans, that is , for Phase I clinical trials to begin and for 
developers to charge patients for those drugs where the requisite level of 
efficacy is established. 253 The FDA reviews INDs to assess the design of the 
proposed studies and to determine whether they will be conducted with 
safeguards to protect patients . 254 
Phase I clinical trials, which take generally six months to one year, 
consist of introducing the drug into twenty to eighty healthy human volunteers 
to determine toxicity, preferred route of administration, and safe dosage 
range.255 Of drugs submitted for human clinical trials, seventy percent fail 
252. Consider that, because penicillin produces harmful effects in some animals, it might 
never have reached the market under current FDA regulations. 
253. INDs generally consist of (1) a brief introductory statement (identification of the name 
of the drug, its active ingredients, its pharmacological class, the structural formula, the route of 
administration, and the drug's broad treatment objectives); (2) an investigational brochure 
(comprised generally of a summary of the pharmacological and toxicological effects of the drug, 
its pharmacokinetics, and the resulting biologic disposition in animals); and (3) a clinical trial 
protocol. See O'REILLY, supra note 242, at § 13. 12. 
254. To obtain various objectives (IND approval, clinical trial success, limits on liability, 
minimization of expense from repeating clinical trials, enhancement of overall negotiation position 
with FDA) drug developers must select qualified clinical investigators (preferably prestigious 
teaching hospitals) to supervise administration of the products and ensure investigations are 
conducted and monitored in accordance with FDA regulations as well as the general investigational 
plan and protocols contained in the IND. O'REILLY, supra note 242, at § 13 . 1 1- . 12. The present 
trend among genotech companies is to delegate drug development to contract research 
organizations (CROs) for clinical process. See supra parts II.A, 11.B . l . CROs offer economies 
of scale based upon the expertise in development, clinical trials planning and implementation, 
feasibility testing, database management, and application procedures realized by CROs. BIOTECH 
95, supra note 2, at 27. 
. 12. 
255. The clinical trial process is discussed fully in O'REILLY, supra note 242, at § 13 . 1 1 -
208 
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in Phase I .  Phase II trials are conducted on a limited number of human 
subjects, usually 100 to 300, who have the specific disease or symptoms that 
the drug is intended to treat. The objective of these Phase I and Phase II 
trials-which last approximately two years and consist of placebo-controlled, 
double-blind studies-is to develop dosage and toxicity data and obtain 
preliminary evidence of effectiveness .  They also may address short-term side 
effects and risks in people whose health is ' impaired. Of the thirty percent of 
drugs which reach Phase II, thirty-three percent fail. Thus, there is a total 
failure rate of approximately eighty percent in Phases I and II. 
The remaining twenty percent then undergo Phase III trials which last 
approximately three years and involve 1000 to 3000 patients . Their objective 
is to assess the overall risks and benefits of the drug, establish safe and 
effective dosages ,  and provide an adequate basis for physician labelling. 
Finally, in Phase IV of the IND process (actual FDA review) , the drugs are 
evaluated for adverse reactions over time, and the Phase III data is 
supplemented to address particular concerns and the effects of the drugs on 
specific groups of subjects . 
Before commercialization ,  if the new therapeutic is a biologic, CBER 
requires submission and approval of a Product License Application (PLA) and 
an Establishment License Application (ELA) .256 If classified simply as a new 
drug, CDER requires the filing of a New Drug Application (NDA) . ND As and 
PLAs may be filed with the FDA only after the IND process is complete and 
the requisite data gathered. The FDA, which has 1 80 days to review a NDA 
and may request supplemental information, approves about seventy-five percent 
of all NDAs submitted; approval of PLAs take a comparable amount of time. 
However, even after a PLA or NDA is approved, the process of reviewing 
applications takes an average of 2.5 years . 
Emphasis on pre-market surveillance and testing , which heavily front­
loads drug development costs , distinguishes the United States' drug-approval 
system from its counterparts in other nations. 257 The practical effect,s of this 
approach include enhanced patient safety during drug development and early 
marketing, added R&D costs , 258 higher capital requirements for drug 
256. See id. 
257. Tufts University conducted a comparative study of drug development between the 
United States and Great Britain which looked at the drugs approved in these countries between 
1977 and 1987. The conclusion reached was that the British system relies more heavily on post­
marketing surveillance. See Henry, supra note 2 19, at 637-38. 
258. See, e.g. , Karen Southwick, Plying a Murky Gene-Therapy Pool Biotechnology: A 
Promising Field is Hindered l:ty Red Tape, Money, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1995, at D4 (The cost 
ofGenzyme's gene therapy trials for its cystic fibrosis therapy "running about $15,000 to $20,000 
per patient-more than three times the cost of a conventional trial. And that will translate into high 
price tags for gene therapy when it is commercially available. ") .  
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developers , and delays in drug availability. 259 
2. Reforms Responsive to the Genotechnology Industry 
During the past few years , genotechnologies with the potential to impact 
dramatically the lives of terminally-ill patients have reached the FDA in a wave 
and, not coincidentally, reforms have been enacted to expedite the review 
process. 260 These reforms are attributable primarily to patient pressure, most 
notably that applied by AIDS activists and advocates for cancer patients. 261 
Congress is currently contemplating an overhaul of the FDA to make it easier 
for drug and medical device manufacturers to make their products available 
in the United States ' market. 262 
Reforms already implemented have decreased the time of the review 
process. The FDA and NIH are in the process of accelerating the review of 
gene therapy protocols by combining their review processes . 263 Under the 
Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1 992 (PDFA), Congress has added 620 
FDA reviewers ,  300 in CBER.264 Moreover, the PDFA introduced a new 
classification of drugs, which enables the FDA to prioritize new drugs to be 
reviewed.265 There is also a safety test agreement among the United States , 
Europe, and Japan to eliminate duplication of animal testing.266 
Most important, recent FDA changes shorten time periods and reduce 
259. The recently approved chicken pox vaccine is an illustration of some of the practical 
effects of the United States' system. Some criticize the FDA's handling of the chicken pox vaccine 
Varivax because two million children in Europe and Asia have had versions of it since 1984. John 
Carey, Is the FDA Hooked on Caution?, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 30, 1995, at 72. A concern which 
slowed approval of the vaccine was that it is not known how long the vaccine will work and there 
is a fear that the vaccine could lead to people contracting the disease as adults rather than as 
children. This is rather problematic, for chicken pox strikes adults with much more serious 
symptoms. Lawrence K. Altman, After Long Debate, Vaccine for Chicken Pox is Approved, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 18, 1995, at l .  
260. Henry, supra note 219, at 639. Carey, supra note 259, at 74. ("Some AIDS activists 
say the [FDA] has been approving some drugs too quickly, without enough clinical testing to 
figure out the best way to use them, or even if they work. ") 
261 . See, e.g. , Peter H. Stone, Ganging Up on the FDA, 27 NAT'L J. 410, 414 (1995) 
(National Kidney Cancer Foundation meeting with trade groups and think tanks to discuss issues 
and strategies regarding FDA reforms); see also Anderson, Cancer and AIDS Groups Push/or 
Changes in Drug Approval Process, 81 NAT'L CANCER INST. 829 (1989). 
262. This proposal is being initiated through legislation expected to be introduced by Sen. 
Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kan.), chair of the Senate's  Labor and Human Resources Committee. See 
Bloomberg Bus. News, Bill Would Ea£e Biotechnology Restrictions, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 5, 
1995, at 43. 
263. BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 14-15.  
264. Pub. L. No. 102-57 1 ,  106 Stat. 4491 (1992). 
265. Currently, two mutually exclusive ratings distinguish the therapeutic potentials of 
drugs-'-type P (priority) and type S (standard). Type P drugs provide improved treatment over 
alternative drug therapies through greater effectiveness. See Henry, supra note 219, at 627. 
266. Id. at 639. 
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the number of patients required for testing where technology deals with life­
threatening diseases for which there are no alternative treatments available. 267 
These changes include (1) the creation of Treatment INDs, 268 (2) the creation 
of Group C drugs for cancer, and (3) Parallel Drug Tracking269 -all of which 
are intended to make investigational drugs available to patients who require 
them at an earlier time.270 In November 1 995 , the Clinton Administration 
announced FDA reforms expressly intended to maintain American leadership 
in biotechnology. 271 These reforms include elimination of requirements that 
genotech companies file separate applications for new drugs and for the 
manufacturing facilities that will produce them if the drugs are well 
understood, seek approval for each group of biotech drugs shipped, and file 
some twenty-one separate applications for each biotech drug approval. 272 
Although there is not an abundance of genotech drugs with full FDA 
approval, 273 there are signs suggesting that FDA responsiveness is working 
to speed drugs to market. In December 1994, the FDA approved Genentech's  
Pulmozyme, a cystic fibrosis therapeutic. 274 This approval came only nine 
months after the company filed its PLA 275-about half the usual time-and 
it was preceded by approval of manufacturing and packaging plans. 276 
267. See 21 CFR § 3 12.34(b) (1993); 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (1993); Food Drug Cosm. L. 
Rep. (CCH) , 71 ,  1 87 (Jan. 23, 1995); O'REILLY, supra note 242, at § 1 3 . 1 3 .  
268. Treatment INDs, by permitting wider distribution of drugs prior to approval under 
New Drug application standards, allow patients access to drugs about two to three years earlier 
than their standard IND counterparts, and the developers of the drugs are allowed to charge 
patients for their use., Henry, supra note 219, at 624. A major problem with Treatment IND's, 
however, is that, because of their experimental nature, most insurance companies will not cover 
them . Therefore, "[t]reatment INDs could also set up a two-tiered system whereby wealthy patients 
would obtain the experimental therapy and those who could not afford the therapy would end up 
in clinical trials. There is also fear that drug developers may price the investigational drugs too 
high."  Id. at 625. 
269. Parallel drug tracking makes promising INDs available to selected patients, concurrent 
with the beginning of clinical trials designed to determine the efficacy of the drug. Id. at 625. 
270. Henry, Problems, supra note 219, at 628 (These regulatory innovations are intended 
to reduce the mean FDA approval time by 45 % ,  to 5.5 years .). 
271 .  John Schwartz, FDA Revises Biotechnology Rules, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1995, at 
Al9. 
272. Id. 
273. Rosenberg, supra note 87, at 61 (stating that only one new genotech drug earned FDA 
approval in 1994). See generally BIOTECH 96, supra note 2. 
274. Pulmozyme is a genetically engineered copy of a natural human enzyme which cuts 
strands of DNA that thicken lung secretions. See Fisher, Cystic Fibrosis Drug Approved, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 30, 1993, at lA. The drug was approved following a six to nine month 
clinical trial involving 968 people suffering from cystic fibrosis. Id. No tests were performed to 
assess the drug's safety and effectiveness in children under five years of age or in patients with 
less than a 40% breathing function, and it also was not tested to see if it would be safe and 
effective for more than one year. Id. 
275. BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 15.  
276. Lawrence M. Fisher, New Drug Approved for Cystic Fibrosis, LEXINGTON HERALD­
LEADER, Dec. 3 1 ,  1993, at A3. 
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Genentech's success with Pulmozyme (and the FDA) is attributed to: (1) early 
interaction with cystic fibrosis specialists, including scientists associated with 
the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation and the FDA to identify clinical strategies and 
data requirements; (2) incorporation of quality-of-life and pharmaceutical 
measures (the construction of a manufacturing facility and development of a 
long-range business plan) in Phase II and III studies to avoid having to redo 
such studies ; and (3) establishment of a foundation to help indigent 
patients-removing the stinger associated with the drug's $10,000 annual per­
patient cost277 and avoiding a pricing controversy like that associated with 
AZT.278 The FDA also approved Chiron/Berlex's Betaseron, a drug for 
multiple sclerosis. 279 In fact, during 1 993 and 1 994, twenty-four genotech 
products were approved by the FDA and 234 compounds were in various 
stages of human testing. 280 During 1 995, fifteen genotech products were 
approved, 281 and 494 products presently are undergoing human clinical 
trials .282 (The significant approvals for July 1 994 through June 1995 are 
included in Appendix II.) During the spring of 1 995, the FDA announced 
reforms to speed new therapies-including many of these products-to 
market.283 
Accelerating the process even more is FDA's recent willingness to 
expand access to experimental drugs and perhaps even to forego regulation 
under certain circumstances. Serono Laboratories Inc. received FDA approval 
to expand access to Serostim, a genetically engineered human growth hormone 
for AIDS patients suffering from severe weight loss.284 The FDA also is 
277. Fisher, supra note 274, at lA (stating that the cost could be $10,000 per year) . 
278. See supra note 1 83 and accompanying text. 
279. BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 16. 
280. Rosenberg, New England Firms Gained Approval for 3 Bio Tech Drugs, BoSTON 
GLOBE, Aug. 27, 1995, at 76. 
281 .  BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 20. Three drugs approved were developed in New 
England. Rosenberg, New Englmui. Firms, supra note 280 at 76; see, e.g. , Cambridge Biotech 
Test, WALL ST. J . ,  Sept. 13, 1995, at B2 (Cambridge Biotech Corp. received FDA marketing 
approval for a Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type 1 blood-screening test, with an expected annual 
worldwide market of $30 to $40 million.). It is anticipated that six more genotech products 
developed in New England will be approved by the FDA in 1996: Avonex, a multiple sclerosis 
drug produced by Biogen Inc. ;  Redux, an obesity drug produced by Interneuron Pharmaceuticals 
Inc . ;  Graftskin, a natural skin cover for closing venous ulcer wounds, produced by Organogenesis 
Inc . ;  Seprafil and Sepracoat, surgical adhesion preventatives produced by Genzyme Corp. ;  and 
Serostim, a drug to prevent "AIDS wasting" produced by Serono Laboratories Inc . Ronald 
Rosenberg, Biotech Firms Hope 1996 Brings FDA Approvals, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 8 ,  1995, at 
9 1 .  
282. BIOTECH 96, supra note 2 ,  at 23 (relying upon Goldman Sachs data). 
283. See infra notes 312-13 and accompanying text (identifying proposed reforms) . 
284. Ronald Rosenberg, Serono Wins FDA OK, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 22, 1994, at 47. 
The trials of this drug have been limited to company-sponsored studies involving approximately 
350 individuals. Id. Nevertheless, the availability of the drug is demonstrative of willingness by 
the FDA to expand access if patients are terminally ill. 
212 
A False Start? 
giving an expedited review to Genzyme' s Seprafilm, a technology that reduces 
the incidence of adhesions after surgery, and which already has been approved 
for sale in Ireland, Sweden and the Netherlands . 285 Moreover, the FDA will 
forego immediate regulation of Genzyme's cartilage restoration procedure-in 
which healthy cartilage is removed, grown and multiplied in a lab, and then 
transplanted back into the patient-which has been used on about 150 patients 
in Sweden. 286 Based on the premise that the procedure grows but does not 
change cells and because of the extensive control procedures Genzyme has 
already put in place, the FDA is allowing Genzyme to perform the procedure 
commercially. 287 The relaxation of regulations in cases such as these 
contributes to the current trend of expanding market access to new products .  
E. Other Examples of Regulatory Support 
There are other federal efforts to bolster investment and R&D in the 
genotech industry which, though less direct or encompassing than those 
addressed above, deserve some attention. First, recently enacted federal tax 
law excludes from taxable income fifty percent of capital gains from certain 
small business stock, 288 and this law is expected to stimulate investment in 
genotech firms and other start-up companies. 289 Observers also expect recent 
SEC Small Business Initiatives limiting restrictions on "seed" financing for 
private companies to benefit the genotech industry. 29° Furthermore, proposed 
congressional legislation would limit shareholder actions by creating limited 
corporate liability for statements and projections labeled "forward­
looking. "291 These bills also propose to limit damages in investor fraud class-
285. FDA Decision Boosts Genzyme, BosTON GLOBE, Aug. 8, 1995, at 45. For reports 
on the successes of Seprafilm's premarket testing, see Genzyme Will Seek FDA Approval to Sell 
Its Sepra.film Product, WALL Sr. J . ,  Sept. 14, 1995, at B2 (Genzyme planning to seek FDA 
marketing approval for Seprafilm based on favorable test results on gynecological surgery 
patients); cf. Genzyme Treatment For Adhesion Helps Half of Trial Patients, WALL Sr. J., Oct. 
25, 1995, at B4 (Seprafilm trials resulted in preventing post-surgical adhesions in 51 % of colon 
surgery patients; "less-than-universal effect . . .  rais[ing] questions about how widely the treatment 
may be used if it is approved by the Food and Drug Administration . . . Genzyme has said it 
hopes Seprafilm will become standard in abdominal and gynecological surgery and create a $400 
million to $1 billion market."). 
286. Larry Tye, Genzyme Gets OK to Revive Cartilage-Transplant Trial, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Apr. 12, 1995, at 45 . 
287. Telephone Interview with Mark A. Hofer, General Counsel, Genzyme Corp. , Nov. 
7, 1995. 
288. See generally I.R.C. 1202 (1995). 
289. Johnson, supra note 27, at 10. 
290. Id. at 1 1  (analyzing the likely impact of the SEC Small Business Initiative's 
Regulation D (504), which allows private companies to raise $1 million in a year without standard 
SEC advertising, investor qualification, or information restrictions). 
29 1 .  The proposed bills are S .  240 and H.R. 1058, with H.R. 1 058 immunizing companies 
for forward-looking projections and S. 240 having a more moderate requirement of "actual 
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actions to a portion of the defendant's fault, rather than holding all defendants 
jointly and severally liable. 292 Such changes would have a noticeable impact 
on the genotech industry, which has and continues to be plagued with such 
actions-many inspired by clinical trial failures. 293 
The genotech industry also is likely to benefit from a renewed 
commitment to promote federal-state partnerships. Many states, including 
Massachusetts , California and Maryland have targeted developing a genotech 
industry as a priority. 294 The importance of the industry to those states in 
which it is concentrated suggests that it will be represented aggressively in 
federal-state collaborations, especially considering how much these states are 
doing for the industry. 295 The founding of the State-Federal Technology 
knowledge" that the projection is false. See Karen Donovan, Class Actions Curtailed, NAT'L L. 
J. ,  July 10, 1995, at A6. 
292. Id. 
293 . See, e.g. , Hoexter v. Biogen, Inc . ,  No. 94- 12198PBS (D. Mass. filed Nov. 4, 1994) 
(alleging insider trading in violation of lO(b) , 20(a), 20(A), and lOb-5); Lazar v. Vincent, No. 
94- 12177PBS (D. Mass. filed Nov. 2, 1994) (Biogen, Inc .)  (alleges misrepresentations and 
nondisclosure of material facts regarding Hirulog); Jones v. Biogen, Inc.,  No. 94-12181PBS (D. 
Mass. filed Nov . 2 ,  1994) (allegations of lO(b), 20(a) , and lOb-5 violations); Leger v. Perseptive 
Biosystems, Inc. ,  No. 94-12582PBS (D. Mass. filed Dec. 27, 1994); Vision See's v. Perseptive 
Biosystems, Inc . ,  No. 94-12575PBS (D. Mass. filed Dec. 27, 1994) . These suits are all brought 
on grounds of misrepresentation or failure to disclose material facts under sections I O(b) and 20(a) 
1of the Securities Exchange Acts, (codified at 1 5  U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(a) (1988)) and under SEC 
rule lOb-5 (codified at 17 C.F.R. §240. lOb-5 (1995)). 
294. For documentation of Massachusetts' commitment to the biotech industry, see Stephen 
Buckley, Jr. and G. Steven Burrill, BIOTECH 94: NEW ENGLAND (Ernst & Young) (1995); see 
also ANNUAL REPORT, WORC. Bus. DEV. CORP. 3 (1995) (expansion and construction of new 
biotech research parks in Worcester and Grafton, MA expected) ; Lissa Eckelbecker, Building on 
Biotech: Plans for 1\vo Parks in Grafton Plyg Along as Industry Struggles, WORCESTER TEL. & 
GAZETTE, Nov . 6, 1994, at El (plans of Tufts University to open Tufts Biotechnology Park). 
Maryland (with close proximity to NIH and Johns Hopkins University) and California are also 
attractive to biotech investors . The Bay Area now has more firms-202-than any other region. 
New England is next with 175. See Steve Kaufman, Bio-Roulette Failures Have Cut the Flow of 
Funds to Biotech, But Big Rewards Tempt Some Investors, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 28, 
1994, at ID. In the competition to win federal funds, Maryland was designated recently as the 
home of the AIDS Research Institute, a $12 million package. Co-discoverer of the AIDS virus 
Robert C. Gallo, epidemiologist William Blattner of the National Cancer Center, and clinician 
Robert Redfield of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research will head the Institute. It is 
anticipated that the Institute will foster Maryland's efforts to become the focus within the genotech 
industry. See Baltimore Wins Top AIDS Scientist 's Research Institute, BosTON GLOBE , May 25, 
1995, at 16. See Bill Barnhart, An Improbable Dow Day Industrial, Transponanon Indexes Record 
No Change, CHIC . TRIB. ,  Jan. 19, 1994, at 5 (addressing California's advantageous entrepreneurial 
environment for technological innovation) . But see BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 15 (several other 
states are attempting to secure larger biotech investment) . 
295 . A network of state biotechnology associations has fonned and is continuing to expand. 
See BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 44. State and local benefits offered to the industry include: R&D 
and other investment tax credits; seed captial and/or operating capital funds; tax loss 
transferability; sales tax exemptions; job creation incentives; investing state pension funds; 
property tax abatement; subsidized land use tax until facilities are operational; and construction 
fee waivers. See id. 
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Partnership evidences commitment to an effort to foster a federal-state 
cooperative approach to technology by promoting collaboration between the 
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National 
G • A  · · 296 M ovemors ssoc1ation. oreover, federal support for the industry and 
the resulting accomplishments have inspired state efforts and competition to 
attract the industry's budding businesses. 297 
III. Genotech at the Crossroads: Challenges, Choices, and Proposals for 
Change 
With all of its accomplishments and possibilities , the genotech industry, 
as it begins to commercialize technologies , is at a proverbial crossroads . 298 
In sharp contrast to existing regulatory support for genotech R&D, the legal 
and regulatory infrastructure to commercialize genotechnologies is l acking. As 
discussed above, due to financial pressures , the industry has been reshaping 
itself-a process that has led to dramatic changes.299 Though genotech now 
is attracting investment dollars through initial public offerings (IPOs) and other 
sources,300 the dry times of 1 994 and much of 1995 may have left a lasting 
impression. There is, or at least should be, awareness that clinical 
disappointments, public controversy, and short-sighted policymaking to quell 
the particular controversy of the moment may change the market again. 
The following are some of the most important challenges facing the 
genotech industry, choices before policymakers , and proposals for change. All 
of these challenges, choices, and proposals bear upon the financial viability 
of the genotech industry and its attractiveness to investors , which directly 
affect the future and nature of the industry . Even more important, they also 
will influence the improvements to human health associated with the 
forthcoming generation of genotech therapeutics and diagnostics. 
A. The Drug-Approval Process 
The vast majority of the nation's genotech companies , some of which 
296. See BERGLUND & COBURN, supra note 183, at xiii; see also THE STATE - FEDERAL 
TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP TASK FORCE, FIN AL REPORT (1995) (emphasizing the renewal of the 
National Science and Technology System, state participation, encouragement of private sector 
investments in technology, and national excellence in manufacturing). 
297. See Kaufman, supra note 294. 
298. See Day, supra note 90, at 1 8-19 (summarizing and discussing problems : failed tests; 
lawsuits; impatient investors; precarious reliance on a single-product; cost of publicity) . 
299. See generally BIOTECH 96, supra note 2. 
300. BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 10; see, e.g. , Ronald Rosenberg, Genzyme /PO Scores, 
BosTON GLOBE, Oct. 14, 1995, at 64 (Company provided one of the highest stock offerings of 
the year due to anticipated FDA approval of its two surgical coating products.). 
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have been engaged in R&D for more than a decade, have no products in 
commerce. 301 The length of the FDA approval process affects the companies 
whose products are being reviewed directly and also may affect the market­
wide impression of the industry.302 One high-profile genotech company's 
failure can have an industry-wide impact and there have been many such 
failures . 303 Accordingly ,  one of the most pressing concerns of CEOs of 
genotech companies is the ability to get technologies through the FDA and to 
market, which, in turn, affects their most pressing concern-financing. 304 
The difficulty the FDA has in evaluating these new genotechnologies is 
illustrated clearly by the example of its review of dexfenfluramine, an obesity 
drug developed by Interneuron Pharmaceuticals Inc. On September 28, 1995, 
the FDA's Endocrinologic and Metabolic Drugs Advisory Committee ruled 
301 . McDermott, supra note 7, at A l . Robert E. Ivy, Chairman, President, and CEO, 
RIB! Immunochem Research,  Inc. ,  quoted in BIOTECH 95, supra note 2 at 26 ("If you are in the 
pharmaceutical business, your first client is the FDA. After satisfying the FDA, your client is 
the patient. After you satisfy the patient, you can start paying back the shareholder."). 
302. Tom Petruno, Renewed Interest in Biotech Stocks, CHIC. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 12, 1993, 
at 40. In the summer of 1995, the Health Industry Manufacturers Association (HHA) released a 
275-page study showing that although the number of applications for products has declined, the 
time it takes to evaluate these applications has increased 1 . 5  times. Regulalory Burdens Cited as 
Leading Cause of Delayed Technology, HOME HEALTH CARE DEALER/SUPPLIER, July/ Aug. 1995, 
at 20. Ronald Rosenberg, FDA Panel to Deal with Antiobesity Drug on Monday, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Sept. 30, 1995, at 6 1  (stating that the FDA advisory panel, after an intense nine-hour session, 
still could not reach a quorum on a fat-fighting drug, and that the company' s  stock fell as investors 
tried to gauge the FDA panel' s  actions) . 
303 . See BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 25-27; see also Cassidy, supra note 88, at A l 3-14 
("Demand has crashed because very few venture capitalists are willing to back start-ups after a 
year in which there were several glaring examples of experimental drugs failing to live up to 
expectations, companies grappling with long-term financial issues and the growing realization that 
production costs are often too high for small biotech businesses. "); see also Day, supra note 90, 
at 1 8  ("Expectations that the FDA would approve [Medimmune Inc . 's cystic fibrosis] drug had 
run the company's stock up to more than $36 a share in November 1993. It went crashing down 
to the $3 to $4-a-share range, stunning company executives. ") ;  Kaufman, supra note 294, at lD 
("The failure of many biopharmaceuticals in late-stage FDA clinical trials-about 30 in the last 
three years-has also forced them to confront the staggering cost of financing a biotechnology 
company. "); Ronald Rosenberg, Biogen Lost a Drug, Kept its Health, Reputation, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Nov. 20, 1994, at Al-A2 (providing Biogen as an example of an industry roller coaster trend of 
companies taking large risks and facing tough declines on research of a single drug that does not 
produce anticipated results) ; Rosenberg, supra note 87, at 61 (tracking the successful rise in 
Biogen, Inc. 's stock price with positive test results on an intramuscular drug, Beta Interferon, to 
treat multiple sclerosis, and susequent plunge with disappointing results on the development of 
a blood thinner alternative, Hirulog). Compare Marc Monseau, Possible Drug Approval by FDA 
Helps Boost Shares of Biogen, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 29, 1995, at 31 (reporting a 7 . 1  % gain in 
Biogen, Inc. shares due to investor hope that the company would apply soon for marketing 
approval for its multiple sclerosis product); Ronald Rosenberg, Optimism Over Antiscarring Drug 
Boosts Genzyme Shares, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 1 995, at 58 (reporting that Genzyme stock 
climbed more than four points within 30 minutes of the announcement of success with HAL-F, 
an antiscarring drug which would have a major impact on the market for surgical adhesions). 
304. Specifically, the lack of clarity in FDA review standard guidelines concerns these 
c;ompanies. See BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 26. 
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that dexfenfluramine is effective, but not safe enough for long-term use. When 
the FDA asked the committee for clarification, an incomplete vote (some panel 
members had left the room) resulted in a three-to-two vote for approval. 305 
Finally, in November 1995, the full panel on a six-to-five vote recommended 
approval of the drug-the first obesity drug approved by the FDA in twenty 
years . 306 
Currently, both Congress and the industry are pressuring the FDA to 
reform the drug-approval process.307 Critics charge that the FDA has 
contributed to increasing health care costs , monopolistic practices ,  
unavailability of crucial therapeutics to particular categories of patients, and 
a decline in the American advantage in biotechnology in the international 
arena.308 The congressional reform effort is bipartisan, and it includes 
hearings being conducted by the Senate's Labor and Human Resources 
Committee and the House Commerce Committee's subcommittee on Oversight 
and Investigation .  309 Although no new legislation is expected until 1996, 
existing legislative proposals include: (1)  contracting out product reviews to 
private testing laboratories to speed up product approvals; (2) eliminating the 
requirement that the manufacturers of genotechnologies build full-scale 
manufacturing facilities as a prerequisite for approval of their therapeutics; (3) 
eliminating required FDA review when a company makes standard changes 
in its manufacturing practices; and (4) harmonizing FDA regulatory 
requirements with those of other countries to avoid repetition of clinical 
efforts .310 Although the Clinton Administration has announced revisions of 
FDA rules concerning biotechnology products , legislation is required to codify 
these regulatory modifications . 311 
Perhaps more significant, in April 1995 the FDA itself identified reforms 
that could accelerate substantially the drug review process .  To supplement 
proposals two and three outlined above, the FDA proposed that: ( 1 )  a two-year 
305. Rosenberg, supra note 87, at 6 1 .  
306. Joseph Pereira, FDA Advisory Panel Urges Approval of the First New Diet Pill in 
Decades, WALL ST. J . ,  Nov. 17, 1995, at B2; Ronald Rosenberg, Panel's OK of Diet Drug Lifts 
lnterneuron Stock, BoSTON GLOBE, Nov . 18,  1995, at 61 (indicating that the full FDA commission 
is likely to approve it). 
307. See BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 36. 
308. Id. 
309. Id. 
3 10. Id. at 37. Eighty-five percent of genotech CEOs have predicted that such reforms 
will have a positive impact on the industry. Id. at 10. There also is a proposal to provide genotech 
companies with more flexibility in exporting products that are awaiting FDA approval to foreign 
industrialized countries. Id. at 37. In light of the added caution many other nations have 
demonstrated towards genotechnology, such legislation could lead to significant political backlash 
against the United States .  See supra Section 11 .B.2. ; ily'Ta Part III.B.2. Accordingly, great attention 
should be paid to cultural and political differences between the United States and target test 
markets before such legislation is enacted. 
3 1 1 .  Schwartz, supra note 271 ,  at Al9. 
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pilot program be created to examine the feasability of private-sector evaluation 
of some low-risk medical devices; (2) FDA standards be harmonized with 
international medical standards, enabling the FDA to accept drugs tested 
abroad rather than mandating retesting in the United States; (3) a single major 
clinical trial be accepted as evidence that a drug works; and (4) 125 categories 
of very low-risk medical devices be added to the 440 already exempt from 
FDA review. 312 In November 1995 , the FDA announced that it intends to 
streamline its approval process for genotech developers by, among other 
things, eliminating the requirement that the FDA approve manufacturing plants 
for genotech drugs . 313 
The proposals identified above generally merit serious consideration, and 
some should be implemented immediately. It seems particularly appropriate 
to utilize the expertise of the private sector in evaluating genotechnologies, 
which are novel technologies developed by leaders in science and academia 
whose expertise is rare and, in some cases, perhaps impossible to match. The 
FDA's proposal to introduce a two-year pilot program for low-risk 
technologies is a safe beginning for such reform. Shifting such basic testing 
to laboratories with some political distance from the drug-approval process may 
result in accelerated review. Moreover, even if the direct involvement of 
private laboratories is limited to very low-risk technologies , the overall review 
process may benefit simply by exposing FDA laboratory workers and 
administrators to the efficiencies of private sector commercial laboratories. 
Also, this limited reform may lead to delegation of the basic testing 
components for certain complex technologies to the private s ector . 
Expanding the categories for low-risk medical devices would enable the 
FDA to focus its limited resources on other more complex technologies . Such 
reform also would benefit the private sector by enabling some genotech 
companies to begin generating or expanding revenues. However, the impact 
of this change on the genotech industry is likely to be minimal since most 
genotech devices are classified as Class IIl.314 Furthermore, this proposal 
raises serious questions. For example, many of the genotech products which 
fall into the "devices" category are diagnostics. Though such products may 
pose a minimal physical health risk to patients , the mental and societal risks 
accompanying such technologies are considerable. 315 As discussed in Section 
III.D, these issues must be addressed and resolved before patient exposure to 
genotech diagnostics is expanded. 
312. BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 58. 
313. Acron Zitner, JiDA Set to Give Biotech Firmsa Boost, J3oSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 1995, 
at 63; see also Schwartz, supra note 271, at Al9. 
314. Diane E. Hoffman, The Biotechnology Revolution and its Regulatory Evolution, 38 
DRAKE L. REV. 471 ,  5 1 1-12 ( 1988-89). 
315. See infra notes 419-33 and accompanying text. 
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Harmonizing FDA regulatory requirements with those of other countries 
and accepting a single major clinical trial as evidence of a drug's  efficacy 
would avoid wasteful duplication of effort. The world-wide scientific 
community is particularly accustomed to working together and sharing 
information in the field of genotechnology as a result of efforts such as HGP 
and the work of organizations such as HUGO and UNESCO. In fact, as stated 
earlier, many European-based pharmas have invested in genotechnology 
developed in the United States ,  and some United States genotech companies ,  
such as  Genzyme, now are conducting clinical trials abroad. If repetition of 
clinical efforts were avoided, more resources could be allocated to 
postmarketing surveillance. In fact, regardless of whether such reforms are 
realized, meaningful post-marketing surveillance must be mandated to ensure 
responsible application of genotechnologies. Long-term surveillance is the only 
means to evaluate satisfactorily the safety of many genotechnologies , the side 
effects of which may take years to emerge and are impossible to assess fully 
at the pre-marketing stage. Moreover, such reform is commercially viable 
because the expense of post-marketing surveillance would be offset by revenues 
received by genotech manufacturers marketing the drugs being observed. In 
other words , costs would be shifted to the post-marketing stage, with earlier 
commercialization financing this more extensive observation. So long as it is 
accompanied by adequate safeguards and meaningful consent requirements, 
such reform also is the responsible regulatory course from the patient 
perspective. Withholding technologies which extensive clinical trials suggest 
will have a dramatic impact on the lives of the terminally ill and where existing 
testing capabilities have been exhausted is simply not an acceptable option. 
Improving the drug-approval system for genotech therapeutics and 
diagnostics would profoundly affect the genotech and health care industries,  
especially given the number of such technologies now in the drug-approval 
process . 316 In addition to the proposals mentioned above, another possibility 
for reform should be considered. Minimizing the "biologics" classification 
would avoid many of the added regulatory burdens currently imposed, the most 
onerous being : ( 1 )  the requirement that the products used in Phase III trials 
be produced in the intended commercial-scale manufacturing facility; (2) the 
limitation of access to marketing licenses to companies that manufacture the 
biologic; and (3) the mandate that each significant participant in the 
3 16. Such improvement also would, at least to some extent, preempt interference with 
clinical trials by patients utilizing the "information super highway. "  It already has been 
documented that patients suffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), also known as Lou 
Gehrig's disease, involved in Neurontin (a drug used to treat epilepsy) trials went on-line and 
reported positive results, enabling each other to determine if they were receiving placebos or �he 
real thing. See William M. Bulkeley, E-Mail Medicine: Untested Treatments, Cures Find 
Stronghold on On-Line Services; Doctors Fret the Gravely Ill May Share Information and Skew 
Drug Testing, WALL ST. J. ,  Feb. 27, 1995, at A l .  
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manufacturing process hold establishment and product licenses for the new 
technology. 317 These requirements are anachronistic remnants of a time when 
biologics could not be produced with the purity of traditional drugs-a time 
when the science of genetics engendered fear rather than confidence in its 
practical prospects for improving human health. For the many modern 
biologics that can be produced with drug-like purity and consistency, these 
added burdens should be removed. 318 An alternative possibility is simply 
eliminating the added burdens under the PHS, while maintaining the biologics 
classification for other purposes, such as post-marketing surveillance, and the 
minimization of bureaucratic delays. Such reform would, among other things, 
enable genotech companies to enter manufacturing agreements with pharmas 
without giving up ownership interests in the technologies, thus reducing some 
of the dangers regarding pharma investment identified above in Section I.B. 
A more ambitious solution would be to develop a new classification 
system tailored to genotech-based drugs . Such a system would be flexible, with 
multiple drug-approval tracks and clinical trial alternatives created with patient 
and economic cost-benefit analyses in mind and building upon the reforms 
introduced by the FDA in 1988 and by PDFA in 1 992. There are already some 
indications that the FDA and NIH are recognizing this need for added 
flexibility. For example,  as stated above, the FDA is permitting Genzyme to 
·continue its new cartilage restoration procedure pending development of FDA 
regulation for such therapies , and some self-reforms already have been 
announced by the FDA.319 
The potentially conflicting objectives of making new technologies 
available to patients and protecting the public from possibly harmful 
technologies are embodied in all drug-approval processes and create a 
necessary but extremely difficult cost-benefit analysis . The difficulty of such 
an analysis is directly proportional to the novelty (and uncertainty) of the 
technologies and their potential to improve human health. The analysis 
becomes especially challenging when highly experimental technologies offer 
potential treatment for those who are terminally ill and, more generally, for 
those who are suffering from conditions not adequately treatable with 
3 17. See 2 1  C.F.R § 601 . 1-.51 (1995). 
31 8. See Gamerman, supra note 243 . The arguments for eliminating the distinction between 
the review processes for biologics and more traditional drugs may be summarized as follows: (i) 
modern biologics can be produced with drug-like purity and consistency; (ii) there are no scientific 
distinctions between many products regulated as drugs and those regulated as biologics; (iii) there 
are no significant regulatory controls under Biologics Act that are/could not be implemented under 
FDCA. Id. at 226. In addition, "[b]ecause of the policies and regulations imposed by CBER, 
biologics developers must commit far more of their limited financial resources to manufacturing 
before they know whether they have an appropriate product than do drug developers."  Id. at 214. 
3 19. Telephone Interview with Mark A. Hofer, General Counsel, Genzyme Corp., Nov. 
7, 1995; see Schwartz, supra note 271 ,  at A l 9. 
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established technologies. Many current biotech products do not substantially 
treat their target diseases, and researchers and regulators may have difficulty 
reaching agreement on how to design effective clinical studies and what the 
goals of such studies should be. 320 
For treatments targeted to the terminally ill,321 CBER might adopt an 
approval track approach more like the United Kingdom's .322 This approach 
is designed to ( 1 )  allow drug developers to make new technologies available 
to patients unable to wait; and (2) remove the "experimental" label from these 
technologies earlier, thereby both removing insurers' justification for refusing 
coverage and generating patient data more quickly. The resulting economic 
advantages for drug developers would have to be accompanied by stronger 
patient consent and care requirements for health care providers and heavier 
post-marketing requirements on the developers.323 Such an approach would 
reflect the novelty of many genotech therapeutics and diagnostics , the long­
term side effects and effectiveness of which may not be determined any other 
way. Additional possibilities include aggressively expanding the use of 
Treatment INDs,324 Group C drugs for cancer, and Parallel Drug Tracking 
for low-risk genotechnologies such as tissue growth and adhesion 
technologies .325 Another more prudent possibility is the acceleration of Phase 
III for potentially life-saving technology by shortening trial time periods and 
reducing the number of patients required to be tested where the technology is 
320. See BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 26. 
321 .  A change in requirements for terminally ill patients would have to come from the 
regulators, because the Supreme Court has held that it cannot come from patients or through the 
courts. See United States v .  Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) . In Rutherford, the Supreme Court 
found that the lower court had erred in holding that the FDA should apply a looser standard in 
approving drugs to be used by terminally ill patients on the grounds that such patients are going 
to die without such drugs. 442 U.S. at 550-551 .  The Court unanimously held that the FDA has 
authority to require safety and effectiveness for all drugs, including those to treat the terminally 
ill, and that Congress intended for the FDA to shield even terminally ill patients from fraudulent 
cures. 442 U.S. at 558. 
322. Drug testing in Great Britain also begins with animal testing, and investigational and 
experimental drug use on humans requires certification and licensing. However, therapeutic use 
(physicians administering drugs to patients) is permitted and excluded from the certification 
requirement. It also is accompanied by reliance on and close patient monitoring by health care 
providers and stringent post-marketing surveillance requirements on drug developers. Henry, supra 
note 219, at 637. 
323. Id. at 637-38 .  
324. "The Treatment IND is intended to speed availability of drugs by allowing a sponsor 
to distribute a drug more widely than before it has all the data needed to obtain a full market 
approval under a New Drug Application . "  Id. at 624. Treatment INDs allow companies to charge 
the patients for the investigational drug, thus permitting patients access to drugs about two to three 
years earlier. Along with its benefits, such a system leads to a difficult accessibility issue because 
many insurance companies will not pay for investigational drugs. "Treatment INDs could . . . 
set up a two-tiered system whereby wealthy patients would obtain the experimental therapy and 
those who could not afford the therapy would end up in clinical trials. There is also fear that drug 
developers may price the investigational drugs too high. "  Id. at 625. 
325. See generally id. at 623-28.  
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for life-threatening and incurable diseases . Such a reduction in pre-market 
testing again should be offset by imposing a higher post-marketing 
requirement. 
There are obvious dangers accompanying these proposals. These dangers 
were illustrated in the recent failure of an NIH-sponsored e xperimental AZT­
based AIDS vaccine, which was administered to at-risk newborns and to 
infected expectant mothers to impede transmission of the AIDS virus from 
mother to child.326 Noteworthy genotech disasters include those experienced 
in trials by Xoma Corp. and Chiron,  which had a profou nd negative impact 
on the industry and its innovation .  327 Recently, an experimental drug was 
tested on seventeen advanced cancer patients by Genetics Institute. In early 
test-tube experiments , the drug restored normal immune responses in cells that 
were damaged by the AIDS virus .  However, a Phase II trial of the drug 
resulted in the death of one patient and the hospitalization of eleven others . 328 
The general dangers of administering highly experimental protocols are 
well documented,329 as are the lawsuits which arise out of them,330 the 
impact of failures on the value of developers' stock,331 and the lack of a 
326. "AZT, the most common antiviral drug used against the AIDS virus, has been 
dropped from a clinical trial among children after it proved to be the least effective, and to cause 
the highest rate of side effects of three treatments, the National Institutes of Health a1U1ounced 
yesterday. "  AZT is Dropped from Clinical Trial, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 14,  1995, at 6 (emphasis 
added). 
327. See Benedict Bahner, Hanging Back: Biotechnology Companies Are Struggling to 
Survive at a Time of Investor Reluctance, CHEM. MARKEfING REP. , Mar. 7 ,  1994, at IO 
(Depressed stock prices are due in part to "the failure of high-profile septic shock therapies from 
Centocor, Xoma and Synergen . . . .  Most notable was Centocor's HA- IA/Centoxin, whose 
clinical trials ended when tests showed a mortality rate 'excess' among patients tested with it."); 
see also The "Virtual"  Pharmaceutical Company and Other Trends in Strategic Alliances, 
PREsswIRE, Jan. 24, 1995 (discontinuation of clinical trials of Chiron drug for septic shock had 
a minimal impact on the company's stock price "compared with a 50% fall in capital value" of 
Centocor, Synergen and Xoma which had "product failures in the same therapeutic areas "). 
328. Mitchell Zuckoff, Drug Inquiry Targets Absence of Use of Test Dose, Waiting Period, 
BOSTON GLOBE, June 15, 1995, at 51;  see also Genetics Institute Hopes to Restart Drug 's Testing, 
BOSTON GLOBE, July 23, 1995, at 74 (releasing preliminary results of internal investigation) . 
329. See generally David W. Bates et al. , Incidence of Adverse Drug Events and Potential 
Adverse Drug Events: Implications for Prevention, 274 JAMA 29, 29-35 ( 1995). These dangers 
have been made evident in recent investigation of mistakes regarding experimental cancer 
treatments administered at the Dana Farber Cancer Institute. See Richard A. Knox & Daniel 
Golden, Drug Dosage Was Questioned, BOSTON GLOBE, June 19, 1995, at 1 ,  20; Richard Saltus, 
The Doses and Risks of Chenwtherapy, BoSTON GLOBE, Mar. 27, 1995, at 37 (Experimental 
chemotherapy treatments are "a game played very close to the edge."). See also Scott Allen, 
Deadly Legacy, BOSTON GLOBE, May 29, 1995, at 27-28 (emphasizing that experimental cancer 
treatments carried out in the 1950s and 1960s are now generating law suits) ; Day, supra note 90, 
at 18 (noting that failed tests are one of the genotech industry's "major challenges. ") .  
330. See, e.g . ,  Allen, supra note 329, at 27-28. 
331 .  See Day, supra note 90; Rosenberg, supra note 87, at Al (noting that abandonment 
of one drug's development after disappointing test results caused Biogen' s stock price to drop 25 % 
in a few days); U.S. Bioscience Stock Falls 69%,  BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1 8 ,  1994, at 60 (noting 
steep fall in stock price following failure to win FDA approval for experimental cancer drug, 
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systematic mechanism for reporting mistakes regarding experimental 
treatments .332 Nevertheless, the danger of suffering or dying from a terminal 
illness while a viable treatment remains in the existing drug-approval 
process-and therefore unavailable-also is obvious ,  as is the danger of 
suffocating economically an industry capable of generating a myriad of such 
technologies . 
The changes discussed above would result in a shift of the genotech 
industry's development costs to the post-marketing period, when patients are 
using and paying for their technologies . 333 From the patient's  perspective, 
additional risk would be assumed in exhange for quicker access and, for the 
terminally ill , a chance for extended life. 334 Along with the heavier post­
marketing requirements discussed above, Congress should enact a meaningful 
informed-consent requirement accompanied by a regulatory compliance 
defense. This enactment would both enhance patient voluntariness and 
understanding and limit drug developer liability for unanticipated and 
unforeseeable effects , which would have to be carefully and explicitly 
defined. 335 Such legislation should include a mandatory counseling 
component. True informed consent may not be realized through standardized 
forms and/or from the apparent assent of the extremely vulnerable terminally 
ill. Essentially, these proposals would form a more responsible legal and 
regulatory infrastructure for the commercialization of genotechnologies, and 
increase the likelihood that delays in their availability would reflect responsive 
public policymaking rather than regulatory nonresponsiveness or an inability 
to grapple with the issues raised by these new technologies . 
Ethyol). 
332. See Richard A. Know & Brian C. Mooney, Hospital Dosage Mistakes Not Rare, 
BoSTON GLOBE, Apr . 16, 1995, at 1 ,  14.  
333. An overview of arguments for shifting clinical data requirements to post-marketing 
is provided in Henry, supra note 219, at 624, 638. 
334. Pulmozyme, the genetics therapeutic for cystic fibrosis discussed supra note 274, was 
approved by European regulators in 1 993. See Louis Trager, Europe OKs New Drug 
by Genentech; Cystic Fibrosis Treatment Should Benefit Patients, S.F.  EXAM. ,  Dec . 17, 1993. 
335. See Margaret Gilhooley, Innovative Drugs, Products Liability, Regulatory 
Compliance, and Patient Choice, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1481 (1994) for a discussion of the 
importance of patient-care safeguards and consent requirements in light of the inherent 
patient/subject conflict involved in treating patients on experimental protocols. Safeguards cannot 
completely eliminate the possibility of delayed effects during trials and even once technologies 
have been marketed, especially for genuinely novel technologies. See id. at 1482. A regulatory 
compliance defense could serve to limit legal liability for this inevitable occurrence, thereby 
encouraging innovation. Such a defense as proposed by one commentator should be accompanied 
by supplementing drug labeling with a digest of current literature on scientific studies relating to 
the drug that would be accessible to both doctors and patients. Id. at 1482-88. An informed 
consent requirement with a counseling component should also accompany such a defense. 
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The novelty of genotechnology and the relative lack of jurisprudence 
applying traditional patent policy to it have encouraged genotech firms to 
"hedge their bets " by filing patent applications . For example, despite the 
PTO's denial of the NIH's patent applications, companies continue to apply 
for patents on partial gene sequences.336 This trend could result in several 
companies each obtaining a patent on a segment of a complete gene,337 
thereby necessitating elaborate licensing arrangements to enable any one of 
these companies to commercialize the entire gene or its products .338 Issues 
of patent ownership and validity are becoming more critical as technologies 
become commercially viable and companies increasingly devote resources to 
enforcing their patents through the courts. 339 
336. Smith & Kettel berger, supra note 151 ,  at 49-50, 57 (noting that more than a dozen 
companies, including lncyte Pharmaceuticals, are vying to sequence DNA fragments, but since 
patent applications are secret, there is no available estimate of how many patent applications claim 
partial DNA sequences) ; see also Carey, supra note 8, at 74 (noting that HGS was "madly filing" 
patents on gene fragments) . The company filing the most gene sequence patents is TIGR, headed 
by J. Craig Venter and affiliated with HGS whose CEO is Dr. William A. Haseltine. See supra 
note 100 and accompanying text. Recently, as Venter has turned to more basic science and 
Haseltine has duplicated Venter's sequencing and begun producing 750,000 DNA code pieces 
daily, the relationship between TIGR and HGS has become strained. Carey, supra note 8, at 77. 
Venter's arrangement with HGS gave him the right to publish his findings in return for HGS 
receiving commercial rights to the genes he discovered. Id. To ensure its commercial advantage, 
and perhaps also to prevent any patent it applies for from being denied on the ground of 
obviousness, HGS would now like Venter to delay publication. Id. See also 35 U.S.C. § 1 03 (1988 
& Supp. V 1 993) (obviousness bar to patentability). Merck is attempting to counter HGS's efforts, 
however, by making gene fragments publicly available. Carey, supra note 8 at 73. "Merck 
executives figure that i f  everyone has the same information, the company's vaunted research and 
development department can win most ofthe races to market. 'Mliking drugs from genes is like 
going from a dictionary to the works of Shakespeare,' explains Merck's Alan R. Williamson, vice­
preseident for research strategy worldwide. "  Id. See also Elvyse Tanouye, SmithKline Beecham 
Leads in Race to Use Genetics to Find Drugs, WALL ST. J . ,  Nov. 24, 1995, at A l ,  A5 (detailing 
Merck's plans to deposit all results from its work with Washington University in the federal 
government's gene databank which is accessible via the Internet to any scientist and illustrating 
how such databanks can be searched for the genetic foundation of a new drug which can then be 
used to create a competing product) . 
337. Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 1 5 1 ,  at 47. 
338. Id. The transaction costs of commercialization under such circumstances would likely 
be considerable. If licensing were to become a pervasive problem for the industry, an industry 
group might form-like ASCAP or BMI-to centralize licensing and decrease transaction costs. 
339. See Day, supra note 90, at 18 (noting that many companies devote considerable 
resources to launching or defending against patent suits); Eric C. Woglom & Margaret A. Pierri, 
U.S. Is Unifying Utility Requirements, NAT' L L. J . ,  Feb. 20, 1 995, at C37 (focus of patent activity 
in genotech moving from procurement to enforcement); Amgen Wins' Round in Patent Dispute, 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15,  1995, at D2 (federal district court upheld decision finding Genetics 
lnstitute's patent for Epogen invalid and unenforceable against 'Amtech); Sally Lehrman, 
Genentech, Lilly Settle 8-Year Fight Over Drug, S.F. EXAM . ,  Jan. 6, 1 995, at B l  (noting that Eli 
Lilly settled patent suit over Genentech's human growth hormone for $145 million, and that 
companies spent $75 million protecting respective technologies). i 
224 
A False Start? 
Because of the complex funding structure of most research efforts-with 
money provided by government, academia and industry-ownership of the 
resulting work product and any patent rights thereto may be unclear.340 An 
example is the controversy over the BRCAl gene, mutations of which have 
been found to cause a predisposition to breast and/or ovarian cancer.341 The 
work isolating the gene was conducted in collaboration by researchers at the 
NIH, the University of Utah Medical Center, McGill University, Eli Lilly, and 
Myriad Genetics, Inc.342 However, the patent application named only 
researchers from the University of Utah and Myriad Genetics as inventors .343 
The NIH, which had provided valuable assistance to the project at taxpayer 
expense, objected. 344 Eventually a settlement was negotiated resolving control 
of diagnostic testing and treatments , and the Nm was added to the patent.345 
These types of disputes are likely to continue to arise as research funded by 
government agencies, academia and the private sector results m 
commercialized technologies . 
With pharmas expressing greater interest in genotech companies and their 
technologies , and with financial stakes rising as commercialization of 
genotechnology begins , the validity of patents is likely to be challenged more 
often.346 The PTO's new utility guidelines347 and recent issuance of some 
340. See supra Section l.B for a discussion of collaborations involving government, 
academia and industry. 
34 1 .  Malcolm Skolnick et al.,  The BRCAJ Gene: Commercialiwtion vs. the Public Interest, 
HEALTH L. NEWS, Mar. 1995, at 2 ("The BRCAI is likely responsible for approximately half 
the incidence of hereditary breast cancer or about five percent of all breast cancer diagnoses."); 
see also Richard Saltus, Gene in Some Jewish Women Tied to Cancer Risk, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 
29, 1995, at l (stating that I in 100 women of European Jewish heritage may carry BRCAI, a 
higher rate than that found among non-Jews); Richard Saltus, Genetic AjJl.ictions Evolved from 
Ashkenazi History, BoSTON GLOBE, Sept. 29, 1995, at 7. 
342. Skolnick et al. , supra note 34 1 ,  at 2. 
343. Id. 
344. Id. ("Rep. Wyden [D-Ore.] noted that NIH had provided valuable and seminal 
assistance to the project and that since the government had a role in the discovery and the research 
had been partly financed by the taxpayers it was important for NIH to insure that BRCAl would 
be used for the public good and fairly priced.") .  This objection seems somewhat anomalous in 
light of general federal technology transfer policy described in Section II.B. l.  
345. Id. Under the agreement, two NIH scientists responsible for the background research 
are to be listed as co-inventors on the patent application and NIH will receive 25 % of future 
royalties. Anne Wilson, U., Parties Settle Dispute on Cancer-Gene Patent, SALT LAKE TRIB . ,  
Feb. 16, 1995, at B l .  
346. See, e.g. , Amgen, Inc . v .  Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., 92.7 F.2d 1200 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991) (addressing defendant's counterclaim that Amgen's patent was invalid). A duly issued 
United States patent carries with it a presumption of validity that must be rebutted by the alleged 
infringer. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
347. For the last several years, companies complained that the PTO had been holding 
genotech inventions to higher standards of utility and non-obviousness than other, more traditional 
inventions. See Woglom & Pierri, supra note 339, at C37, C38 (PTO established special 
section-"Group 1800" -to evaluate genotech patents; as time passed, patent bar began to believe 
that genotech applications were held to a higher standard of utility than that applied in other 
225 
The Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 13 :  163, 1996 
patents of questionable validity make this likely. For example, in March 1995, 
the PTO granted a patent to Dr. W. French Anderson and the NIH which 
covers "any method of introducing genetically altered human cells into a 
patient to combat disease. "348 The NIH has granted Genetic Therapy, Inc. 
an exclusive license to commercialize the underlying technology. 349 Although 
the patent has been derided as overbroad, 350 it may be cheaper for other 
companies to license the technology than to litigate the validity of the patent. 
This controversy highlights an important policy concern: to the extent 
that the PTO has de facto relaxed its requirements for genotech inventions and 
will issue more questionable patents, 351 the rest of the industry bears the 
burden of either litigating the validity of these patents or entering into license 
agreements with those who hold them. Assuming many genotech companies 
opt for the latter, probably cheaper, alternative, then the PTO essentially has 
facilitated a redistribution of wealth within the industry by granting those 
allotted questionable patents something of value without the public receiving 
comparable value in the form of the information disclosed in the patent 
specification. This result is at odds with the traditional view of patents as a 
quid pro quo for disclosure of information meeting the rigorous statutory 
standards. 
Simply stated, while the United States, through the NIH, may have "jump 
started" the genotech industry by encouraging early patenting of discoveries, 
it has succeeded primarily in sowing confusion and litigation. These 
controversies demonstrate that the PTO' s application of statutory standards in 
the context of genotechnology should be scrutinized for consistency with 
traditional applications of those standards and the fundam ental objectives of 
the patent system to ensure that the policy objectives underlying those 
standards are not lost. 
examining groups; length and difficulty of genotech patent prosecution supported this claim; PTO 
accused of functioning like second FDA) . The PTO responded with new guidelines that should 
make it easier for genotech firms to obtain patents. Id. See also Utility Examination Guidelines 
and Legal Analysis Are Finalized, 50 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 281 (1995). Note 
that the guidelines addressed only the § 101 utility requirement, and did not clarify the standards 
for non-obviousness. 
348. Slind-Flor, supra note 186, at A6 . .  
349. Genetic Therapy, Inc. Announces Issuance of Broad Gene Therapy Patent, Business 
Wire, Mar. 2 1 ,  1995, available in WESTLAW, Newswires & News Services, Business 
Newswires, Business Wire File (license granted under CRADA between Nill and GTI). 
350. Id. 
351 .  See John H. Barton, Patent Scope in Biotechnology, 26 lNT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. 
& COPYRIGHT L. 605 (1995) (arguing that broad patents may hamper innovation and suggesting 
legal reforms); cf Patents: Utility Examination Guidelines and Legal Analysis Are Finalized, 1995 
DAIL y REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) 141  ( 1995) (reporting PTO publication of final guidelines 
for review of liberalized patent application requirements). 
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1 .  The Basics of Patent Policy 
At the heart of all patent systems is the theory that if society "honor[s] 
the creator of a useful thing, . . . society will get more useful things . "352 
This formulation represents policy judgments based on both economics and 
ideas of social welfare that are reflected in the substantive provisions of the 
Patent Act. 353 Economically, the patent system is a response to a "public 
goods" problem: 
In economic terms, a "public good" is one that has the property of 
nonexclusivity: Once the good has been produced, it is impossible 
(or prohibitively costly) to exclude any individual from benefiting 
from it, whether or not he or she pays . . . .  In granting a limited 
monopoly through copyright or patent, government attempts to 
compensate for distortions arising from nonexclusivity. According 
to this rationale, without the counterbalancing grants of monopoly 
power bestowed through copyright and patent, the inability of 
authors and inventors to appropriate economic returns from their 
labors would result in the underproduction of new works and 
inventions . 354 
Through amelioration of the public goods problem, the patent system aims to 
provide incentives for research and development. 
By granting a limited monopoly, the patent system not only spurs 
development but also introduces market imperfections. 355 Particular 
provisions of the Patent Act help ensure that the detriments associated with 
monopolies do not outweigh the benefit of increased investment in inventive 
352. MERGES, supra note 192, at 2 (noting also that the textual statement embodies the 
tension that permeates all patent debates-tension inherent in a system in which social benefits 
in the form of technological progress are achieved through private rewards) . 
353. 35 U.S.C. ( 1 988 & Supp. V 1993) . Congress' power to enact statutes like the Patent 
Act is granted by the U.S.  Constitution in art. I,  § 8, cl .8:  "The Congress shall have the power 
. . .  to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . . " See U.S. 
CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, FINDING A BALANCE: COMPUTER SOFTWARE, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 185 (1992). 
354. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 353, at 185. Note 
also that market imperfections created by the public goods problem may be corrected by 
government subsidization. In the genotech area, government has used not only the grant of 
exclusive rights through the Patent Act to help encourage genotech innovation, but also has been 
a primary source of funding for that activity. See supra text accompanying notes 155-160, 190-94. 
355. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 353, at 186 
(monopolists will tend to produce less of the good and charge a higher price; a monopoly can 
create excessive incentives for innovative activities accorded monopoly status; a monopoly can 
produce "spillover" effects-externalities-in other markets; administration of intellectual property 
regime is costly) . 
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activities. For example, exclusive patent rights356 are limited temporally,357 
as well as subject to certain other limiting doctrines. 358 Moreover, an 
inventor will not qualify for a patent in the first instance unless his or her 
invention meets the statutory requirements of novelty, utility and non­
obviousness and is adequately described in an enabling disclosure. 359 Thus, 
in return for the grant of a limited statutory monopoly, the patentee must agree 
to disclose his invention.360 These limits help to correct the market 
imperfections of a monopoly. 
The Patent Act aims to increase the store of useful information available 
to society and other inventors by granting exclusive rights to encourage 
inventors to invest in those activities likely to produce such information. At 
first glance, the theoretical underpinnings of the Patent Act seem to support 
fully granting patents on genotech inventions .361 The genotech industry 
generates a wide spectrum of technologies . Furthermore, the investment in 
bringing a new genotech drug to market is usually large-as much as $400 
million-while the time lag between idea and introduction of the drug to 
market may be as long as twelve years . 362 Because investor mentality tends 
to be "if you cannot patent it, do not invest in it, "  without some type of 
exclusive rights to enable firms to recoup their investments in genotech 
356. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) ("Every patent shall contain . . .  a grant 
to the patentee . . .  of the right to exclude others from making; using, or selling the invention 
throughout the United States . . . .  "). 
357. Woglom & Pierri, supra note 339, at C37, C39 (in 1995, Congress changed the term 
of a patent from 17 years from date of issue to 20 years from date of filing so as to conform to 
GATI specifications). 
358. For example, the judicial doctrine of patent misuse-closely related to antitrust 
law-prevents the patentee from leveraging his monopoly in one market into another. See generally 
MERGES, supra note 192, at 866-928; U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: PATENTING LIFE 58 (1989) (limited experimental or 
fair use exceptions may protect otherwise infringing uses). 
359. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101- 103, 1 12 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
360. The intended benefit to society has shifted over time: 
Under the original patent systems, society's benefit was the 
introduction of a new art or technology into the country. By the Jate 
eighteenth century, the primary benefit was seen as the technological 
know-how behind the inventor's patent. The beneficiaries on this view 
were not just the public at large, but instead others skilled in the 
technical arts who could learn something from the patentee's 
invention. This was a major change in the economic role of patents, 
for it shifted the emphasis from the introduction of finished products 
into commerce to the introduction of new and useful information to 
the technical arts. 
MERGES, supra note 192, at 5-6. 
361 . Woglom & Pierri, supra note 339, at C37-38 ("Patents are the lifeblood of the 
bio�echno�o
_
gy industry-an industry that offers much promise, but as of yet limited profits. As 
cap1tal-ra1smg tools, patents are critical to the industry's staggering research and development 
efforts."). 
362. See supra note 239 and accompanying text . 
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advances , research may never be conducted at all or, if conducted, may never 
move out of laboratories and into the marketplace. 363 
2 .  The Patent Act and Genotechnology 
Pursuant to section 101 of the Patent Act, " [w]hoever invents or 
discovers any new and useful process ,  machine, manufacture, or composition 
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. "364 Thus, 
for an invention to qualify for patent protection, it must fall within the 
categories of statutory subject matter and be both novel and useful. 365 
Additionally, under section 103 of the Act, the invention must have been non­
obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was 
made. 366 Finally, to obtain a patent, the applicant must provide a written 
specification that sets forth an enabling disclosure. 367 
Since Diamond v. Chakrabarty, it has been settled law that, while 
naturally occurring phenomena are not patentable, genetically engineered living 
organisms may fall within the Patent Act's statutory subject matter. 368 
Chakrabarty reiterates the historic substantive distinction between discovery 
and invention. Discovery of a naturally occurring phenomenon, despite the fact 
that it may require a large investment, is not patentable while 
invention-human-engineered transformations of natural substances-may 
be.369 Thus, pursuant to existing PTO policy and established law, patent 
protection applies to "those organisms that an inventor has altered in a new 
363. Victoria Slind-Flor, Biotech Bar Frets About the Future, NAT'L L. J. , June 5, 1995, 
at A6 (reporting that the Biotech Industry Organization, responding to opposition of the religous 
right, stated that without patent protection, the "next generation of modem medicines and cures 
will never get out of research labs") .  
364. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
365. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C .C.P.A. 1979). Section 102 further elaborates the 
conditions relating to novelty. See 35 U.S.C § 102 (1998 & Supp.V 1993) . 
366. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
367. 35 U.S.C. § 1 12 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
368. 447 U.S. 303, 308-10 (1980). The Court upheld a patent on human-made, genetically 
engineered bacteria capable of breaking down crude oil, concluding: 
The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not 
patentable . . . . [Respondent's] claim is not to a hitherto unknown natural 
phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring manufacture . . . .  [G]ene�c 
technology was unforeseen when Congress enacted § 101. . . .  The grant or derual 
of patents on micro-organisms is not likely to put an end to genetic research or to 
its attendant risks . . . .  Whether respondent's claims are patentable may determine 
whether research efforts are accelerated by the hope of reward or slowed by want 
of incentives, but that is all. 
447 U.S. at 309, 3 14, 317.  
369. MERGES, supra note 192, at 124 (comparing Chakrabarty with Funk Bros. Seed Co. 
v. Kalo Innoculant Co. ,  333 U.S. 127 (1948)). 
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and useful way or to genes when they have been isolated as synthetic 
molecules, aform in which they do not occur in nature. "370 Recently, patents 
of purified chemicals , including purified genetic sequences , have been upheld 
as these purified chemicals do not occur in nature. 371 
Less certain is whether patent protection will be available for the 
discovery of a gene sequence or partial sequence .  372 NIH's patent 
applications for partial gene sequences generated a well-publicized controversy. 
The PTO rejected the applications based upon lack of utility, novelty and 
nonobviousness-not for lack of statutory subject matter. 373 The PTO's action 
could reflect its desire to avoid the issue of statutory subject matter in this 
context or a substantiation of the contention that the historical distinction 
between discovery and invention has been eroded to a nullity. 
An applicant for a patent must set forth an invention that is useful , novel , 
nonobvious, and disclosed in an enabling disclosure in addition to claiming 
statutory subject matter. 374 Although the PTO's new utility guidelines make 
it less likely that applications claiming a genotech invention will be rejected 
for lack of utility, this requirement still presents a meaningful hurdle for the 
patenting of  gene sequences of unknown function. 375 As other governments 
and companies like Merck publish their genetics findings,  particularly with 
respect to partial DNA sequences , the patenting of later full-length sequences 
potentially could be barred because they are no longer either novel or 
nonobvious. Finally, because genotech advances may be difficult to describe 
in an enabling disclosure, patentees may find it infeasible to provide the 
specification required by the statute. 376 
370. Oman, supra note 13, at C43 (emphasis added). 
371 .  See, e.g. , In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394 (C.C .P.A. 1970) (holding vasodilators 
patentable because purified version exhibited properties not possessed by unpurified version). Two 
commentators have put the point thus: 
Man's act of purifying and isolating a natural substance from its source, and 
providing the "substantially purified" substance for commercial use has 
routinely been found sufficient to remove the "phenomenon of nature" 
rejection from claims to DNA sequences. "The PTO has issued numerous 
patents on DNA sequences and some of the patents have been judicially 
enforced, although no one has challenged their validity on the ground that 
they claim a phenomenon of nature. "  Thus, such grounds for invalidation 
seem unlikely. 
Smith & Kettleberger, supra note 151,  at 57 (quoting Rebecca S.  Eisenberg, Genes, Patents and 
Product Development, 257 SCIENCE 903, 905 (1992)). 
372. Id. 
373. Id. 
374. See 35 U.S .C. §§ 101-103, 1 12 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
375. See supra note 347 and accompanying text. 
· 
. 376. See sup�a note 2 1 7  and accompanying text (new legislation making it easier for b10tech firms to obtam process patents adopted in part to account for difficulties of describing 
advance in enabling disclosure) . 
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3 .  Proposals for Change 
Genotechnology offers perhaps unprecedented potential for the alleviation 
of human suffering. However, private corporations are unlikely to make the 
investment required to develop the industry unless they are able to realize a 
competitive return on that investment. Uncertainty often creates risk which 
causes investors in truly novel ventures to demand a premium on their returns 
relative to other, safer investments . While there are many factors contributing 
to the inherent riskiness of a genotech investment, uncertainty regarding 
patentability is likely to be one of them . Thus , any proposal for change in the 
patent system should at least attempt to make the patentability of genotech 
discoveries and the enforcement of resulting patents more predictable. 
First, the law should be clarified by a return to the first principles 
enunciated in Chakrabarty. 377 Mere "discoveries" of partial or full gene 
sequences and/or the proteins a gene produces (however great these 
accomplishments may appear today) are just that-discoveries , and not 
patentable inventions . 378 While this distinction between discoveries and 
patentable inventions has been ignored in recent years , it should be revived. 
A patent is not a reward for effort or money expended in discovering nature 
but, rather, a reward for the new and useful invention that results from that 
discovery. Industry likely will object to this proposal, contending: (1) that 
substantial investment is required to isolate genes and the proteins they help 
form and, without patent protection, such advances will not occur; (2) without 
patent protection, firms will turn to trade secret protection, withdrawing 
knowledge from the public domain; and (3) the patent system avoids wasteful 
duplication of research through its disclosure system.379 
While genotechnology exhibits some characteristics of public goods, the 
necessary answer is not that all of the industry's R&D must be patentable.380 
Enacting the proposals set forth in Section III .A would alleviate some of the 
front-loading of costs , lessening the need for strong property rights at the 
outset. Also, Congress could consider enacting legislation along the lines of 
the Orphan Drug Act, which would grant more limited exclusive rights to those 
377. See supra note 368. 
378. See, e.g. , Stephen Crespi, Biotechnology Patenting: The Wicked Animal Must Defend 
Itself, 9 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 43 1 ,  432 (Sept. 1995) (citing London Times commentary on 
death of EC's draft directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions: "Genes are 
neither products nor inventions: they are the means by which living things instruct these cells to 
produce proteins. The isolation of a new gene ought properly to be regarded as an act of 
discovery-which is not patentable-rather than an act of invention-which is. ") . Crespi, however, 
does contend that genes may be patented under certain circumstances. Id. at 441 . 
379. See Oman, supra note 13,  at C43. 
380. See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LA w AND ECONOMICS, 47-48 
(1988) (granting exclusive rights is not only means to solve public goods problem; government 
could produce the good or grant subsidies for its production). 
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technologies which are not traditionally considered patentable but for which 
some market incentives may be required. 
Additionally, duplication of effort is already occurring . 381 The most 
obvious example is the competition between Merck and HGS to identify gene 
sequences . Merck makes its discoveries publicly accessible while HGS, with 
patent applications in hand, is charging the private sector a hefty fee for that 
information.  382 The proposed cabinet-level Science Department,383 
introduced to coordinate R&D programs among federal agencies, may 
eliminate some of this duplication of effort. Vigorous enforcement of the 
antitrust laws, particularly those related to monopolies , s hould also assist in 
making sure that genetics information remains available even if the 
consolidation trend in the genotech industry continues . 384 
Besides returning to foundation principles , the PTO should concentrate 
on (1) ensuring that it applies the correct standard for determining 
nonobviousness;385 and (2) expanding and ordering its prior art database so 
that it does not issue patents that will later be held invalid. 386 The former 
381 .  See supra note 336 and accompanying text. HGP, Merck and HGS efforts are all 
largely directed to identifying and cataloguing gene sequences. Note that considering this 
duplication of effort, if patents were to issue on partial gene sequences, (1) the number of 
interference proceedings would likely increase and (2) complex cross licensing arrangements may 
have to be concluded. See supra notes 337-39 and accompanying text. A bright-line rule may allow 
industry to devote more resources to drug development by obviating the need for costly patent 
litigation or incurring transaction costs in licensing arrangements . Moreover, granting patents 
would hardly avoid duplication of effort as other inventors not licensed under the patent would 
have to "invent around" it, likely duplicating much of the original patentee's efforts. 
382. See Tanouye, supra note 102, at B l ,  BS (Merck making results of its efforts publicly 
available; HGS does open parts of database to academic and government researchers but keeps 
other parts private and reserved. for commercial use). Incidentally, Merck's approach undercuts 
the argument that companies will necessarily seek trade secret protection. 
383. Browning, supra note 179, at 1005. 
384. See Elisabeth 0. Teisberg et al . ,  Making Competition in Health Care Work, HARV. 
Bus. REV.,  July-Aug. 1994, at 131,  140. Firms like HGS charge a high fee for database access 
and require that licensees afford HGS a right of first refusal on commercial development. Survey, 
supra note 2, at Sl2 (calling HGS strategy an attempt to corner gene market) . However, the 
antitrust laws were set up to deal with situations in which a company engages in unfair trade 
practices in furtherance of a monopoly or attempt to monopolize. Moreover, HGS is hardly the 
only source of genetic information. Merck and HGP plan to make information generally available. 
This suggests that government and industry should adjust their thinking and focus not so much 
on patents for gene sequences but on finding a meaningful way to provide access to genetic 
information, perhaps through an on-line service, using contractual terms rather than patent 
protection to appropriate any access fee required to recoup investment. See al.so Tanouye, supra 
note 102. 
3 85. See Patents: Biotech Industry Critical of PTO Examining Procudures at Hearing 1994 
DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) 202 (1 994) (many accused PTO of applying stricter 
standard of nonobviousness for biotech patents than other inventions). 
386. Cf. John Carey, Untangling the Legal Strands of DNA, Bus. WK. ,  May 22, 1 995, 
at 78 (if pieces of genes happen to be in public database, PTO may consider them "prior art" 
making the full gene unpatentable; if genes become too easy to find and sequence, courts may 
deem information "obvious" and thus unpatentable). 
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may require the PTO to establish guidelines much as it did in clarifying the 
utility standard. The latter may necessitate assistance from industry in 
formulating a reliable prior art database. Further, Congress should adopt some 
version of H.R. 1732 to afford third parties more meaningful access to patent 
reexamination proceedings, helping to assure that issued patents are, in fact, 
valid.387 
Finally, Congress may want to consider issues of patent ownership as 
private and public monies become increasingly commingled, the commercial 
viability of genotech is realized, and the controversy surrounding BRCAl is 
repeated and multiplied. 388 Only the private sector will efficiently, 
aggressively, and extensively derive practical applications of genotech in the 
near future, but public concerns regarding the expenditure of federal funds 
must be addressed. Federal technology policy continues to encourage "giving 
away" federally funded technology. The revolving door between federal 
agencies and the private sector continues to spin. Substantial federal funding 
for genotech research reaches private firms both directly and indirectly through 
grants to academia. To some extent, the federal approach to technology 
transfer has been schizophrenic . The federal practice has been to finance 
research conducted by public institutions which have partnerships with private 
concerns and to allow these private firms to own the resulting patents and 
derive revenue therefrom. There is no sign of any deviation from this general 
approach. However, the approach is undergoing increasing public scrutiny, 
leading some legislators to question if not the entire federal technology transfer 
scheme, then at least whether or not the government should be sharing in the 
revenue derived from the research it funds . 389 
To respond to public criticism, and to allow genotechnology firms more 
accurately to assess the true costs of their technologies, Congress should 
consider ways to establish a tangible financial return on its direct investment 
in genotech which does not remove or impede commercial incentives. For 
example, Congress should consider requiring the sponsoring agency to include 
a CRADA provision calling for "royalties " paid into a public fund when a 
company profitably commercializes technology developed under the CRADA. 
387. See House Subcommittee Considers Bills on Reexamination and Early Publication, 
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA) 1 74 ( 1995) (H.R. 1732 would afford third 
parties opportunity for greater participation in reexamination proceedings and expand bases for 
and scope of re-examination). 
388. See supra notes 341-45 and accompanying text. 
389. There is some precedent for the federal government sharing in royalties gene�a�ed 
by products based, at least in part, on federally funded research. See supra note 345 (descr�b�ng 
resolution over patent application for BRCAl) ;  cf Bartlett, supra not� 1 8�, at �46 (descnbmg 
NIH regulations published in November 1 994 that watch more clos�ly its uruv�rsity and res�rch 
institutions grant and contract recipients and their involvement with comparues for compliance 
with NIH policies as mandated by the Bayh-Dole Act) . 
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This fund could be used to increase patient access to drug treatments by 
subsidizing IND Treatments and Group C drugs .  The fund� 
. 
also co�ld 
subsidize the development of effective drugs for rare conditions which 
otherwise would not be economically feasible to produce. At the very least, 
these funds could offset cuts in federal funding to teaching hospitals proposed 
under pending health care reform . 
Such an approach should be designed carefully to avoid discouraging 
firms from entering into CRADAs and partnerships with academia, and from 
investing in genotech. First, the government should require detailed 
recordkeeping of its own agencies and the recipients of federal funding to 
assure that inventors-and thereby patent owners-may be identified with 
reliability. Second, the royalty cash flow should be structured as a percentage 
of net profit, in order to ensure that the genotech firms are not forced into 
incurring losses by paying royalties to the federal government, and, in order 
to avoid conflicts of interest, channelled into a separate R&D fund to enhance 
the availability of effective genotechnologies. To protect against commingling 
the royalty fund with other federal funds, Congress should enact legislation 
providing for segregation and mandating that a high percentage of the royalties 
collected in any one year be allocated over the following two years . 390 
Disbursements from the fund should be authorized only for certain purposes 
such as financing genotech treatments for the indigent or offsetting cuts to 
basic scientific and clinical research funding for teaching hospitals . In this way, 
private financing may replace some of the federal monies eliminated as the 
budget is pared. 
Of course, administering such a fund may be expensive and, to be 
effective, would require a level of impartiality seldom demonstrated by 
Congress. To instill a basic level of meritocracy, the structure could allow all 
facilities administering genotechnological treatments to apply for grant funding 
with data demonstrating the efficacy of experimental treatments and budgetary 
needs on a per patient basis. The grants could be allocated by experts in the 
field who are capable of both evaluating the applications and avoiding conflicts 
of interest. In this way, any given experimental treatment would be financed 
th�o�gh
. 
the institution . which demonstrates the greatest capability, perhaps 
ehmmatmg some duplication of effort and creating incentives for providers to 
be the best and the first to offer an experimental treatment with proven 
efficacy· This grant structure is familiar to the science and health care 
commu�itie
_
s .  _Moreover, the process of preparing such applications may 
compel mst1tutions to assess their own efficiencies, priorities and capabilities. 
390. Se� Ros� PEROT' INTENSIVE CARE: WE MUST SA VE MEDICARE AND MEDICAID Now 41-4� (1995) (discussing the problem of commingled Medicare funds and the "trust fund" myth).  Applicants for a patent are alread · d · · · · 
d 
. 
Y reqmre to state m the apphcat1on whether or not the invenuon was ma e with federal funds. 
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A False Start? 
As discussed above, the genotech industry is now consolidating.391 By 
itself, this trend is unremarkable and reflects a wider, national trend among 
industries, including health care. 392 Most industries , as they progress from 
a scattering of start-up enterprises to a collection of companies with products 
in their pipelines , go through a phase in which smaller companies combine 
with larger ones , or go out of business altogether. This consolidation is usually 
efficient in the sense that economies of scale may be realized while innovation 
increases, leaving the industry with the appropriate number of firms and 
capitalization structure to maximize innovation after the shake-out is over. 
There is ample evidence that genotech stock was overvalued during most of 
the 1980's, and that analysts either believed the industry's own inflated 
expectations or failed to understand the inherent risks accompanying the 
industry's efforts . 393 As these risks became apparent, the downward trend 
in the prices of stock in genotech companies was inevitable, and it represented 
nothing more than market adjustment to the true financial and factual 
situation. 394 
However, as these risks became apparent, investment dollars-particularly 
from venture capitalists-began drying up, effectively forcing genotech firms 
into the arms of pharmas. 395 The pharmas are to some extent competitors 
of genotech firms since genotechnology may supplant the demand for 
conventional pharma drugs . Thus, while the marriage between genotech 
companies and pharmas seems necessary and beneficial to the industry, 396 
concerns abound. Selling control over genotech therapeutics and diagnostics 
to the entities that own conventional drugs which will be made obsolete, may 
delay the introduction of some genotech therapeutics until licenses on the 
conventional money-makers run out. Pharmas may get more genotech 
therapeutics and diagnostics to market, but their overhead also may make more 
391 .  See supra Section LB. However, the massive industry consolidation predicted has 
not yet occurred. BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 9. In 1995, "[w]hile 19 companies merged or 
delisted, an additional 1 4  went public . "  Id. 
392. See Teisberg et al . ,  supra note 384, at 138; Scot Lehigh, Caution: Merger Ahead, 
Unions and Hospitals Are Consolida.ting-Leading Where?, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 6, 1995, at 71 ;  
Robin Side!, US Mergers, Led by Media, Banks Break Record in Third Quarter, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Oct. 1 ,  1995, at 55. 
393. BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 77-81 (1990) 
(discussing how analysts, failing to adjust for the vagaries of the FDA approval process, patent 
uncertainties, and pharma investments, were consistently disappointed in their forecasts of high 
earnings; genotech stock prices returned to traditional P/E multiples in late 1980s). 
394. Id. 
395. See supra Section I.B.2. 
396. Id. 
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of them price-prohibitive. 397 This concern is tempered, however, by evidence 
that market forces are bringing down the cost of drugs o verall. 398 
Perhaps most important, increased pharma control may result in a loss 
of the innovation and entrepreneurial spirit which can be credited with much 
of what the genotech industry has accomplished to date. According to a recent 
survey of genotech CEO's, " [f]ifty-four percent of CEOs cited the difficulties 
of working with the bureaucracy associated with larger companies, and 48 
percent noted that hidden agendas can also ruin a deal as , over time, unspoken 
motives for creating the alliances begin to surface. "399 The more established 
genotech firms have been able to structure alliances with the pharmas in a 
manner that allows them to retain some measure of independence. 400 Other 
smaller firms, however, are less able to do so.401 
The return of investment appeal of genotech tempers these concerns 
regarding pharma involvement, lessening the vulnerability of the genotech 
industry to pharma control. Nevertheless, pharmas already own considerable 
interests in genotech,  and dependency upon pharmas may increase when 
resources for manufacturing and distribution are needed. Also, widely 
publicized clinical disappointments and misguided federal policymaking could 
extinguish easily the present general investment appeal of genotech. Federal 
policies that slow the commercial availability of technology in a knee-jerk 
response to clinical disappointments are likely to be much less effective than 
measures that assess reasonably the risks and benefits involved. 
These concerns about pharmas should not necessarily lead to regulation 
397. Cf. MALKIEL, supra note 393, at 79 (discussing the risk that genotech firms' profits 
from successful drugs will be siphoned off by marketing partners, usually drug companies). 
398. See generally THE BoSTON CONSULTING GROUP, INC., supra note 12. 
399. BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 36; see also Teisberg et al . ,  supra note 384, at 138 
("Excessive consolidation will risk creating very powerful [entities] with less need to respond to 
their customers. It will also limit the experimentation that is critical to stimulating new procedures 
and treatments . ");  Burton & Rundle, supra note 147 (Eli Lilly selling Hybritech, Inc. which it 
had hoped would develop monoclonal antibody-based cancer drugs and diagnostic tests; "Former 
Hybritech executives regard the company's  tenure under Lilly as a case study of how a giant 
pharmaceutical concern can hamstring an entrepeneurial enterprise."). 
400. The innovation of these CEOs is reflected in the elaborate alliances they have 
structured with the academic world to develop their foundation technology and in the even more 
elaborate alliances they are forming with multinational pharmaceutical companies, not-for-profit 
organizations, and each other to survive and bring their therapeutics and diagnostics to market. 
For example, although the genotech CEOs are selling interests in their company's  technology to 
pharmaceutical companies in order to survive, many are entering into "non-monogamous" 
agreements to meet several strategic goals-including the preservation of a healthy level of 
independence. See BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 19. 
401 . Id. at 33 ("The pharmaceutical companies have more leverage and can wait for 
capital-hungry biotech companies to accept lower offers . . . .  [B]ig pharma is less willing these 
days to accept less than worldwide product rights, which makes it more difficult for biotech 
companies to subdivide their markets for licensing purposes. "); Ronald Rosenberg, Financing of 
Gene Industry � Tough Sell, BoSTON GLOBE, May 21 ,  1995, at 108 (Numerous partnerships with 
pharmas are bemg formed, but many genotech companies may be signing oout of desperation.). 
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to discourage genotech-pharma alliances. Arguably, the alliances create more 
possibilities than dangers . Instead of developing drugs that merely identify 
illness and address symptoms ,  such integrated teams more successfully could 
research and develop drugs that actually target and eliminate illness .402 
Market-driven forces are putting tremendous pressure on the pharmas, thus 
suggesting that pharmas will not hold back on introducing new 
technologies. 403 Moreover, to the extent that other sources of United States 
financing are not reliable in the long-term , the pharmas may offer an 
alternative to off-shore migration of the technology and foreign acquisition of 
an industry rooted in the United States economy.404 
The concern over pharma control also may be misplaced. The alliances 
may simply buy time for the genotech industry to recover from the inevitable 
clinical disappointments and regulatory struggles in its present and near 
future. 405 Many of the genotech firms are structuring multiple deals with 
different pharmas , each deal built around specific technologies, thereby 
enabling the genotech firms to maintain a level of independence.406 To the 
extent there are concerns that consolidation through alliances with pharmas will 
have an adverse impact on i nnovation, federal policy committed to enforcing 
antitrust laws in the field of genotechnology should address these concerns . 
In sum, Congress should assess and monitor the economic incentives of the 
industry, yet refrain from large-scale regulatory changes to control the market 
beyond those outlined above .  
As argued throughout this Article, new regulation to eliminate false 
barriers to market entry for genotechnologies and to provide consistency 
between federal R&D policy and policy bearing on commercialization of these 
technologies needs to be implemented. An effort must be made to coordinate 
FDA, PTO, NIH and other policy directly bearing upon the industry. 
Overregulation for its own sake will delay the introduction of technologies 
without concomitant increases in patient safety, thereby depriving patients of 
402. BoSTON CONSULTING GROUP, INC.,  supra note 12, at 65-67; Ronald Rosenberg, 
Taking Gene Therapy to the Market: Biotech Start-ups, Drug Firms Try New Approach, BoSTON 
GLOBE, Jan. 22, 1995, at 80. 
403 . See THE BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, INC.,  THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT FOR 
U.S. PHARMACEUTICALS: THE ROLE OF PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES IN A APPROACH TO 
HEALTH CARE 14-26 (1993). 
404. See BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, �t 56 (addressing is.
sue of off-shore migration); .,_\ 
Prepared Testimcny of Robert T. Abbott, President and CEO of V1agene, Inc. , Before the House 
Committee on Science, Space and Technology, Federal News Wire (Fed. Info. Systems Corp.) 
(Sept. 28, 1994) (foreign acquisition of United States ge�o��ch indu�try potential_ 
con��u:nces 
of current harsh financing climate; pharma company acqms1bon provides alternative hqmd1ty to 
traditional public offering). 
405. See Kaufmann, supra note 137, at ID. 
406. See BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 18. 
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the benefits of new drugs and negatively affecting health costs .407 As long 
as the industry is competitive, it will produce drugs efficiently. 
Congress must focus on identifying and correcting those situations where 
the market is imperfect or where other social or ethical concerns compel a 
different result. 408 If genotech products are held back from the market as a 
result of federal policy, it must be because they are being fully and efficiently 
assessed and not because of regulatory shortcomings . Additionally, federal 
policy must focus not just on the efficacy and safety of the technologies but 
also on the ethical and social questions they raise. 
D. Ethical Issues 
Like most social and political revolutions, the revolution in health care 
associated with genotech is accompanied by substantial social and ethical 
questions .409 With the United States fostering the growth of a genotech 
industry and leading the world's efforts in the field of human genetics, it is 
unconscionable that the United States has not assumed the lead in addressing 
the ethical implications of these technologies. 410 The reality is that the United 
States is lagging behind many of its sister nations , including many European 
nations and their collective conscience as embodied in the European Union, 
in even acknowledging these blatantly obvious issues . Needless to say, 
therefore, the United States has not begun to address them in a direct and 
practical manner. 41 1 
407. See Rob Norton, History 's Lessons of Health Care Costs, FORTUNE, Dec. 28, 1993, 
at 86-87 (discussing historical inefficacy price caps); Four States Driving Up Medical Home Health 
Care Costs, HOME HEALTH CARE DEALER/SUPPLIER July-Aug. 1995, at20 (attributing technology 
delays to regulatory burdens); see generally, THE BoSTON CONSULTING GROUP, INC., supra note 
12. 
408 . See generally Gorman, supra note 16. 
409. See THE GENETIC FRONTIER: ETHICS, LAW AND POLICY (Mark s. Frankel & Albert 
Teich eds . ,  1994); THE ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES (Ruth Ellen Bulger 
ed. ,  1993). 
410. See generally ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 17. 
41 1 .  See U.S.  CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 
IN U.S. PUBLIC PoLICY-BACKGROUNDPAPER (1993) [hereinafter BIOMEDICAL ETHICS] . Although 
the United States has attempted to establish ethical guidelines for medical care and research issues 
(for example, the use of human beings in research), HGP-specific issues have not been adequately 
addressed even though three percent of the HGP budget is committed to addressing ethics issues 
through the Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues (ELSI) component of the HGP-the largest source 
of federal funding for bioethics. Id. at 8. See generally Malinowski, supra note 39. 
The fact is that scientists, policymakers and even much of the public have grown too 
comfortable with science's capabilities in the area of human genetics. When the first gene was 
cloned in 1972, "scientists were so worried about the implications of what they were doing that 
they considered a voluntary moratorium on the recombination of cloned genes into the DNA of 
other organisms. Now, . . .  [t]he creation of recombinant people, with foreign genes stitched into 
their cells, is widely accepted. "  Survey, supra note 2,  at S4. But see Oman, supra note 13, at C44 
(suggesting that "the United States has been very sensitive" to ethical issues raised by human 
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Although theoretically sophisticated ethical treatment of the issues raised 
by genotechnologies may prove helpful, there is an immediate need for applied 
ethics. Many of the societal ramifications of simply not dealing with the ethical 
aspects of genetics technologies are readily ascertainable. Task forces 
assembled both by the Institutes of Medicine and HGP have acknowledged that 
commercial and academic laboratories are making genetic testing capabilities 
easily accessible to the public too quickly and that many genetic tests are 
subject to misinterpretation. 412 Legal liability for wrongful birth as well as 
wrongful life and general malpractice is likely to pressure health care providers 
to err on the side of making such genotech diagnostics-however 
imprecise-available . 413 
There also are foreseeable economic consequences associated with these 
technologies . The lack of adequate consideration of the societal and ethical 
implications of genotechnologies , and introduction of resulting guidelines and 
regulations, leave the industry subject to broad-side attacks such as the recent 
challenge stirred up by an environmental activist, Jeremy Rifkin, and a 
coalition of conservative religious leaders .414 Genotech is, in essence ,  
medicinal evolution, and unchecked political controversy could erect high and 
even impenetrable barriers. For example, in light of the growing dependency 
genetics research). 
On the other hand, "[a] recurring theme in most of the academic commentary on the Human 
Genome Project is the need for community involvement. A recurring complaint is the relative lack 
of community participation until now."  Kirby, supra note 33, at 17-19. Concerns have been 
"expressed about the way in which the Human Genome Project itself has been initiated and funded 
by governments and scientists with very little input from the public . "  Id. at 14. For an example 
of European efforts to address the ethical and social implications of genetics technologies, consider 
that France has proposed uniform legislation to make such issues the matter of true public policy, 
rather than being determined by individual doctors on a patient-by-patient basis. Id. ; see also 
Malinowski, supra note 39, at 1513 .  Also, the Council of Europe is developing a regional 
convention. See Kirby , supra note 33, at 18; Richard H. Nicholson, Old World News: One Law 
for All?, HASTINGS CENTER REP. ,  Mar. -Apr. 1995, at 4, 4 (addressing debate whether the 
proposed European Convention on Bioethics now being prepared by the Council of Europe should 
be used to enforce moral principles). 
412. See generally ASSESSlNG GENETIC RISKS, supra note 17 ;  Malinowski, supra note 39; 
Saltus, supra note 17.  
413. See Malinowski, supra note 39, at 1504-07. 
414. Under the leadership of Rifkin, head of the Foundation on Economic Trends which 
consistently has opposed genetic engineering research, this alliance of 80 religious leaders asserted 
the ethical position that patenting basic units of life demeans it; their immediate political objective 
was to obtain a ban on the patenting of cells, animals and other basic forms of life. Kathleen Day, 
Church Groups to Fight Patenting of Life Forms; Coalition to Press for Congressional Action, 
WASH. PosT, May 1 3 ,  1995, at A3; Ronald Rosenberg, Call to Ban Patents Stirs Industry Fears, 
Boston Globe, May 1 9, 1995, at 39. However, "[m]any genetic scientists and executives 
themselves say the basic knowledge of the chemical code of life-DNA-should be in the public 
domain, with patents going only to unique processes and products derived from DNA knowledge. " 
Id. 
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upon European pharmaceuticals , 415 there is a real danger that political 
controversy in the United States over human genetics could result in a repeat 
of the RU486 experience, meaning that technologies could be kept out of the 
consumer market for purely nonscientific reasons .416 
Ethical issues are readily apparent in virtually all aspects of the genotech 
industry and its technologies. These include ( 1 )  patient care issues, such as 
insurance coverage, 417 counseling,418 cost, 419 accessibility ,420 and 
415. See BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 30. However, 69% of 1 995 biotech deals were 
structured with United States firms. Id. at 3 1 .  
416. See generally Claire L. Ahern, Note, Drug Approval in the United States and 
England: A Question of Medical Safety or Moral Persuasion ?-1he RU-486 Example, 17 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNATIONAL L. REV. 94 (1994); LAWRENCE LADER, RU 486: THE PILL THAT COULD END 
THE ABORTION WARS AND WHY AMERICAN WOMEN 00 NOT HAVE IT ( 1 991) .  
417.  The possibility that insurers already are using genetic test results in making health 
coverage decisions was recognized by Francis Collins at the Sept. 29 hearing of the Senate Career 
Coalition. Scientists, Insurers Disagree on Genetics Test Resve.x Access, THE CANCER LETTER, 
No. 38, Oct. 6, 1 995, at 2; see also M. A. Dewar et al. ,  Genetic Screening by Insurance Carriers, 
267 J. AM. MED. Assoc. 1207, 1207-08 (1992) (letter to the editor); Mark Rothstein, Genetics, 
Insurance, and the Ethics of Genetic Counseling, 3 MOLECULAR GEN. MED. 159-77 (1993). 
Insurance discrimination based upon genetic predispositions has not been directly addressed by 
the federal government, with the exception of a recent EEOC decision regarding employment 
discrimination and not specifically addressing the issue of insurance. See infra note 423. However, 
several states, including Arizona, California, Maryland and Montana are regulating genetics-based 
insurance discrimination. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-448 (1990 & Supp. 1995); CAL. INS. 
CODE § 1 1512.95 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); MD . ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 223 (1994); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 33- 18-206 (1993). See generally Survey, supra note 2, at 1 5 .  
418. See generally, AsSESSING GENETIC RISK, supra note 17; Malinowski, supra note 39. 
419. Genetics technologies may be more effective, but also more expensive than existing 
treatments. Accordingly, hospitals, doctors, patients, and insurance companies may find themselves 
faced with a choice between an affordable traditional treatment and a cutting-edge alternative that 
offers a marginal advantage at a much higher price. A prime example of this dilemma was the 
introduction of Genentech' s clot-busting drug known as t-PA or Activase. See Doctors Face Ethical 
Dilemma Over Which Heart Drug to Use, OREGONIAN, Sept. 5, 1993, atD4. The drug could save 
10 more lives than an existing drug, Streptokinase, for every 1000 heart attack patients treated--a 
result of2000 lives/yr. Although Genentech offers the drug free of charge to some needy patients, 
the cost for t-PA is at least $2000 per patient, while streptokinase costs only $200. Id. ; Tom 
Schmitz, High-Tech Heart Drug Gets Tiny Edge in Study, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May l ,  
1993, at IA; Byron Spice, Costlier Drug is Better for Heart Trouble, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETIE, 
May I ,  1993, at A5. Another cost issue is that, in light of some of the tremendous costs of genetic 
technologies, it is unlikely that insurance companies will cover them readily and that we as a 
society can afford them-at least until other costs have been lowered through the technologies. 
For example, Genzyme's Ceredase/Cerezyme treatment for Gaucher's Syndrome, which afflicts 
5000 people worldwide, costs $150,000 a year initially, followed by a maintenance program of 
monthly infusions for the rest of the patient's life at a cost of approximately $60,000 per year. 
Ronald Rosenberg, Genzyme 's Plans to Beat Obsolescence, BoSTON GLOBE, Jan. 8, 1995, at 60. 
("Indeed, Genzyme has received some harsh criticism both for the drug's high price-as much 
as $350,000-when it was first introduced-as well as for its overly aggressive efforts to sell 
directly to patients . ") .  Such high costs are especially controversial when the underlying research 
and development was funded in part through federal funds and/or benefitted significantly from 
federally-transferred technology, or agency resources were expended to expedite review of the 
technology. See supra note 326 (addressing AZT controversy); see also note 388 and 
accompanying text (addressing BRCAl controversy). The difficult cost-benefit analysis associated 
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informed consent for both treatment and research;421 (2) patient rights issues, 
such as privacy422 and discrimination;423 (3) the inherent patient/subject 
with patient accessibility and insurance coverage may, under the Americans With Disabilities Act 
be conducted by juries. See Howard Schaffner & Monica E. McFadden, Disabilities Act Make; 
Denial of Benefits Risky, NAT'L L. J . ,  Jan. 16, 1995, at Cl7-19. 
420. See generally �ublic Priorities for Genetic Services, HASTINGS CENTER REP. , May­
June 1995, at Sl-23 (Special Supplement) . The problem of reasonable and equitable access to 
genetics technologies; the circumvention of the benefits of such technologies by inadequate laws, 
public policies, and commercialization which collectively skew equitable distribution; and the 
issues of informed consent and privacy are addressed in John D. Blum, Book Review, 15 J. LEG. 
MED . 345 (June 1994) (reviewing EUGENE BRODY, BIOMEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS (1993)). An especially complex issue is the accessibility of investigative treatments for 
the terminally ill. See supra Section III.A (addressed in the context of FDA policy). 
421 .  The impact of genetic diagnostic capabilities on patient care has not been assessed, 
even though the expansion of these technologies is explosive: 
The current explosive pace of research in the molecular biology of cancer has 
resulted in a proliferation of new tests. If these are implemented, more and more 
people will be advised that they have an early cancer and can be treated. 
Unfortunately, there are indications that finding a cancer early may not be better, 
unless it is one that will progress if untreated . . . .  Aside from the burden of fear 
and anxiety that accompany a cancer diagnosis, the risk from possibly unnecessary 
surgery, the patient with an early detected cancer faces the risk of uninsurability due 
to a pre-existing condition. 
Skolnick et al. ,  supra note 341, at 2. The issue of consent and confidentiality in the context of 
research for HGP and HGDP is discussed in Knoppers, supra note 164, at 6-15 (discussing and 
citing international legislation to address these issues). 
422. See generally, Bartha N. Knoppers, Confidentiality in Genetic Testing: Legal and 
Ethical Issues in an International Context, 12 MED. & LAW 573-82 (1993). The danger of 
dissemination of genetic information has been acknowledged through the introduction of the 
Genetic Privacy Act, the first legislation proposed by the Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues (ELSI) 
component of the Human Genome Project. See Gene Privacy Act Introduced, HUMAN GENOME 
NEWS, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 4, 4. This Act, which has been introduced into six state legislatures, 
would require explicit authorization to collect DNA samples for genetic analysis, 
limit uses of the samples for genetic analysis, limit uses of the samples and genetic 
information obtained from them, and set forth penalties for violators. The act aims 
to protect individual privacy while permitting genetic analysis for medical and 
identification purposes and legitimate research. 
Id. Legislation to ensure the confidentiality of genetic information also has received public support 
from powerful legislators, including Senator Barbara Mikulski, a Democrat from Maryland. See 
Bob Hohler, Congress is Urged to Fund Gene Research in Health Plan, BoSTON GLOBE, May 
14, 1994, at 5 .  Such legislation has been proposed in the past-the Human Genome Privacy Act 
(HGPA), which was introduced before the House of Representatives on Sept. 13,  1990; H.R. 
5612, lOlst Cong. ,  2d Sess. (1990). See George P. Smith & Thaddeus J. Bums, Genetic 
Determinism or Genetic Discrimination ?, 1 1  J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23, 52-57 (Fall 
1994). Existing privacy protection is allotted under the Federal Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a (1988), which restricts the type of information the government may collect, explicitly 
restricting the collection of information by federal agencies. The privacy of patient records in 
general is addressed in Alison Bass, HMO to Limit Access to Data: VA Units Take Opposite Tack, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 1995, at 1 .  
423. See EEOC, Directives Transmittal, Executive Summary: Compliance Manual § 902 
(Mar. 14, 1995); Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old 
Responses to New Technology, 74 B. U. L. Rev. 1 (1994); Charles B. Gurd, Whether a Genetic 
Defect is a Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: P'.eventing �netic Discriminatio� 
!Jy Employers, 1 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1 07 (1992) ; Francis H. Miller & Phihp A. Huvos, Genetic 
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conflict surrounding patients in experimental clinical trials424 and those whose 
DNA is being used for the underlying HGP and HGDP research;425 (4) 
professional and business ethics issues , such as pricing426 and conflicts of 
interest427 and allegations of favoritism on the part of the federal 
Blueprints, Employer Cost-Cutting, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REv. 
369 (1994); Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Employment and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 29 Hous. L. REV. 23 (1992). The scope of the danger of  discrimination based 
upon genetic information is immense for, " [a]t some level, there is something in everyone's 
genome that could get them into trouble eventually. "  Survey, supra note 2, at S15; see also 
Richard Saltus, US Ruling Bars Discrimination Based on Genes, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 1 1 ,  1995, 
at 5. The policy statement by the EEOC barring discrimination based upon genetic predisposition 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act reflects a growing recognition of the societal impact 
of scientific advances. However, this ruling strictly pertains to employment; though most people 
receive insurance coverage through their employer, the decision does not address insurance issues 
directly. Under the EEOC's new interpretation, an employer cannot terminate an employee or 
renege on a job offer because of the results of genetic testing. As for the state level, the California 
legislature has voted to ban all discrimination on the basis of genetic status .  Survey, supra note 
2, at Sl5. 
424. See Margaret Gilhooley, Innovative Drugs, Products Liability, Regulatory 
Compliance, and Patient Choice, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1481 (1994) (addressing the conflict 
between the drug-approval process and patient protection, primarily from the approach primarily 
of patient care). The dangers associated with clinical trials are exemplified in the chemotherapy 
incidents at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute disclosed in spring 1995, the subsequent disclosure 
of numerous other such incidents at Boston-area hospitals, and the patient deaths and 
hospitalizations resulting from the Phase III clinical trial administered by Genetics Institute of 
Cambridge, Massachusetts . See David W. Bates et al. ,  Incidence of Adverse Drug Events and 
Potential Adverse Drug Events: Implications for Prevention, 274 JAMA29 (July 5, 1995); Richard 
A. Knox & Daniel Golden, Doctors Missed Clue to Chemotherapy Overdoses, BoSTON GLOBE, 
June 19, 1995, at 20; Richard A. Knox & Daniel Golden, Drug Dosage was Questioned: Dana.­
Farber Pharmacist Sent Order Back to Doctor in Breast Cancer Case, BOSTON GLOBE, June 19, 
1995, at 1 ,  20; Richard A. Knox & Brian C. Mooney, Hospital Dosage Mistakes Not Rare, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 16, 1995, at I ,  14; Richard A. Knox, Hospital Drugs Hurt I in 15, BoSTON 
GLOBE, July 5,  1995, at I ,  13 Richard A. Knox, State Cites Dana-Farber Failures, BoSTON 
GLOBE, May 3 1 ,  1995, at 2, 28; Ronald Rosenberg, 2 More Hospitalized in Drug Test, BosTON 
GLOBE, June 13 ,  1995, at 45, 64; Michell Zuckoff, Drug Inquiry Targets Absence of Use of Test 
Dose, Waiting Period, BosTON GLOBE, June 15, 1995, at 5 1 .  
425. See generally Knoppers, supra note 164, at 6-22. 
426. The lack of regulatory control despite extensive federal investments and direct 
contributions in the underlying technologies have given rise to controversies over pricing and 
commercialization of technologies, such as the controversies associated with AZT and BRCAl ,  
a gene responsible for approximately half the incidence of hereditary breast cancer or about five 
percent of all breast cancer diagnosis. See, e.g. , Skolnick et al . ,  supra note 341 .  There is ample 
1
and persuasive evidence that price caps should be rejected "because they will have devastating 
effects on innovative new drugs and devices. "  Teisberg et al. ,  supra note 384, at 140; see also 
Norton, supra note 407. Nevertheless, without measures to alleviate the impression that federal 
funds are being used to reap huge commercial returns for the industry and at the expense of public 
health (including more effective and aggressive public relations efforts by the industry), pricing 
controversies will continue to arise. 
427 . . To the extent that genetics technologies will streamline drug consumption by being more effective and through enhanced diagnostic capabilities, there is an obvious potential conflict 
associated with the pharma buy-up of genetics technologies. See Schrage, supra note 73, at 32 
("The . mor� genetic information �hat's generated, . . .  the better tailored and targeted drug therapies will become. Your genetic profile will become an indispensable part of the medications 
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government,428 many generated by the direct involvement of researchers in 
entrepreneurial efforts to raise capital for and commercialize their work·429 ' 
and (5) global issues bearing upon international human rights , such as the 
impact of the patenting430 and commercialization of genetics technologies on 
biodiversity and the environment. 43 1 Ironically, as suggested above, the most 
readily available technologies-genetic diagnostic and screening 
capability-raise many of the most ominous ethical questions . These questions 
include self-selection, also known as eugenics,432 and patient care issues such 
you might be prescribed . ") (citation omitted). 
428. A deluge of such allegations has accompanied the patent granted to Dr. W. French 
Anderson and his colleagues at the NIH on March 2 1 ,  1995, and licensed exclusively to Genetic 
Therapy Inc. of Gaithersburg, Maryland. See supra note 348 and accompanying text. 
429. The genotech industry is, by its very nature, a conglomerate of high science and raw 
venture capitalism, which has given rise to allegations and actual incidents of scienti fie misconduct 
and questionable practices. See, e.g. , US Health Officials Criticize Drug Firms Marketing Ethics, 
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 13,  1994, at 12A (Genentech to stop funding height screening 
because critics say it was a veiled effort to get short kids to take growth hormone; charges that 
Genentech executive paid $1 million in kickbacks to Minneapolis doctor); Robin E. Margolis, 
Regukuory Update, HEALTH SPAN , Oct . ,  1994, at 30 (the Office of Research Integrity at HHS 
brought allegations of scientist misconduct against BioQuest, Glaxo Institute for Molecular 
Biology, and Stanford University, alleging that they misstated credentials and fabricated data to 
obtain grants) . Providing scientists and top executives with equity holdings is the only way to 
attract top-flight people to fledgling firms, which stand a high risk of failure, and the only way 
to do this is to raise capital premised upon success. The end result may be a hard-sell to investors 
and pressure and scientists to embellish is its success. See Kathleen Day, Biotech Executives Find 
Wealth in their Genes , WASH. PosT, April 8, 1994; Fisher, supra note 101 , at 9A (" [T]he 
commercial recruitment of leading scientists from publicly supported universities and federally 
backed genome centers has stirred professional resentment among some geneticists, who argue 
that the rush to commercialize or patent pieces of the genome project will hinder the greater 
discoveries that can come when the scientific community freely shares its discoveries. "). This is 
especially troublesome during a time when reported incidents of scientific fraud are becoming more 
prevalent. See Anthony Flint, US Curbs on Data Fraud Not Expected: Research Institutions Need 
to Control Problem, Head of Federal Panel Says, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 1 1 , 1 995, at 3. 
430. Much controversy has surrounded the commercialization of R&D paid for (if not 
conducted) by the federal government. See, e.g. , Skolnick et al . ,  supra note 341 , at 2-3. The 
international community has been critical of the NIH's efforts to patent gene sequences despite 
the theme of international cooperation associated with HGP. See Malinowski, supra note 89, at 
8; cf. John Richards, International Aspects of Patent Protection for Biotechnology, 4 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. ME DIA & ENT. L.J. 433 (Summer 1993) (citing 23 countries as having specific 
provisions barring the grant of patents for inventions whose publication or exploitation would be 
contrary to morality) . 
43 1 .  See Goldman, supra note 216, at 695; Kirby, supra note 33, at 1 8  ("The greatest 
care is needed now as we face the possibility of reducing, or even eliminating, elements of 
[humans' genetic] diversity . ") .  
432. See generally Malinowski, supra note 39, at 1493- 1 497. How genetics technology 
is used, not the technology itself, is the issue, and the capabilities and temptations �ntroduced by 
genetics technologies are the danger: "To use genetic technology as a way of trymg to control 
what other people will become is not only immoral; it is also to miss the point. The true 
significance of genetic technology, and the power that it is delivering over !if�, i� n�t th�t people 
can be designed from scratch, but that they can break free from some of the hm1tat10ns imposed 
by their inherited genes. "  Survey, supra note 2, at S l7. 
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as insurance coverage and access,  counseling/informed consent requirements, 
and increased demand for in-vitro fertilization and late-term abortion. 433 
Perhaps now, when the consensus among policymakers seems to be that 
health care funding must be cut, 434 the most fundamental ethical and public 
policy question is , "Who is going to pay for the forthcoming generation of 
genotechnologies? " The myriad of genotech products and capabilities 
underscores this question, especially given the fact that there is no cost­
effectiveness requirement for drug approval within the United States. 
Moreover, the American health care culture is such that patients expect 
technologies with any enhanced efficacy over market substitutes to be made 
available, and providers generally have been ready to oblige, regardless of 
cost.435 As stated above, legal liability has made providers especially willing 
to make genetic diagnostic capabilities available. 436 Responsive to such 
pressures , genotech diagnostic products are multiplying and rapidly being 
pushed into commercialization. 
The silence has lingered far too long.437 These issues must be addressed 
and governing regulations introduced and enforced. Although the Office of 
Science and Technology Assessment has proposed the introduction of a 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission,438 what is needed is an 
independent agency.439 To be more precise, what is needed is a counterpart 
433. The National Advisory Council for Human Genome Research has warned "it is 
premature to offer DNA testing or screening for cancer predisposition outside a carefully 
monitored research environment. " Richard Saltus, Plan to Market Tests for Cancer Gene is Hit, 
BoSTON GLOBE, Mar. IO, 1994, at 3. The warning, prompted by successes such as discovery of 
the BRCAl Gene, "noted that many questions remain unresolved, including whether a person is 
better off knowing about a future risk if medicine can do little to prevent the disease, and how 
to avoid genetic discrimination." Id. Oncor, a Maryland genotech company, has announced that 
it will begin offering gene analysis services to families. Id. One implication of this technology 
is increased demand for in-vitro fertilization and late-term abortion. See Survey, supra note 2, at 
Sl 7. See generally Malinowski, supra note 39, at 1451 -54. 
434. See generally PEROT, supra note 390. 
435. Id. at 303. The issue of cost cannot be addressed adequately in this survey article. 
436. See Malinowski, supra note 39 (addressing "wrongful birth"/"wrongful life" actions) . 
437. This silence may be due in part to the distinction made between risk assessment and 
risk management. As explained by Dr. James Dickson, when research (risk assessment) elements 
of the Public Health Service entered themselves too far into the arena of the management of risk, 
there can be political repercussions. Telephone Interview with Dr. James Dickson (Aug. 7, 1994). 
438. National Bioethics Advisory Commission Proposed Charter, 59 Fed. Reg. 155, at 
41584-85 (Aug. 12, 1994) . Several commissions have been formed in the past two decades to 
address bioethics issues. See Jay Katz, Do We Need Another Advisory Commission on Human 
Experimentation ?, HASTINGS CENTER REP. ,  Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 29, 29. Furthermore, NIH and 
the Department of Energy each fund Ethical, Legal , and Social Issues (ELSI) programs, which 
are the largest Federal funding source for bioethics studies. See BIOMEDICAL ETHICS , supra note 
4 1 1 ,  at 8.  These commissions and programs, lacking the independence proposed above, have either 
been unsuccessful or unable to withstand political sea changes. 
439. See Katz, supra note 438, at 29-3 1 .  For discussion of the creation of such a body 
within the United States and an actual proposal to do so in France, see Malinowski, supra note 
39, at 1513-17. Cf Nicholson, supra note 4 1 1 ,  at 4 (addressing debate on whether or not the 
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to the FDA and NIH that has as much regulatory authority as those agencies 
but which is focused on genotechnology and committed to responsible 
gathering and dissemination of information to enhance public awareness of 
genotechnology and the development of needed health policy. 440 This agency 
should be staffed to represent the perspectives and interests of patients, the 
genotech industry, health care providers and educators , and the insurance 
industry. It should be made accountable to the public and Congress and vested 
with enough authority and resources to investigate genotechnologies and 
directly introduce regulations . Resulting mandates could require the inclusion 
of provisions within CRADAs which directly address some of the ethical issues 
identified above by providing added safeguards against irresponsible uses, 
thereby alleviating public concern. 
Of course, the composition and conduct of such an agency would have 
to be carefully monitored to ensure that it functions effectively and is not 
captured by industry or used as a showpiece to stifle dissent from groups such 
as the religious right. It is critical that the recommendations of such an agency 
be crafted carefully and publicized extensively. Although the alliance nature 
of the genotech industry suggests that it will be represented by a powerful 
lobby, the public accountability mandate of the proposed agency and high­
profile nature of genotechnology should safeguard against undue industry 
influence. Tenure limitations on those appointed to guide the proposed agency 
would provide another safeguard. Moreover, this interdisciplinary approach 
to health policy decisionmaking has shown potential in the past-though it 
always has been applied in the context of bioethics. An independent agency 
could reduce the element of political vulnerability evident in the functioning 
of previous United States bioethics commissions which were disbanded before 
accomplishing their stated goals . 441 
Whether through the proposed independent agency or not, the most 
difficult ethics issues accompanying genetics technologies will be addressed, 
and that process will result in regulation. At least one proposal for regulation, 
the Genetic Privacy Act, which was drafted by a team of academics including 
George Annas and introduced during the spring of 1 995, has attracted the 
attention of some state legislatures .442 At the present time, approximately 
twelve states have enacted genetics regulations, including Colorado and New 
proposed European Convention on Bioethics now being prepared by the Council of Europe should 
be used to enforce moral principles) . . . 
. 
440. France already has taken substantial legislative steps to introduce such an mst1tut10n 
into its political system. See Malinowski, supra note 39, at 151 �- 17  · . 
441. See BIOMEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 4 1 1 ,  at 1-5; Malinowski, sup:a note 3�, at 14?8-
99. An exception is the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of B1omed1cal 
and Behavioral Research, in existence from 1974-87, which is responsible for the ban on human 
experimentation without the subject's consent. See id. at 1498-99. 
442. See generally DiChristina, supra note 24, at 18.  
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y ork. 443 Nevertheless, comprehensive legislation must be debated and 
enacted at the national level. As set forth above, these issues simply are too 
controversial and obvious to be ignored much longer without significant 
consequences-especially with more genotechnologies entering commerce. 
Instituting the proposed agency would enhance the possibility of generating 
health policy with foresight and thought, rather than leaving it to be addressed 
by Congress in a reactionary fashion in response to political challenges and 
public emotion.444 
If the commercialization of genotechnology is to be slowed down, it 
should be slowed for policy reasons, not because it is easier to delay market 
availability than to deal with these technologies. Again, in light of the human 
health and other societal implications associated with these technologies , 
ignoring the policy and regulatory questions and shortcomings surrounding 
genotechnology is , at best, irresponsible. Moreover, the reforms suggested 
here might inspire members of the genotech industry to better organize 
themselves , consider more carefully the ethical issues accompanying their 
work, and-in a constructive manner-make proposals which embody the 
industry's insight. 445 
Conclusion 
Since the beginning of this decade, the front-pages of the nation's major 
daily newspapers have continuously been occupied by the genotech industry's 
discoveries .  Nevertheless, health policy responsive to practical applications of 
the resulting technologies is insufficient, especially at the federal level . The 
nation's policymakers have not addressed issues as obvious and important as 
insurance coverage for genotech therapeutics and diagnostics , privacy of 
genetic screening results , and informed consent requirements for genetic 
screening in a practical manner. Thus, the diagnostics and therapeutics that 
the genotech industry has been developing over the past several years , which 
are about to begin reaching the public, are almost as ominous from a health 
policy perspective as they are inspiring to the patients who will benefit. 
Federal policy, to a large extent, has driven the genotech industry to its 
present cross-roads . Policy supportive of genotech R&D has not been followed 
by an adequate regulatory and health policy response to commercialization of 
443 . Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-3-1 104.7 (1994 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2733 
(1990 & Supp. 1995); see also Associated Press, Geneticist Calls for Privacy in Test Results, 
BoSTON GLOBE,  Sept. 30, 1995, at 3. 
444. See, e.g. , supra note 414 (addressing recent challenge to patenting of genetic 
discoveries raised by a coalition of religious leaders and Jeremy Rifkin). 
445. The introduction of regulation in the medical profession had a similar effect, inspiring 
the profession to organize and become central to the health policy of the nation. See generally 
PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982). 
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the resulting products. The industry's  accomplishments in science and health 
care have been achieved by small, entrepreneurial companies aided by the 
endorsement and direct and generous support of the federal government during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s . The federal government's public support of 
HGP also has enabled genotech companies to draw vast amounts of capital 
from the private sector, thereby directly helping to launch the industry. 
Unfortunately, federal policy as well as the pharmas' involvement may have 
created a "false" market built upon inflated and unobtainable expectations, 
resulting in major disappointments and the loss of investor interest. Investment 
capital , taxpayer dollars and, more important, invaluable human capital may 
all have been accessed too early-before the basic research necessary to turn 
genotechnology into safe and effective products was complete. 
Although the market appeal of genotech stock has returned, it is uncertain 
how long it will remain. The insufficiency of the existing regulatory and legal 
infrastructure, along with the potential for public concern about drug 
disappointments and reactionary policymaking, threaten the industry's market 
appeal and future. When the genotech industry completes the metamorphosis 
it is currently undergoing, and the industry's first generation of technologies 
are well within the realm of public awareness, it may be that existing talent 
and venture capital was spent, and the industry closed a tremendous learning 
curve only to have its accomplishments purchased cheaply by pharmas or held 
back by reactionary policymaking. 
At the present time, some element of change is certain. How the genotech 
industry is reshaped , or reshapes itself, will be influenced by federal policy, 
industry's own successes and failures , interest on Wall Street and among 
investors in general , and leadership within the industry. In the midst of the 
present uncertainty, and on the eve of the introduction of practical applications 
of genotechnologies into commerce, there is an opportunity for policymakers 
and industry to have a profound impact on human health. The federal 
government's timely response through the introduction of an adequate 
regulatory infrastructure could accelerate the availability of genotech products, 
enhance and stabilize the investment appeal of the industry, ensure a safe level 
of oversight and responsibility, and avoid some readily apparent potential 
abuses of genotech capabilities. In light of the profound impact of the 
underlying technologies on human health, the United States' economy, and the 
United States ' overall vested interest in the genotech industry, this opportunity 
is accompanied by an obligation to assess the adequacy of existing federal 
policy regarding the commercialization of genotechnologies . Though delays 
in market availability may be necessitated by direct and thoroughly 
contemplated policymaking, such delays should not be tolerated when due to 
regulatory inefficiencies and non-responsiveness. 
The problem is that this opportunity to maximize the benefits from 
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genotechnology in the near future is not discernible without foresight-the same 
level of foresight shared by the scientists and venture capitalists responsible 
for the evolution of the genotech industry and advent of practical applications 
of genotechnologies . Unfortunately, despite the significant role that lawyers 
are playing in the unfolding of the genotech industry, 446 lawmakers 
historically have been blind to such opportunities. As recognized and stated 
by Justice Warren Burger more than a quarter-century ago,  " [t]he law does 
not search out as do science and medicine; it reacts to social needs and 
demands . "447 
Federal policy has expanded and augmented scientific and medical 
research resulting in a great number of new technologies . However, existing 
federal policy is no longer adequate. The gap between genotechnologies and 
the regulatory infrastructure bearing upon the introduction and uses of 
genotechnologies has broadened. Before elected public policymakers can 
thoroughly address and question the uses of genotech therapeutics and 
diagnostics , health policy will be determined by health care providers on a 
technology-by-technology, patient-by-patient basis. Another possibility is that 
public anxiety will trigger short-sighted policymaking which may extinguish 
commercial incentives and generally prevent future commercial applications 
of genotechnology. 
The lack of regulatory foresight and infrastructure should make both the 
genotech industry and those who would benefit from the forthcoming 
generation of genotech therapeutics and diagnostics-all of us-uncomfortable, 
if not downright anxious . Without regulatory foresight, the industry is more 
likely to suffer a broad-sided political attack ,  as exemplified by the recent 
challenge to the patenting of genetics discoveries launched by a coalition of 
some eighty religious leaders-the first substantive political challenge to the 
genotech industry, but certain! y not the last. 448 The danger is that the 
446. Law and lawyers are heavily involved in the genotech industry' s  development, though 
their involvement is reactionary: 
[L)aw and lawyers are playing a significant role in biotechnology's development. 
The case for that proposition is clear. Biotechnological product development has a 
relatively uniform "life cycle, " beginning with "conception" in the research of 
universities and other not-for-profit institutions and "growing" through licensing and 
technological transfer, patenting, and financing, maturing through regulatory 
approval, and sometimes dying an "unnatural" death through product liability, rather 
than in the old-age of obsolescence .  With a life-cycle constrained by legal and 
regulatory events, the law and lawyers play an indispensable role in facilitating every 
stage of the development of biotechnology. 
Robert A. Bohrer, Forward: What is Biotechnology and Why Devote a Law Review Symposium 
to Biotechnology Law?, 55 U. Pm. L. REV. 607, 608-09 (1994) (footnotes omitted) . 
447. Warren E. Burger, Reflections on l.Aw and Experimental Medicine, 15 UCLA L. 
REV. 436, 436 (1%7). 
_448. See Ros:nberg, supra note 414 .  With the absence of regulatory lines (whether drawn 
by legislators or the industry itself), the industry is subject to broad-sided attacks 
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economic and health care contributions of the industry will be delayed, if not 
lost. 
This Article has described the genotech industry and the forthcoming 
generation of products it is developing, highlighted critical legal issues which 
bear upon the industry and its potential contributions to human health, 
identified important choices which policymakers should address,  and offered 
suggestions to help maximize the human health and economic contributions of 
the genotech industry. Hopefully, a reasoned debate of these proposals by 
policymakers will translate into a thoughtful , not reactionary, legal response 
to genotechnology, thus leading to greater market efficiency and, even more 
important, alleviation of human suffering and preservation of human life. In 
light of genotechnology's potential, policymakers must not ignore the choices 
identified throughout this Article, for we all will bear the significant costs of 
their silence. 
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APPENDIX 1:449 
Biotech Drugs Approved by the FDA by March 1 995 
Product Company Application (use) Approval Date 
Actimmune Genentech management of chronic Dec. 1990 
(gamma interferon) granulomatous disease 
Activase Genentech acute myocardial Nov. 1987 
(recombinant alteplase) infarction; acute June 1990 
pulmonary embolism 
Adagen Enzon treatment of infants and March 1990 
(adenosine deaminase) children with severe 
immunodeficiency 
Alferon N Interferon Sciences genital warts Oct. 1989 
(Interferon Alfa-N3, Human 
Leukocyte Derived) 
Betaseron (recombinant Berlex Laboratories/ relapsing, remitting Aug. 1993 
interferon beta 1-B) Chiron Multiple Sclerosis 
Ceredase/Cerezyme Genzyme Type l Gaucher'• disease Apr. 1991 
(alglucerase) (Ceredase) 
May 1994 
(Cerezyme) 
(alglucerase) 
Epogen/Procrit Amgen/Ortbo (Epogen) treatment of June 1989 
(erythropoietin) Biotecb anemia associated with 
chronic renal failure and 
anemia in Retrovir-treated Dec. 1990 
IDV-infected patients/ 
(Procrit) chemotherapy-
associated anemia 
449. Compiled from data provided by Kendall Strategies Inc. 
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Humatrope/Nutropin Eli Lilly/ human growth hormone March 1987 
(somatropin) Genentech, Inc. deficiency in Nov. 1993 
children/(Nutropin) 
growth hormone failure 
due to chronic renal 
insufficiency prior to 
kidney transplantation 
Humulin Eli Lilly diabetes Oct. 1982 
(recombinant human insulin) 
IntronA Schering/Plough hairy cell leukemia; June 1986 
(alpha-interferon) genital warts; AIDS- June 1988 
related Kaposi's sarcoma; Nov. 1988 
non-A, non-B hepatitis; Feb. 1991 
hepatitis B July 1992 
Leukine Jmmunex autologous bone marrow March 1991 
(yeast-derived GM-CSF) transplantation 
Neupogen Amgen chemotherapy-induced Feb. 1991 
(Filgrastim) neutropenia; bone June 1994 
marrow transplant; 
accompanied neutropenia 
Oncaspar Enzon/Rbone- acute lymphoblastic Feb. 1994 
(pegaspargase) Poulenc Rorer leukemia 
Ortboclone OKT3 Ortbo Biotech reversal of acute kidney June 1986 
(Muromonab-CD3) transplant rejection 
Proleukio, IL-2 Chiron treatment of kidney May 1992 
(Aldesleukin) (renal) carcinoma 
Protropin Genentech growth hormone Oct. 1985 
(Somatrem, Human Growth inadequacy 
Hormone) 
Pulmozyme Genentech Cystic Fibrosis Dec. 1993 
(DNase) 
Recombinate Baxter Healthcare/ blood clotting factor vm Dec. 1992 
rAHF/Kogenate Miles for the treatment of Feb. 1993 
(recombinant antihemopbilic hemophilia A 
factor) 
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Recombivax/ Merck/ hepatitis B vaccine July 1986 
Engerix-B SmithKline Beecham Sept. 1989 
(Hepatitis B 
Vaccine 
Recombinant) 
ReoPro Centocor, Inc. reduce acute blood clot Dec. 1994 
(Abciximab) related complications for 
high-risk angioplasty 
patients 
Roferon-A Hoffmann-La hairy cell leukemia; June 1986 
(recombinant Roche AIDS-related Kaposi's Nov. 1988 
alfa-interferon) sarcoma 
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Appendix 11:450 
Significant Biotech Approvals From July 1994 Through June 1995 
Company Product Indication Date 
ALZA DynaCirc CR controlled release July 1994 
formulation of 
antihypenensi ve drug 
Hybritech Tandem PSA detect prostate cancer August 
Molecular Biosystems Albunex ultrasound contrast agent, August 
heart disease 
DNX BIODIGM LDL reduction September 
Quadra Logic Photofrin photosensitive drug for September 
Technologies photodynamic therapy 
SangStat Medical PRA-STAT HLA antibody detection October 
Amgen Neupogen severe chronic December 
neutropenia (3rd 
indication) 
Centocor ReoPro anti-platelet for December 
angioplasty 
Epitope OraSure oral fluid collection for December 
HIV-I antibody testing 
lmmunex Thioplex cancer (tumors) December 
Univax Bioloeics WinRbo SD blood clotting disorders; March 1995 
suppress Rh 
isoimmun.ization in 
pregnancy 
Bio-Technology General Bio-Tropin recombinant growth May 
hormone 
T Cell Sciences TRAX CD4 cell enumeration May 
CD4 Test Kit 
GeneTrak CQuentials transplant donor tissue June 
DR DNA analysis 
Typing Kit 
450. Reproduced from BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 20. 
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NeXstar DaunoXome advanced, AIDS-related, June 
Kaposi's sarcoma 
U.S. Bioscience Ethyol prevent kidney damage in June 
ovarian cancer patients 
treated with cisplatin 
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